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ABSTRACT
When it was originally passed in the United States in 1966, the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) was the broadest and most comprehensive freedom of information law in the world.
Based on the idea that the American people have a right to know about the inner workings of
their government, FOIA allowed anyone in the country to request and obtain access to a wide
variety of records held by federal agencies. Over the past half century, the law has been used by
journalists and other concerned citizens to expose countless instances of waste, fraud, and
mismanagement in government. However, half a century after it was originally created, FOIA no
longer seems to be working as intended, as evidence suggests that the government is releasing
less information to the public than ever before. This project examines FOIA’s development over
the past 50 years, with a particular focus on three recent updates to the law that initially seemed
to fix its problems but ultimately appear to have been ineffective. Why is a law that once worked
so well to increase transparency no longer doing so? And what are the consequences of a more
secretive government? Three explanations for the law’s recent shortcomings are discussed and
analyzed.
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INTRODUCTION
On April 27, 2004, CBS News aired an explosive story on its newsmagazine program 60
Minutes II.1 The organization was the first to share images confirming reports of a series of
human rights abuses that had recently occurred at an American detention camp in Abu Ghraib,
Iraq.2 The images depicted American soldiers assaulting and humiliating Iraqi prisoners on
multiple occasions.3 One picture showed a captive with wires on his hands, who was instructed
to stand on a box and was told that he would be electrocuted if he fell off. Another depicted the
bloodied corpse of a man who had apparently been beaten to death, and others showed naked
captives forced to simulate sex with each other. Even more disturbing was the fact that the
American soldiers in the pictures were smiling, laughing, and giving the camera a thumbs-up.4
The images from Abu Ghraib—12 of them in all—had been leaked to CBS News
following a recent Army investigation into the prison, which had resulted in the suspension of 17
American soldiers.5 The American people were outraged following this revelation; in a poll
conducted a month after the 60 Minutes report aired, three-fourths of Americans said that the
mistreatment of Iraqi detainees was unjustified under any circumstances.6 President George W.
Bush’s approval ranking sank to its lowest point thus far in his presidency, and support for the
war in Iraq plummeted.7 At the time, however, it was still unclear exactly how widespread these

1

Rebecca Leung. “Abuse of Iraqi POWs by GIs Probed.” CBS News, April 27, 2004,
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/abuse-of-iraqi-pows-by-gis-probed/.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.
5
Thom Shanker. “THE STRUGGLE FOR IRAQ: THE MILITARY; 6 G.I.'s in Iraq Are Charged With Abuse Of
Prisoners.” The New York Times, March 21, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/21/world/struggle-for-iraqmilitary-6-gi-s-iraq-are-charged-with-abuse-prisoners.html.
6
Wayne Drash. “Abu Ghraib photos were ‘big shock,’ undermined U.S. ideals.” CNN, May 20, 2009,
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/05/18/detainee.abuse.lookback/index.html?iref=nextin.
7
Ibid.
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human rights abuses really were; were these isolated incidents confined to the walls of Abu
Ghraib, or were similar abuses happening at American prisons throughout Iraq, or even the rest
of the world? Americans wanted answers, but the U.S. government was unwilling to provide
them, arguing that doing so would threaten the national security.8
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), however, was unwilling to accept this
answer. On June 2 of that year, the organization sued the Department of Defense for more
information about the events at Abu Ghraib and any similar instances of abuse at other U.S.
detention facilities.9 The ACLU had formally requested that the department release this
information six months earlier through a freedom of information law, and now it claimed that the
government had broken the law by refusing to do so.10 “The government’s ongoing refusal to
release these records is absolutely unacceptable,” an attorney for the ACLU said in a statement.
Under the law, “[t]he public has a right to know what the government’s policies were, why these
abuses were allowed to take place, and who was ultimately responsible.”11
The lawsuit that began on that day would not end for nearly 13 years. On January 18,
2017, U.S. District Judge Alvin Hallerstein sided with the ACLU and ordered the Defense
Department to release thousands of photographs from Abu Ghraib that it had previously been
trying to hide.12 The images revealed hundreds of additional instances of abuse, torture, murder,
and rape that had occurred at the prison in the early 2000s,13 demonstrating that the cruelty was

8

Seymour M. Hersh. “Torture at Abu Ghraib,” The New Yorker, May 10, 2004,
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2004/05/10/torture-at-abu-ghraib.
9
New York Civil Liberties Union, "U.S. Illegally Withheld Records on Abuses at Abu Ghraib and Elsewhere,
ACLU Charges," press release, June 2, 2004, https://www.nyclu.org/en/press-releases/us-illegally-withheld-recordsabuses-abu-ghraib-and-elsewhere-aclu-charges.
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid.
12
Reuters. “U.S. must release Abu Ghraib photos, judge says.” RawStory, January 18, 2017,
http://www.rawstory.com/2017/01/us-must-release-abu-ghraib-photos-judge-says/.
13
Ibid.
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far more widespread than many Americans had imagined. The executive branch had argued that
these images could endanger American soldiers if made public, but Hallerstein ultimately
ordered their release on the grounds that the government had not presented him with enough
evidence to justify these concerns.14 It appeared that the disclosure of this information might
embarrass the federal government, but it would not put American citizens at risk.
The law that ultimately forced the Department of Defense to release these images is
known as the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The law captures the notion that American
citizens have a fundamental right to know about how their tax dollars are being spent.15 It aims to
increase government transparency by requiring that executive branch agencies release specific
information about their operations to the public in virtually all instances when citizens request
that they do so. Although some categories of information are exempted from disclosure through
the law,16 most of the information that citizens request is eligible to be released, placing a
spotlight on countless government activities that might otherwise be covered in darkness.
FOIA was passed by a unanimous Congress and signed into law by President Lyndon
Johnson in 1966, and over the past half-century it has been used to uncover government
negligence, deception, fraud, and mismanagement on innumerable occasions. In just the past two
years, for example, the law has been used to reveal that air traffic controllers working for the
Federal Aviation Administration are dangerously overworked;17 that the National Security
Agency has continued to surveil Americans’ emails, despite earlier promises that it would stop;18

14

Ibid.
S. 1160. 89th Cong., 2st sess., Congressional Record 112: 13642.
16
Tina Zappile. “Freedom of Information Act.” (2014). 8.
17
Claire Groden. “Secret study says air traffic controllers are dangerously overworked.” Fortune, August 11, 2015,
http://fortune.com/2015/08/11/air-traffic-controllers-study/.
18
Charlie Savage. “File Says N.S.A. Found Way to Replace Email Program.” The New York Times, November 19,
2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/20/us/politics/records-show-email-analysis-continued-after-nsa-programended.html.
15
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that the Department of Defense recently wasted an estimated $500 million contracting for the
construction of military drones;19 and that employees for the Drug Enforcement Administration
were regularly allowed to keep their jobs after serious misconduct, including dealing drugs
themselves.20 By filing FOIA requests for this information, journalists and other watchdog
groups have forced federal agencies to uncover information about their operations that they
almost undoubtedly would have kept secret otherwise. And although not all FOIA inquiries
result in eye-opening discoveries like these, the massive effect the law has had at increasing
government transparency and accountability over the past 50 years is nevertheless undeniable.
Despite FOIA’s many successes, however, there is a growing consensus that the law is no
longer working to increase government transparency as effectively as it once did. It is not
uncommon for requesters to wait months if not years to obtain information that the law mandates
agencies disclose within weeks, and many requesters claim that an increasing proportion of their
FOIA inquiries are being either totally denied or only partially fulfilled. Some evidence supports
these claims that FOIA performance is worsening. In 2016, for example, the Obama
administration cited national security concerns and other considerations to deny a record number
of FOIA requests.21 When these denials were challenged in court, the decisions were overturned
at the highest rate in six years, meaning that the government had been wrong to withhold the
requested information in the first place.22 It appears that federal agencies are doing whatever they

19

Sharon Weinberger. “The Pentagon’s Half-Billion-Dollar Drone Boondoggle.” The Intercept, August 12, 2015,
https://theintercept.com/2015/08/12/pentagons-half-billion-dollar-drone-boondoggle/.
20
Brad Heath and Meghan Hoyer. “DEA agents kept jobs despite serious misconduct” USA Today, September 27,
2015, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/09/27/few-dea-agents-fired-misconduct/72805622/.
21
Ted Bridis. “Obama’s final year: US spent $36 million in records lawsuits” The Associated Press, March 14,
2017, https://www.apnews.com/0b27c4d4b23b436d805328694e58c605/Obama%27s-final-year:-US-spent-$36million-in-records-lawsuits.
22
Ibid.
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can to resist disclosing information through the FOIA—even if that means breaking the law in
the process.
These statistics represent a continuation of what seems to be a notable downward trend in
FOIA performance government-wide throughout the past couple of decades, making it more
challenging for journalists and other interested citizens to hold their government accountable.
For reasons that I explain in the next chapter, it is difficult to compile more robust statistics to
empirically prove that this is the case, yet those who have used the law most frequently in recent
years say that it is undeniable that FOIA performance has indeed worsened. According to the
former president of the Society for Professional Journalists, for example, federal agencies “are
getting more sophisticated in denying, delaying, and derailing requests, using FOIA as a tool of
secrecy, not openness.”23 A reporter for Newsweek similarly said recently that “[w]hat we are
now witnessing in terms of obstructionism and obfuscation [of FOIA] is truly unprecedented.”24
The director of the Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in journalism agreed, noting
that “[m]ore of American life now occurs in shadow. And we cannot know what we do not
know.”25
It appears that the aforementioned examples of FOIA successes are now largely
aberrations rather than the norm, as the government seems to be releasing less information than
ever before. The ACLU’s struggle to obtain information about the human rights abuses at Abu
Ghraib serves as a prime example to illustrate this point, as the Department of Defense only
released the requested images after being ordered to do so by a federal judge—and in a lawsuit

23

Erin C. Carroll, "Protecting the Watchdog: Using the Freedom of Information Act to Preference the Press," Utah
Law Review 2016, no. 2 (2016). 214.
24
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Ensuring Transparency Through the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA): Hearing before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. 114th
Cong., 1st sess., June 2, 2015.
25
Carroll., 206.
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that lasted more than a decade nonetheless. By the time this information became public, the
American people had largely lost interest in the story, as the country’s war in Iraq had ended six
years earlier. A lot had changed, and the country had moved on.
How would Americans have reacted to the new Abu Ghraib images if they had been
released back in 2004? Would the Army have changed its policies governing the treatment of
detainees? Could that have saved lives? Would the 2004 presidential election have turned out
differently? We will never know the answers to these questions, but it is safe to conclude that a
government shrouded in secrecy sometimes has its consequences, and there now seems to be a
growing consensus that FOIA needs to be modified to prevent them. It is clear that the law,
which was the broadest and most expansive of its kind when passed in the 1960s,26 is no longer
living up to its full potential. Paradoxically, FOIA has actually received three major revisions
over the past two decades, all of which were supposedly designed to remedy some of its most
commonly cited problems; the Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, the
OPEN Government Act of 2007, and the FOIA Improvement Act of 2016 all included measures
to improve FOIA performance by increasing agency compliance with the law, expanding the
amount of information that requesters could obtain through it, and streamlining the request and
disclosure processes so that agencies could release information more quickly.27 For reasons that
are unclear, however, these efforts do not appear to have had much of an effect at accomplishing

26

Zappile, 5.
Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, Public Law 104-231. U.S. Statutes at Large 110
(1996): 3048-3054.;
Openness Promotes Effectiveness in Our National Government Act of 2007, Public Law 110-175. U.S. Statutes at
Large 121 (2007): 2524-2531.;
FOIA Improvement Act of 2016, Public Law 114-185. U.S. Statutes at Large 130 (2016): 538.
27
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this goal. How is it possible that such major and promising updates to FOIA have been so
ineffective at solving its biggest problems? I attempt to answer that question in this project.
Existing scholarship on FOIA suggests that recent amendments to the law may have been
admirable efforts to improve it, but that the changing ways in which requesters have used the law
over the past two decades have nevertheless contributed to its declining performance. One
theory, for example, contends that an ever-increasing annual volume of FOIA requests has
overwhelmed agencies, which have not had the financial nor staff resources to process these
requests in a timely manner. Consequently, agencies have taken longer to release information
through the law and may be inclined to deny an increasing proportion of FOIA requests, even
when doing so is illegal. This theory suggests that recent amendments designed to strengthen
FOIA have actually done the opposite by increasing agency responsibilities under the law
without providing the agencies with any additional resources to fulfill these responsibilities; a
requirement that agencies write regular reports detailing their FOIA activities, for example, could
have the inadvertent effect of increasing agency backlogs by taking resources away from
processing requests, even if the requirement was designed to decrease backlogs by increasing
oversight of agency activities.
A second theory suggests that a recent increase in FOIA denials is the result of a
corresponding increase in requests for sensitive national security information that is exempted
from disclosure through the law. The text of FOIA contains a list of nine categories of
information that are exempted from disclosure, and information related to the national security
often fits within one or more of these categories.28 Although many of these exemptions have

28

Tina Zappile. “Freedom of Information Act,” (2014).
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been a part of the law since it was originally passed,29 it is possible that agencies have invoked
them to deny requests more frequently in recent years because of an increased public demand for
national security information. This would seem to make sense in the ongoing aftermath of the
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, which brought national security to the forefront of the
American consciousness; even though Americans may have wanted to know more about their
country’s security at the time, there was also presumably a heightened risk associated with
disclosing this information, leading to an increase in FOIA denials. FOIA backlogs may also
have increased during this period as agency officials spent longer determining whether requested
information was safe to release to the public. And while amendments to the law attempted to
alleviate problems in other ways, they largely avoided the national security issue, which may
have rendered them ineffective.
Both of these theories posit that a changing demand for information from federal
agencies is largely responsible for the apparent decline in FOIA performance over the past two
decades. The first suggests that the volume of FOIA requests has increased so rapidly that federal
agencies have been unable to keep up with demand, and the second suggests that a heightened
volume of requests related to national security issues specifically has allowed agencies to legally
deny more requests by invoking exemptions written into the law. As I explain in subsequent
chapters, there is evidence to support each of these theories. My focus throughout this project,
however, is on testing and supporting a third hypothesis that has not yet been studied by other
scholars. I argue that recent declines in FOIA performance could also be the effects of a supplyside problem, namely that legislators have designed recent updates to the law itself to be

29

Lyndon B. Johnson, "Statement by the President Upon Signing the "Freedom of Information Act"," (The
American Presidency Project: Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, 1966).
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ineffective by deferring policymaking responsibility to unelected judges and government
officials.
My theory is based largely on the work of political scientist George Lovell, who writes
about a series of early-twentieth-century labor statutes in his 2003 book Legislative Deferrals.
These laws initially represented major victories for the increasingly powerful labor movement in
the United States, but they were subsequently reversed by federal judges. In a departure from
traditional legal thinking, Lovell suggests that lawmakers intentionally designed the statutes to
achieve this anti-labor outcome by writing their legislation in a way that would invite judicial
invalidation. By predicting that the courts would strike down their pro-labor statutes, the author
argues that legislators would receive an electoral benefit of passing legislation sought by their
constituents, but that they were also essentially able to achieve anti-labor laws while altogether
avoiding the political backlash that would normally result from doing so, as the brunt of criticism
from angry constituents was directed at unelected judges instead. This is a process that Lovell
calls a legislative deferral.
In this project, I apply this concept of a legislative deferral to the dynamics of FOIA and
explore whether members of Congress may have intentionally designed recent amendments to
the law to worsen FOIA performance, despite their public proclamations that the amendments
were intended to do the opposite; although there are many benefits to increasing government
transparency, doing so also has the potential to undermine other interests that legislators may
have, such as safeguarding the national security or protecting the executive branch from
additional public scrutiny. It would therefore make sense for legislators to pass laws that appear
to increase government transparency, thereby allowing them to satisfy their constituents and
preserve their chances at reelection, while actually aiming to achieve the opposite effect. I

9

suggest that members of Congress have written their FOIA amendments to legislatively defer
important policy decisions to judges and/or bureaucrats in federal agencies, who they anticipate
will interpret the amendments in a way that ultimately results in the release of fewer records.
My argument is complex and multifaceted, as is the current state of FOIA operations
throughout the federal government. However, I explain both in greater detail throughout the
remainder of this thesis. I start in chapter 1 by outlining FOIA’s history over the past 50 years
and its development from a law that was once groundbreaking to one that now lags behind
dozens of others throughout the rest of the world. I also share additional information about
current FOIA performance and why journalists and other requesters claim that it is no longer
working as intended, along with information about why compiling statistics to prove that this is
the case is often challenging.
In chapter 2, I summarize existing explanations for FOIA’s problems and discuss
additional scholarship that forms the basis of my own theory, which I test throughout the project.
I start by describing in greater detail the theories that explain recent declines in FOIA
performance as a result of either a lack of funding or an increase in demand for sensitive national
security information. Then, to elaborate on my own, original hypothesis, I provide a lengthier
summary of George Lovell’s legislative deferral hypothesis and discuss how his scholarship
connects to my own. I subsequently outline a modified version of Lovell’s model that I use in
later chapters to determine whether legislative deferrals occurred with recent FOIA amendments.
The following three chapters are case studies in which I test my hypothesis on the three
most recent amendments to the law. In chapter 3, I examine 1996’s Electronic Freedom of
Information Act, which was passed around the same that complaints about the law initially
appeared to intensify. Specifically, I look at a provision within the amendment that newly
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required federal agencies to expedite the processing of some inquiries made by journalists and
other representatives of the news media. This provision was supposedly designed to help
journalists, in their work on behalf of the American people, obtain requested records more
quickly, but I ultimately conclude that it was actually designed to do the opposite. I argue that
lawmakers deferred to federal agencies by writing this provision in a way that seemed to be
beneficial but in reality was not.
In chapter 4, I use the OPEN Government Act of 2007 as another case study with which I
test my legislative deferral hypothesis. After explaining how FOIA policy changed in the United
States following 9/11, I outline the development of the OPEN Government Act legislation.
Because I do not find any evidence to suggest that members of Congress intentionally left
ambiguous statutes in their bill, I conclude that a legislative deferral did not occur in this
instance. I then discuss a few explanations for why this may be the case.
Chapter 5 is my final case study, in which I use the deliberations surrounding the FOIA
Improvement Act of 2016 to test my theory. I start by discussing the development of FOIA
policy throughout the presidency of Barack Obama, and I explain that, despite his promises to
make his administration the most transparent in American history, it does not appear that this
occurred. I then examine the development of a provision within the FOIA Improvement Act that
codified an Obama policy encouraging agencies to adopt a “presumption of openness” when
processing FOIA requests. Although it appears that this measure would improve FOIA
performance, there is evidence to suggest otherwise, which allows me to conclude that a
legislative deferral occurred in this instance. This provides further support for my hypothesis that
members of Congress have designed FOIA amendments to fail to accomplish their stated goals.

11

Finally, in the project’s conclusion, I summarize and discuss the implications of my
findings. I explain that my hypothesis is supported in two of my three case studies, which allows
me to conclude that my argument has merit but may not be the only explanation for why FOIA
does not appear to be functioning properly. I then discuss the implications of my research, with a
particular focus on how FOIA policy may change now that President Donald Trump is in office.
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- 1 50 YEARS OF FOIA
When the Freedom of Information Act was initially signed into law in 1966, it was the
first information law of its kind in the world,1 giving American citizens more access to
information about their government than ever before. However, it no longer seems as
revolutionary fifty years later; a recent comparison of the strength of similar laws in more the
100 countries found that the U.S. version of FOIA ranked 45th, meaning that it is now weaker
than dozens of laws that it once inspired.2 Federal agencies seem to be withholding more
information from the American public than at any point since FOIA was created, and the
information they do release often takes years to be sent to those who requested it. As I explained
in the previous chapter, in this project I attempt to find out why this is the case.
This chapter is dedicated to setting the stage for my analysis. I outline FOIA’s history and
explain how it has evolved over the past half-century before turning to an extended discussion of
contemporary problems with the law. I provide some empirical evidence to support the notion
that the law is no longer working as intended and then explain that recent amendments to FOIA
supposedly designed to facilitate the release of information appear to have failed to do so.
Although a lack of sufficient data makes it difficult to empirically prove that this is the case, I
subsequently contend that the stated experiences of journalists and others who use the law on a
regular basis provide enough evidence to support the claim that these amendments have at the
very least been ineffective.

1

Tina Zappile. “Freedom of Information Act.” (2014). 5.
Erin C. Carroll, "Protecting the Watchdog: Using the Freedom of Information Act to Preference the Press," Utah
Law Review 2016, no. 2 (2016). 215.
2
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FOIA’s History and Development
The Freedom of Information Act was signed into law on July 4, 1966 by President
Lyndon Johnson. It allowed any person in the country, regardless of his citizenship status, to
request and obtain previously unpublished records on any topic from the federal government,
without explanation or justification.3 By doing so, it promised to make the government more
transparent and give the American people the information they needed to fully participate in their
democracy.
It had taken more than a decade of deliberations in Congress for FOIA to finally make it
to the White House. In 1955, Representative John E. Moss (D-CA) became the chair of a new
House Special Subcommittee on Government Information, which became known as the Moss
Subcommittee.4 Moss had recently witnessed government secrecy firsthand by serving on a
House committee investigating the federal Civil Service and Post Office,5 and, following public
disapproval with the secretive and problematic tactics of the FBI during the McCarthy era, he
was able to capitalize on a widespread mistrust of government to convince his peers that the
creation of a new subcommittee would be worthwhile.6 In its first formal report, the
subcommittee expressed the need for new legislation to make the government more transparent.
It warned that “a paper curtain has descended over the Federal Government…an attitude which
says that we, the officials, not you, the people, will determine how much you are to be told about
your own Government.”7 A new law was needed to change the status quo in Washington.

3

Wendy Ginsberg, "The Freedom of Information Act (Foia): Background, Legislation, and Policy Issues,"
(Congressional Research Service, 2014). 1.
4
Ginsberg, 3.
5
Sam Archibald, "The Early Years of the Freedom of Information Act. 1955 to 1974," PS: Political Science and
Politics 26, no. 4 (1993). 726.
6
Zappile, 2.
7
Archibald, 726.
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Despite its best efforts, the Moss Subcommittee was not able to garner enough support
for such a law until 1966. On June 20 of that year, the bill would unanimously pass in the House
of Representatives by a vote of 308-0.8 Representative Moss had been in the hospital recovering
from illness, but he was able to escape to the House floor to speak on behalf on his prized
legislation,9 which he had been working on in some capacity for nearly his entire time in
Congress.10 “[A]s our population grows in numbers,” he said in his opening remarks, “it is
essential that it also grow in knowledge and understanding. We must remove every barrier to
information about—and understanding of—Government activities consistent with our security if
the American public is to be adequately equipped to fulfill the ever more demanding role of
responsible citizenship.”11 Moss believed that public access to government information was an
essential component of a healthy democracy, and that American citizens could only participate in
their democracy responsibly and fully if they had an accurate understanding of how their
government operated.
Several other representatives who spoke on behalf of FOIA made similar arguments
about the law’s importance. “[O]ur democratic society,” Rep. Donald Rumsfeld (R-IL) said, “is
based upon the participation of the public who must have full access to the facts of Government
to select intelligently their representatives to serve in Congress and in the White House. This
legislation provides the machinery for access to government information necessary for an
informed, intelligent electorate.”12 Rep. Joe Skubitz (R-KS) echoed these comments, saying that
democracy “can only operate effectively when the people have the knowledge upon which to
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base an intelligent vote.”13 And Rep. Bob Dole (R-KS) concluded that “[l]ogically, there is little
room for secrecy in a democracy.”14
Many representatives also argued that the American people had a constitutional right to
know about the activities of their government. “Inherent in the right of free speech and of free
press is the right to know,” Rep. Moss said.15 Similarly, Rep. Cornelius Gallagher (D-NJ) said
that FOIA would “give…meaning to the freedom of speech amendment.”16 Gallagher suggested
that passing FOIA was more important than ever before because the U.S. government was
becoming “larger and more complex,” leading to an increase in secrecy that threatened American
freedoms and made the government harder to control.17 Rep. Garner Shriver (R-KS) agreed,
saying that “the check [on government power] of public awareness must be sharpened” in
response to an increasingly powerful federal government.18 Rep. David King (D-UT) also
mentioned this idea in his remarks, saying that a “mushrooming bureaucracy” was presenting a
threat to the “cherished liberties and fundamental rights” of the nation’s citizens.19 “[T]he
freedoms that we daily exercise,” he said, “were not easily obtained nor are they easily retained.
Inroads and encroachments—be they overt or covert, be they internal or external—must be
effectively guarded against. For freedoms once diminished are not readily revitalized; freedoms
once lost are recovered with difficulty.”20 He saw FOIA as a way to protect these freedoms.
Rep. King also used examples from American history to make his case for FOIA. He
explained that the American colonies had often “demonstrated a formidable hostility toward
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those who earnestly believed that the rank-and-file citizenry was entitled to a full accounting by
its governing bodies.”21 At the time, he said, “[t]he power that knowledge provides was fully
understood; by some it was feared.”22 King explained that the country’s founding fathers were
aware of this power and knew that it could be used to keep government officials accountable in
the new nation. He shared a quote by James Madison that emphasized this point:
Knowledge will forever govern ignorance, and a people who mean to be their own
governors, must arm themselves with the power knowledge gives. A popular government
without popular information or means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or a
tragedy or perhaps both.23
Nearly 150 years after Madison had written this, American citizens and their representatives
were still fearful of government secrecy, especially as they continued to combat the spread of
communist ideology in the Cold War. “It is necessary that free people be well informed,” Rep.
Jack Edwards (R-AL) said, “and we need only to look behind the Iron Curtain to see the unhappy
consequences of the other alternative.”24
There was thus consensus among representatives that increasing access to information
was consistent with American values and was necessary to preserve the strength of the country’s
democracy, particularly as the federal bureaucracy continued to grow and the communist threat
intensified. At the time, the only freedom of information law in the U.S. was a portion of the
1946 Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which members of the Moss Subcommittee claimed
had developed into a tool of secrecy for government officials, who were taking advantage of its
overly vague statutes to withhold information from the public.25 As a result, Rep. King
concluded that
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…the overall intent of the Congress, as embodied in the…[APA], has not been realized
and the specific safeguards erected to guarantee the right of public access to the
information stores of Government appear woefully inadequate to perform the assigned
tasks. The time is ripe for a careful and thoughtful reappraisal of the issues inherent in the
right to know concept; the time is at hand for a renewal of our dedication to a principle
that is at the cornerstone of our democratic society.26
Other representatives agreed. Rep. Edward Gurney (R-FL) pointed out that even members of
Congress were unable to use the APA to access “such routine information as lists of…the
employees” of nonsecurity departments and agencies, putting their ability to govern effectively
in jeopardy.27 Rep. Shriver said that Americans were “fight[ing] daily battles just to find out how
the ordinary business of their government [was] being conducted.”28 FOIA had the potential to
change that.
In addition to closing loopholes that allowed government officials to withhold
unnecessary amounts of information, FOIA went a step further than the APA by removing a
requirement that requesters justify their need for information.29 “[T]his legislation,” said Rep.
Melvin Laird (R-WI), “marks a historic breakthrough for freedom of information in that it puts
the burden of proof on officials of the bureaus and agencies of the executive branch who seek to
withhold information from the press and public, rather than on the inquiring individual who is
trying to get essential information as a citizen and taxpayer.”30 Representative Edwards said that
this measure “should have been approved and signed into law long ago as a means of giving the
American citizen a greater measure of protection against the natural tendencies of the
bureaucracy to prevent information from circulating freely.”31
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And now, after more than a decade of work by the Moss Subcommittee, FOIA was
finally going to become a reality. “During these 10 years,” Rep. Florence Dwyer (R-NJ) said,
“we have conducted detailed studies, held lengthy and repeated hearings, and compiled hundreds
of cases of the improper withholding of information by Government agencies. Congress is
ready,” she concluded, “…to reject administration claims that it alone has the right to decide
what the public can know.”32 Although Democratic representative John Moss had advocated
most strongly for the bill, it had fervent supporters on both sides of the aisle; the Republican
Policy Committee, for example, issued a statement urging “prompt enactment” of the bill to help
eliminate the “screen of secrecy which now exists…[as] a barrier” to transparency.33 It seemed
that everyone could agree on FOIA’s importance, and the bill was indeed subsequently passed by
a unanimous House.34 It had already been passed by a voice vote in the Senate,35 and it was thus
sent to President Johnson’s desk for a signature.
President Johnson signed the legislation about two weeks later, but he was markedly less
enthusiastic about FOIA becoming law than the senators and representatives who had advocated
for it. According to his press secretary at the time, Johnson “had to be dragged kicking and
screaming to the signing ceremony” because he “hated the very idea of the Freedom of
Information Act…hated the thought of journalists rummaging in government closets…[and]
hated them challenging the official view of reality.”36 As a result, he signed the law with little
fanfare on his Texas ranch,37 and only after the Justice Department persuaded him to do so.38
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Still, he feigned approval of the law in his signing statement. “I signed this measure with a deep
sense of pride,” he wrote, “that the United States is an open society in which the people's right to
know is cherished and guarded.39 He also said that “[n]o one should be able to pull curtains of
secrecy around decisions which can be revealed without injury to the public interest.40 Johnson
would continue, though, to explain that a variety of records would fall outside this category and
be exempt from disclosure because they contained sensitive national security information, for
instance, that could be harmful in the wrong hands.41 (For a complete list of information
exempted from the law today, see Table 1.1 on the next page).
In subsequent years, Johnson and the agencies he supervised would try their best to resist
FOIA wherever possible. All 27 federal agencies and departments that had testified about the
legislation during the deliberation process had opposed it,42 and, once it became law, agencies
were frequently able to bend the rules because there were no mechanisms within it to force
agency compliance.43 Additionally, there was no time frame within which agencies had to
respond to FOIA requests or release records, so it took an average of 33 days to respond to
requests and several additional months for requesters to actually obtain materials,44 which was
certainly not what the initial drafters of the bill had envisioned. And because there was no
penalty for federal employees who broke the law by failing to release information at all,45 some
people never received the records they requested, even when they had a legal right to do so.
However, even with this resistance, FOIA was still successful in changing national policy, and it
set a new precedent for freedom of information in both the United States and the rest of the
39
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world.46 At the time, only Sweden and Finland had any laws similar to FOIA, and neither
country’s law was as broad.47 John Moss’s vision of a transparent U.S. government was
becoming a reality.

Table 1.1: FOIA Exemptions 48
Exemption

Definition

Exemption 1

Protects classified national defense or foreign policy information, based on criteria established by
Executive orders [Note: Executive Orders are issued to specify each President’s National Security
Policy; the current one in effect is Executive Order 13,526 dated 12/29/2009, as President Donald
Trump has not yet issued an Order detailing his own policy.]

Exemption 2

Protects internal personnel rules and practices of an agency based on two categories:
(a) trivial or “low 2” information
(b) more substantial or “high 2” information

Exemption 3

Protects information prohibited from disclosure by another federal statute, whether prohibited
without exception or provided criteria for which to decide

Exemption 4

Protects trade secrets and confidential commercial or financial information

Exemption 5

Protects agency memorandums or letters which would not be available outside court proceedings

Exemption 6

Protects information in personnel, medical, and similar files if it “would constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy”

Exemption 7

Protects law enforcement records if they could
(A) interfere with enforcement proceedings
(B) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or adjudication
(C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
(D) disclose the identity of a confidential source (including those involved in national security
intelligence investigations)
(E) disclose techniques, procedures, or guidelines for law enforcement investigations or
prosecutions, including if disclosure could lead to circumvention of the law
(F) endanger the life or physical safety of any individual

Exemption 8

Protects agencies responsible for regulating or supervising financial institutions and the
information they gather about those institutions

Exemption 9

Geological and geophysical information, including maps and wells
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Early Developments
Although the purpose of FOIA to increase access to government information remains the
same as it was 50 years ago, the law has evolved through a variety of amendments, executive
orders, and court rulings.49 These changes reflect attempts by lawmakers and judges to balance
demands for transparency and accountability with concerns about protecting state secrets and
other sensitive information.50 The first change to FOIA occurred in 1974, in response to concerns
about government secrecy following the Watergate scandal.51 Congress overrode a veto by
President Gerald Ford to pass the Privacy Act Amendments, which significantly strengthened the
law. The revisions specified within the amendments essentially transformed FOIA into the law
that the Moss Subcommittee had initially envisioned by placing new requirements on agencies to
ensure that they released information in a timely manner.52 Agencies were newly required to
respond to FOIA requests within ten working days, with the opportunity to receive a ten-day
extension in “unusual circumstances.”53 Additionally, the law prohibited agencies from charging
requesters exorbitant fees for the processing of records and information, and the scope of records
exempted from disclosure became more limited.54 Thus, government information became
considerably more accessible, promising to make the government itself more transparent. In his
veto message, President Ford called the legislation “unconstitutional,” “unworkable,” and
“unrealistic” and expressed his concern that it would place an exorbitant administrative burden
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on federal agencies.55 By overriding this veto, though, Congress signaled that it disagreed,
perhaps in part because it received substantial pressure from the newspaper industry to do so.56
Two years later, in 1976, Congress passed the Government in the Sunshine Act to clarify
further the terms and exemptions of the law.57 That same year, a concept that became known as
glomarization was established by two rulings in the DC District Court over FOIA decisions.58
Glomarization essentially gave federal agencies the ability to deny the disclosure of records for
nearly any reason, regardless of whether or not the requested records were related to an existing
exemption in the law.59 It was first used after the sinking of the Glomar Explorer submarine in
1968. When the incident was reported by the press, several journalists submitted FOIA requests
to the CIA asking that it release all its records related to the incident, but these requests were
denied on the grounds that the requested information supposedly did not exist. Two journalists,
who suspected that the agency was illegally trying to hide the documents, appealed these denials,
but the Court ultimately decided to uphold them. The Court stated that the CIA had a right to
deny the existence of the documents because it had a “compelling reason” to do so.60 These
decisions set a precedent for future court cases related to FOIA decisions, as glomarization was
often used to keep requesters in the dark about the existence of similarly sensitive materials. Any
information related to national security, a person’s personal privacy, or confidential government
informants allowed agencies to successfully invoke this tool for nearly a decade.61 However, the
Department of Justice, which administers FOIA, eventually limited its application through
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subsequent updates to the department’s regulations that required agencies to invoke a specific
exemption written into the law when making denials.62
In 1982, President Ronald Reagan issued an executive order that further facilitated the
withholding of sensitive records.63 These measures became more permanent in 1986 with the
passage of the Freedom of Information Reform Act.64 The act introduced exclusions into FOIA
to protect information in cases when glomarization was insufficient, which had become
especially important to lawmakers after the DOJ’s recent policy changes that had limited
glomarization’s utility. Agencies no longer had to argue that they had compelling reasons to
deny the existence of particular records if the records fell within one of three exclusion
categories now written into the law (for a complete list of exclusions, see Table 1.2).65 As long as
agencies consulted with the Department of Justice’s Office of Information and Privacy (OIP;
now known as the Office of Information Policy) beforehand, courts were instructed to
automatically deny FOIA appeals without indicating whether an exclusion had even been
invoked, thereby keeping the existence of the requested records a secret.66 Because the OIP was
also a federal agency, it was now possible to keep sensitive information entirely within the
executive branch, as judges did not have the power to overrule agency decisions. As a result,
federal agencies had more power than ever before to administer FOIA as they saw fit.
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Table 1.2: FOIA Exclusions 67
Exclusion

Definition

(c)(1)
Exclusion

Allows an agency to deny the existence of records related to an ongoing investigation if the
subject of that investigation is not yet aware of ongoing government actions, therefore,
recognizing the existence of the records would likely cause harm by impeding the investigation
(this extends protections provided by Exemption 7(A))

(c)(2)
Exclusion

Allows federal agencies to deny the existence of records that pertain to confidential informants in
criminal proceedings, applicable prior to an informant being officially recognized as a source
(this extends protections provided by Exemptions 7(B) 7(C))

(c)(3)
Exclusion

Allows the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to protect records considered classified for
purposes of intelligence, counterintelligence, or being related to international terrorism

The first twenty years of FOIA’s existence were thus characterized by efforts of
competing coalitions to strike a fair balance between increasing government transparency and
protecting national security interests. Members of the executive branch consistently opposed
efforts to make the law stronger and actively advocated for measures that would make it weaker.
Members of Congress, on the other hand, tended to support efforts to strengthen FOIA, perhaps
because the law did not increase oversight of their own activities. Disagreements between
Democrats John Moss and Lyndon Johnson over the law’s expansiveness help demonstrate that
government transparency was not a strictly partisan issue, and FOIA thus had supporters and
opponents on both sides of the political aisle. The same pressures from these competing factions
would continue to influence FOIA’s development over the next 30 years. However, in what
appeared to be major victories for transparency advocates, the three most significant updates to
the law within this timeframe would all appear to share a common goal of facilitating the release
of information rather than restricting it. Next, I briefly summarize each of these updates before
turning to a discussion about how and why they appear to have ultimately failed at
accomplishing this important goal, putting the ideal of a transparent government in jeopardy.
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The Electronic Freedom of Information Act of 1996
In 1996, FOIA’s reach was expanded considerably when President Bill Clinton signed
the Electronic Freedom of Information Act (E-FOIA).68 The main purpose of the act was to make
government information more accessible through FOIA requests.69 It did so by requiring
agencies to make all of their records available electronically and by making digital records, such
as emails, subject to disclosure through the law.70 This not only provided requesters with the
opportunity to access a wider variety of government information but also facilitated the process
of doing so. There was also a provision that provided for expedited processing of certain FOIA
requests that were deemed to be of particular interest to the public, which meant that some
records would be released more quickly as well.71 However, in anticipation of an increase in
requests as a result of these changes, the time requirement for agencies to respond to general
requests was doubled from ten to 20 days, so it would often take longer for requesters to receive
information.72 Additionally, Congress did not provide agencies with any extra funding to help
them process these requests, so backlogs would eventually start accumulating.73
In addition to efforts to expand the law’s reach, E-FOIA also included measures designed
to facilitate oversight of agency compliance with the law. Agencies were newly required to track
and report data about their FOIA activities, including information about their requests, appeals,
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backlogs, and response times.74 The law also gave the attorney general the ability to monitor
agency reporting and submit reports summarizing his or her findings to both Congress and the
Justice Department, providing them with additional information about agency activities.75 These
measures appeared to signal that agencies would no longer be able to get away with blatantly
ignoring the law like they sometimes had before. As a result, FOIA seemed closer than ever to
being implemented in the way that John Moss and his contemporaries had initially intended.

OPEN Government Act of 2007
The next major change to FOIA came in 2007, when the OPEN Government Act was
signed into law by President George W. Bush. However, it was preceded by a few more minor
changes in the early 2000s, which were made in response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks on U.S. soil.76 President Bush issued an executive order in November of that year that
further limited public access to the records of former presidents,77 and two months later he
signed a bill known as the Intelligence Authorization Act that limited the ability of foreign
governments to access U.S. government information.78 However, this had little effect on making
the law more restrictive for American citizens.
Another of Bush’s measures, though, did have this effect; Bush instructed Attorney
General John Ashcroft to issue a memorandum to all federal agencies encouraging them to
carefully consider national security interests when determining whether to release information
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though FOIA.79 This meant that many records that previously would have been disclosed through
the law no longer were, creating an obvious barrier to transparency. In response to criticism
about this measure, President Bush would later sign an executive order designed to improve
procedural aspects of FOIA such as the time it took agencies to process requests,80 but it was
clear to many that a more substantial update to the law was still necessary. This update
eventually came in the form of the OPEN Government Act.
Also known as the Openness Promotes Effectiveness in our National Government Act
(hence the acronym OPEN), the law furthered E-FOIA’s mission to increase agency oversight by
establishing the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS), which now serves as the
FOIA ombudsman.81 The OGIS was tasked with reviewing agencies’ FOIA policies, overseeing
their compliance with the law, and recommending policy changes to both Congress and the
President.82 The act also required agencies to provide tracking information about the status of
FOIA requests and forced agencies to waive request processing fees if they failed to respond
within the required 20-day timeframe.83 All of these measures seemed to be designed to
incentivize agencies to process requests—and get information into the hands of the American
people—more quickly.
The act also expanded FOIA’s definition of the “news media” to include websites and
bloggers.84 The law had long exempted members of the news media from paying request
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processing fees because of their role in disseminating important information to the public,85 and
the expansion of this category served to encourage journalists from nontraditional news outlets to
make more FOIA requests. However, it is important to recognize that, just like with E-FOIA a
decade earlier, Congress did not accompany this and other efforts to increase the accessibility of
government records with a corresponding increase in funding to agencies to support their added
responsibilities. Even the OGIS, the federal agency that emerged from the act, did not receive
any funding on which to operate.86 As I will explain in greater detail in the next chapter, this
unfunded mandate is a main reason why some scholars believe that the OPEN Government Act,
despite its best intentions, has ultimately proven to be unsuccessful. Nevertheless, the act as a
whole still seemed to represent a clear effort by Congress to make FOIA stronger.

FOIA Improvement Act of 2016
On his first day in office in January 2009, President Barack Obama issued a
memorandum on FOIA reform to the heads of the executive branch agencies charged with
implementing the law. In it, he reiterated his campaign promise to make his administration the
most transparent in American history and ordered agencies to “adopt a presumption in favor of
disclosure” when responding to FOIA requests.87 “In the face of doubt, openness prevails,” he
wrote.88 “The Government should not keep information confidential merely because public
officials might be embarrassed by disclosure, because errors and failures might be revealed, or
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because of speculative or abstract fears.”89 Obama also instructed Attorney General Eric Holder
to develop new federal guidelines for FOIA implementation, which Holder published two
months later.90 Although these early efforts to increase transparency seemed promising, many
critics now suggest that they did not actually have much of an effect at improving FOIA
processing.91
Despite his critics, though, President Obama undoubtedly deserves credit for signing
another update to FOIA into law in June 2016. Passed just nine months prior to the publication of
this thesis, the FOIA Improvement Act of 2016 is still so recent that there does not appear to be
any scholarly literature on it yet nor any data about its effectiveness. However, its efforts to make
FOIA stronger appear to be of the same magnitude as those of E-FOIA and the OPEN
Government Act that preceded it, making it another major amendment to the law. The act
codified the presumption of openness that Obama initially instructed agencies to adopt in his
2009 policy memo,92 giving additional weight to this requirement and making it harder for future
presidents to reverse. It instructed agencies to withhold information from requesters only when
they “reasonably foresee” that “disclosure would harm an interest protected by an exemption”
written into the law or “disclosure is prohibited by law.”93
In addition, the law placed further limits on agencies’ ability to assess fees for the
processing of requests, encouraged collaboration between agencies to strengthen FOIA

89

Ibid.
U.S. Department of Justice, Department of Justice Guide to the Freedom of Information Act: President Obama’s
FOIA Memorandum and Attorney General Holder’s FOIA Guidelines,
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/foia-memorandum.pdf.
91
Russell Paul La Valle, “Obama’s legacy will be one of secrecy and hostility toward the press,” The Hill,
December, 19, 2016, http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/the-administration/311026-obamas-legacy-will-be-oneof-secrecy-and-hostility.
92
FOIA Improvement Act of 2016, Public Law 114-185. U.S. Statutes at Large 130 (2016): 538.
93
U.S. Office of Information Policy. "OIP Summary of the FOIA Improvement Act of 2016." The U.S. Department
of Justice, https://www.justice.gov/oip/oip-summary-foia-improvement-act-2016.
90

30

administration, and required agencies to submit more comprehensive annual reports
summarizing their FOIA activities.94 It also limited the use of some FOIA exemptions, expanded
the role of the OGIS as a FOIA ombudsman, and required agencies to post more of their records
online in an easily-accessible format.95 All of these changes appear to have been made in
response to criticism by FOIA requesters, who were increasingly complaining that the law no
longer seemed to be serving its purpose of making the U.S. government more transparent.
It is likely that the FOIA Improvement Act’s effectiveness will not be measurable for at
least another few years. However, despite all the seemingly beneficial provisions within it, the
act seems unlikely to reverse a trend that appears to have started a couple of decades ago in
which efforts to improve FOIA performance have seemingly had the opposite effect of
worsening it; as I explain moving forward, all of Congress’s aforementioned efforts to close
loopholes, increase agency oversight, and make FOIA more expansive counterintuitively seem to
have resulted in a law that allows federal agencies to withhold more information from the
American people than ever before, and the FOIA Improvement Act does not appear to be any
different. In the next section, I discuss the current problems with FOIA in greater detail. Then, in
this chapter’s conclusion, I outline my plan for testing theories that could explain why these
problems exist in the first place.

Contemporary Challenges
In September 2012, Bloomberg News published an article on its website detailing the
results of a study it had completed on FOIA. Three months earlier, the organization had
submitted FOIA requests for information about the travel costs of top government officials at 57
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different federal agencies, and only eight responded to these requests within the 20-day window
required by the law.96 Of the 20 cabinet-level agencies to which the organization submitted
requests, just one—the Small Business Administration—responded on time. By the time
Bloomberg published its article, it had only received about half of the records it requested.97 An
official from the State Department contacted the organization saying that one request would not
be processed for nearly a year.98 It was clear that FOIA was not supposed to be working this
way.
By publishing the results of its inquiries, Bloomberg helped to expose an alarming level
of opaqueness in American governance; its experience with FOIA is far from unusual, as
agencies regularly ignore, delay, or outright deny FOIA requests, even when they have no legal
basis for doing so. According to the Associated Press, the Obama Administration set a new
record in 2014 for censoring or denying FOIA requests and took longer to release records that
were not denied.99 Perhaps more alarming is the fact that nearly a third of FOIA denials were
reversed when appealed by requesters, signaling that agencies regularly failed to enforce the law
appropriately in the first place.100 This means that the American people now know less about the
inner workings of their government than they have in the past, limiting their ability to understand
how their tax dollars are being spent and their power to subsequently use this information to hold
government officials accountable. As Tom Rosenstiel, the former director of the Pew Research
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Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism, recently said, “[m]ore of American life now
occurs in shadow. And we cannot know what we do not know.”101
In an attempt to understand why FOIA performance has worsened, a nonprofit known as
the Center for Effective Government recently published a review of the 15 federal agencies that
received the most FOIA requests in FY2012. According to the report, these agencies, including
the Department of State, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Defense,
collectively received more than 90% of all FOIA requests that year, and only eight received
passing grades on the organization’s scorecard.102 In other words, seven agencies failed to meet
the Center’s basic requirements for effectively implementing the law. The organization evaluated
the agencies across three categories, (1) the processing times and eventual outcomes of the
requests they received, (2) the effectiveness of their disclosure rules designed to increase
transparency, and (3) the user-friendliness of their websites to facilitate the process of making
requests.103 In each category, at least one agency received an “A” grade, signaling that the
organization’s grading criteria were not too strict, but no agency received above a “B” overall,
indicating that they all had room for improvement.104 The Department of Homeland Security,
which receives by far the most FOIA requests each year, received the second-lowest grade in the
review, meaning that Americans had exceptional difficulty accessing some of the records they
wanted most.105
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As I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, even though FOIA was the most
comprehensive information law in the world in 1966,106 that is no longer the case; a recent study
found that FOIA is now weaker than comparable laws it once inspired in more than 40 other
countries,107 and another study conducted around the same time resulted in similar findings.108
Although it is challenging to find empirical data that supports this notion, as I explain in the
following section, the experiences of journalists and others who use the law on a regular basis
provide enough evidence to suggest that the law is indeed weaker than ever before. David
Cullier, a former president of the Society for Professional Journalists, recently said that federal
agencies “are getting more sophisticated in denying, delaying, and derailing requests, using
FOIA as a tool of secrecy, not openness.”109 And in 2015 Leah Goodman, an investigative
reporter for Newsweek, mentioned that “never before have we seen so many government
agencies that have turned themselves into veritable black boxes—where information flows in and
nothing comes out.”110 She concluded by saying that “[w]hat we are now witnessing in terms of
obstructionism and obfuscation is truly unprecedented.”111
Countless others agree. Sharyl Attkisson, a journalist best known for her work with CBS
News, recently described FOIA as “largely a pointless, useless shadow of its intended self.”112
Mary Beth Hutchens, the communications director of a nonprofit known as Cause of Action that
advocates for government accountability, said that “[t]he utility of FOIA as an oversight tool to
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track the federal government’s activities is on the brink of being undermined.”113 And a 26-yearold freelance journalist recently wrote a letter to the House Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform describing his first experience with FOIA, in which he wrote that “I often
describe the handling of my FOIA request as the single most disillusioning experience of my
life.”114 There is no doubt that the law is broken.

Empirical Limitations
This project is dedicated to exploring why three major updates to FOIA over the past two
decades—the Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, the OPEN
Government Act of 2007, and the FOIA Improvement Act of 2016—do not appear to have
accomplished their goal of making the law stronger and seem to have actually made it weaker.
Empirically verifying that this is the case would require finding evidence that (1) the proportion
of FOIA requests that are denied and (2) the average FOIA request processing time have both
increased following the passage of each amendment to the law. However, although recent studies
and the testimonies of the journalists who use the law most provide ample support for the notion
that FOIA performance throughout the executive branch is weak, proving that performance has
worsened with each iteration of the law is more challenging, primarily because accurate and
comprehensive empirical data on the matter is unavailable.
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As I explained earlier in this chapter, each of the three recent amendments to the law
increased the number and diversity of statistics that federal agencies were required to include in
their annual FOIA reports. 1996’s E-FOIA was the first amendment to the law that made these
reports mandatory, and it required that agencies include statistics about the number of requests
they received and processed from the previous year; the number of requests pending at the end of
the year; the median number of days it took them to process different types of requests; and
explanations for their decisions not to disclose certain requested information, among other
statistics.115 Because agencies were not required to report this data prior to E-FOIA, few of them
did so, and compiling government-wide statistics about FOIA performance prior to 1996 is
therefore impossible. Additionally, even after E-FOIA was passed, it does not appear that there
was any federal agency that took the time to combine the data in each individual agency’s report
into meaningful government-wide statistics until more than a decade later, when the Office of
Information and Privacy released a report summarizing all agency activity in FY2006.116
Consequently, measuring E-FOIA’s effects is difficult because no baseline is available.
Although some nonprofit organizations attempted to pick up the slack and compile
government-wide FOIA reports on their own, they were limited by the information available to
them. For example, as Meredith Fuchs, the general counsel of the National Security Archive,
explained in a 2007 hearing before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, the requirement that
agencies report the median processing time of their FOIA requests was “essentially meaningless”
because the number “conceal[ed] long backlogs and [did] not accurately reflect the true state of
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FOIA operations at an agency.”117 Additionally, Fuchs explained, “it is difficult to derive other
statistics, including trends across agencies, from median data because these numbers cannot be
aggregated.”118 Even the federal government admitted that this was a problem. In a 2007 report
on FOIA performance in 2005, for example, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) said
that “with only medians it is not statistically possible to combine results from different agencies
to develop broader generalizations, such as a governmentwide statistic based on all agency
reports, statistics from sets of comparable agencies, or an agencywide statistic based on separate
reports from all components of the agency.”119 The GAO recommended that agencies report
arithmetic means as well so that these statistics could be compiled,120 and members of Congress
subsequently made this a requirement when they passed the OPEN Government Act of 2007.121
Even though more comprehensive data about FOIA performance post-2007 is now
available, there is reason to question the reliability of this data, as some agencies have used
dubious tactics when compiling information for their FOIA reports. For example, at the same
2007 hearing in which she criticized the requirement that agencies report median statistics, the
National Security Archive’s Meredith Fuchs suggested that the Department of the Treasury in
particular was reducing its FOIA backlogs in questionable ways. “Starting in August 2006,” she
said, “we began to get letters from the Treasury asking if we continued to be interested in our
FOIA requests. The letters warned ‘if we do not receive a reply…within 14 business days…we
will close our files regarding this matter.’”122 A recent executive order signed by President
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George W. Bush had required agencies to develop plans for improving their FOIA performance,
and one of the goals the Treasury Department had laid out in its plan was to reduce its FOIA
backlog by ten percent by the start of 2007.123 According to Fuchs, it appeared that the agency
was attempting to do so by finding ways to avoid processing certain requests altogether instead
of taking the traditional route of devoting additional resources to processing backlogged requests
more quickly; assuming that the department sent similar time-sensitive letters to many or all of
those who had outstanding requests with the agency, it is likely that the department was able to
reduce its backlog simply by removing the requests of those who failed to respond within the
required timeframe from its queue.
The Department of the Treasury would eventually announce that it had far surpassed its
goal for 2006, reducing its FOIA backlog by an astonishing 40%—significantly more than its
initial 10% goal.124 Encouraged by this progress, the agency seemingly took its efforts to a new
level; Fuchs explained that her organization had received several letters within the past year that
indicated that many of its FOIA requests that had been submitted in the mid-1990s had somehow
been destroyed.125 The agency asked the National Security Archive to send in new copies of the
requests.126 Although the nonprofit was able to do so and the agency’s backlog therefore did not
change, it is easy to imagine that the same strategy of “accidentally” destroying requests could
have been successful with others who were less organized and were unable to produce the
required documents. And while this technically would have reduced the department’s backlog, it
would not have done so through any additional processing of FOIA requests; in other words, it
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would have allowed the department to meet its FOIA performance goals without actually
improving performance and increasing the amount of information released to the public.
There is some evidence that other agencies have used similar questionable tactics to
manipulate their FOIA statistics. At a 2011 hearing before the House Committee on Oversight
and Government Reform, for example, Angela Canterbury, the director of the Public Policy
Project on Open Government Oversight, mentioned part of a recent report by the Associated
Press, which revealed that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) had cut its FOIA
backlog by 40 percent, “in part by referring thousands of cases to the State Department.”127
Canterbury described this as a “shell game” and noted that the State Department’s own backlog
doubled as a result.128 DHS’s numbers may have improved, but the overall disclosure of
information remained unchanged.
Given these two examples, it is certainly conceivable that the practice of manipulating
FOIA data is an even more widespread issue, especially when agencies have incentive to disobey
the law to protect their own activities from external scrutiny. Members of the House Committee
on Oversight and Government Reform recognized this in a 2016 report, in which they noted the
irony in the fact that “[t]he agency making the decision to withhold information is also the
agency with the most at stake if embarrassing or controversial information is released.”129
Additionally, FOIA still lacks substantive penalties for agencies who fail to comply with the law,
so there are few reasons why agencies would choose to refrain from bending the rules in this
way. As a result, while the data that agencies report should not, in most cases, be totally
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discounted, one should view it with a healthy skepticism and understand that it may not be
telling the entire story.
A final consideration when analyzing FOIA data is that the most recent amendments to
the law do not represent the only changes to FOIA policy within the same timeframe; Presidents
Clinton, Bush, and Obama, for example, all issued executive orders or other memorandums
during their tenures that instructed the federal agencies under their control to implement FOIA in
particular ways. These efforts have inevitably had an impact on FOIA performance as well.
When looking at FOIA statistics for the past decade, for instance, it is impossible to know for
sure whether an increase in backlogs and denials is the result of measures included within the
OPEN Government Act of 2007, a 2005 executive order issued by President Bush, a 2009
memorandum issued by President Obama, a combination of all three, or some other factor that is
more difficult to detect.
To summarize, there is evidence to suggest that the FOIA data agencies report as required
by the law may be too incomplete and/or unreliable to empirically prove that a certain
amendment has had a particular effect on FOIA performance. The information necessary to
compile government-wide FOIA statistics has not been available for long enough to be able to
compare agency backlogs, for example, both before and after 1996’s Electronic Freedom of
Information Act and 2007’s OPEN Government Act, making it impossible to conclude with
certainty whether they have weakened or strengthened the law. However, as explained in the
previous section, the limited reliable data about FOIA performance that is available suggests that
the law is currently not working as intended, so it is safe to assume that recent amendments to it
have not totally accomplished their stated goal of facilitating the release of information. In
addition, the testimonies of journalists and transparency advocates such as Tom Rosenstiel, who
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claimed with certainty that “more of American life now occurs in shadow,”130 provide further
support for this notion.

Conclusion
In this chapter, I have summarized the history of the Freedom of Information Act and its
development throughout the past half century. I explained that although the law was initially the
most comprehensive freedom of information law in the world, it now lags behind those in a few
dozen other countries. Although reliable empirical data is unavailable to support the notion that
FOIA is truly weaker than ever before, the testimonies of journalists and others who use the law
regularly allow me to conclude that this is indeed the case, setting the stage for the rest of this
project. In the following chapters, I examine why recent amendments designed to strengthen
FOIA do not appear to have accomplished this goal. I start by discussing two existing scholarly
theories that attempt to explain why this is the case before outlining a third theory that I have
developed myself. I then outline my plan for testing these theories in the rest of the project.
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- 2 EXPLAINING DECLINES IN FOIA PERFORMANCE
Evidence presented in the last chapter indicates recent amendments to the Freedom of
Information Act have not accomplished their stated goals of improving FOIA performance. In
this chapter, I present three theories that could help to explain this outcome. I start by outlining
two theories prevalent in existing scholarship that posit that an increased volume and an evolving
composition of FOIA requests have caused federal agencies to handle the requests differently.
The first suggests that the number of requests that each agency receives on an annual basis has
increased so rapidly that agencies have been unable to process all of them on time, creating
growing backlogs. According to this theory, this process that has been exacerbated by recent
FOIA amendments, which have increased agencies’ responsibilities related to the law without a
corresponding increase in funding to support them, leaving FOIA officials overwhelmed. The
second theory suggests that, particularly following 9/11, an increased proportion of FOIA
requests have recently been related to sensitive national security issues that are exempted from
disclosure through the law, which would explain why FOIA denials have been rising. Both of
these theories relate to a changing demand in FOIA requests, and although there is evidence to
support each of them, neither addresses the supply side of the equation; is it possible that
changes to FOIA itself are the cause of the law’s many problems?
I examine this possibility throughout my project by testing a third hypothesis that has not
yet been the subject of FOIA scholarship. I suggest that recent amendments to the law have
ultimately made it weaker and worsened performance, even though the legislators who passed
the amendments have claimed that they were actually designed to do the opposite; legislators
may be incentivized to pass laws that appear to improve FOIA but fail to actually do so, I argue,
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in an attempt to demonstrate responsiveness to their constituents’ calls for increased government
transparency while simultaneously serving some of the legislators’ other political interests. These
interests could include protecting the national security or sheltering the executive branch from
undue scrutiny, for example, both of which would be accomplished by limiting the disclosure of
information. As I explain, this theory is largely based on political scientist George Lovell’s 2003
book Legislative Deferrals. Toward the end of this chapter, I outline this theory in greater detail
by discussing how legislators might go about designing laws in this way. I then provide
preliminary evidence to support the theory in relation to FOIA before concluding with a
summary of the chapter as a whole and a brief outline of the rest of this project.

Existing Explanations
Existing scholarship on the Freedom of Information Act points to two general theories
that attempt to explain why it has become ineffective. Both suggest that the recent increase in
FOIA denials is the result of an increased or evolving demand for government information. The
first theory proposes that because recent efforts to make the law more expansive have not been
accompanied by additional funding to support agencies in their added responsibilities, agencies
have had no choice but to deny, delay, or ignore requests that would otherwise result in the
release of records. The second proposes that, in the wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks,
the percentage of FOIA requests related to sensitive national security issues has increased, so
more FOIA requests overall are being denied through agencies’ invocations of exemptions
written into the law. In this section, I summarize these theories in greater detail before turning to
a discussion about why my project instead focuses on a third hypothesis, which I outline in the
following section.
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Lack of Resources
One theory contends that the failure of recent FOIA amendments to improve performance
results from a rapidly increasing volume of requests that agencies have not had the financial nor
staff resources to keep up with. According to Department of Justice, the government-wide
volume of FOIA requests to federal agencies has skyrocketed in recent years, rising from
557,000 requests in FY2009 to 788,000 in FY2016.1 That is an increase of about 41%. During
roughly the same period, the number of full-time federal employees tasked with processing
FOIA requests rose from about 3,700 to 4,200, or an increase of just 15%.2 This means that the
volume of FOIA requests has risen markedly faster over the past decade than the federal
workforce charged with implementing the law, forcing agencies to accomplish more with
comparatively smaller staffs. Because of these staffing constraints, it is perhaps understandable
that backlogs at agencies might start to accumulate, or that FOIA officials might be more
inclined to deny requests for information that is legally disclosable just to keep up with their
overwhelming workload.
Some scholars suggest that budget and staffing constraints at agencies have been
exacerbated by recent amendments to FOIA, which have increased agencies’ responsibilities
under the law but have not provided agencies with corresponding increases in funding to fulfill
these responsibilities. The Electronic Freedom of Information Act, the OPEN Government Act,
and the FOIA Improvement Act all included substantial provisions to increase the accessibility
of government records by expanding FOIA’s reach and ensuring that agency activities were
monitored appropriately. However, none of the laws increased funding to agencies to help them
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accommodate a subsequent increase in FOIA requests and the additional demands on their time
because of these changes.3 In an article about the aftermath of E-FOIA, for example, Meredith
Fuchs and Kristin Adair wrote that it “is not enough to say that federal agencies are not
complying with the law,” but rather “their failures, nearly across the board, to implement EFOIA suggest several more systemic problems,” including chronic underfunding.4 Indeed, the
fact that Congress needed to update FOIA so significantly later that year with the passage of the
OPEN Government Act serves as ample evidence that E-FOIA was not working effectively.
Why Congress decided to refrain from solving this problem by increasing agency funding in
either of its subsequent updates to the law is another question.
It is therefore possible that recent declines in FOIA performance are largely the result of
factors outside the control of the government officials who implement the law and, to a certain
extent, the legislators who have passed recent amendments designed to improve it; although
legislatively increasing funding to agencies for implementing their FOIA responsibilities would
have helped to alleviate this problem, it is unclear whether doing so was a realistic possibility for
members of Congress at the time the amendments were passed. It is also possible that the recent
increase in FOIA requests may be the result of efforts by Congress to streamline the requesting
process through new requirements that agencies accept requests electronically, for example. In
this case, although the amendments doing so may have played a role in exacerbating funding
constraints, there does not appear to be evidence that the legislators who designed them intended
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that this outcome occur. Nevertheless, it appears that the amendments have contributed to
resource limitations in some way, potentially worsening FOIA performance.

National Security Concerns
Other scholars contend that FOIA performance has worsened simply because the
composition of FOIA requests has changed over the past two decades, allowing agencies to
legally invoke exemptions or exclusions written into the law more regularly in valid efforts to
protect sensitive information. As mentioned in the last chapter, FOIA’s development over the
past 50 years has been characterized by efforts from competing groups in Congress to strike a
balance between respecting the public’s right to know about the inner workings of its
government and protecting information that could potentially be harmful if it were publicly
disclosed. Consequently, there are several exemptions and exclusions written into the law that
allow agencies to legally deny the release of records.5 Although many would argue that these
tools are also used to withhold certain information illegally, and that these illegal invocations are
more responsible for the massive increase in FOIA denials, it is still possible that the increase is
at least partly a result of legal decisions made because of increases in particular types of requests.
When invoked, exemptions and exclusions differ in the amount of information that FOIA
requesters receive when their requests are denied. When agencies invoke exclusions to deny
requests, they claim that the requested records simply do not exist; when they invoke
exemptions, they acknowledge that the records exist but refuse to release them anyway to
prevent the public from learning about sensitive government information. The exclusions written
into the law are related to protecting the process of intelligence gathering, as demonstrated in
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Table 1.2 in the last chapter (page 25). Although a broader array of interests is protected by
FOIA exemptions, as Table 1.1 demonstrates (page 21), the exemptions used most frequently by
some of the agencies that receive the most requests are also related to intelligence gathering or
other issues connected to national security.6 If more FOIA requests government-wide have
recently been related to these issues, then it is possible that this accounts for part of the seeming
increase in recent FOIA denials.
Some data supports this notion. The idea behind FOIA’s exclusions and exemptions is
closely related to something known as the state secrets privilege, which is used by executive
branch agencies to prevent the disclosure of sensitive information in court. The privilege was
first used in United States v. Reynolds (1953), in which the widows of three engineers killed on a
military bomber sued the government for several key documents related to the incident.7 The
engineers were civilians who provided technical assistance as secret equipment was being tested
on the flight, and their widows sought access to the official accident report to understand what
happened.8 Attorneys for the federal government argued that providing this information would
threaten the national security, and the Supreme Court accepted this position, even though by
doing so it set a precedent that weakened the judiciary’s constitutional power to check executive
actions.9 In his majority opinion, Chief Justice Fred Vinson suggested that information about the
equipment being tested was both dangerous to disclose and irrelevant to the case at hand:
there [is] a reasonable danger that the accident investigation report would contain
references to the secret electronic equipment which was the primary concern of the
mission…[and there] is nothing to suggest that the electronic equipment, in this case, had
any causal connection with the accident. Therefore, it should be possible for respondents
to adduce the essential facts as to causation without resort to material touching upon
6
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military secrets.10
The requested information was eventually declassified a half-century later, and it became clear
then that the requested records did not actually contain any state secrets, but rather evidence of
government negligence that had caused the bomber to crash.11 Vinson and the other justices had
been wrong, but they did not know this at the time because they did not read the requested
records themselves.12
The Reynolds case set a precedent for future court cases related to national security,
giving executive branch agencies the ability to determine on their own whether certain
information should be used as evidence in court. However, considering the immense power that
this gave the agencies, they still used the state secrets privilege relatively infrequently for about a
half-century.13 That changed, though, following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. In the
years since, the use of the privilege has expanded dramatically.14 Scholar Daniel Cassman
suggests that one possible explanation for this “is that lawsuits challenging counterterrorism
policies—such as detention, detainee treatment, and surveillance—created entirely new areas of
litigation that consistently touch on sensitive security matters.”15 However, he also notes that the
distribution of rulings in state secrets court cases since 9/11 is the same as it was beforehand;16 in
other words, the percentage of cases in which courts accept the state secrets privilege as a reason
to withhold information has remained the same following 9/11, even though the overall number
of cases in which the privilege is accepted has increased as a result of the government’s
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increased invocation of it. While Cassman contends that this data indicates that the state secrets
privilege has continued to be used appropriately following 9/11, other scholars argue that it
instead reflects continued overuse.17 Either way, the fact that the privilege has an effect of
limiting government transparency is undeniable.
A similar argument can be made about FOIA exemptions and exclusions. It is possible
that agencies are using these measures in the same manner that they did prior to 9/11, but that the
number of FOIA requests denied on these grounds has increased because the number of requests
related to sensitive national security issues has also increased. Agencies would therefore be
following the law appropriately by invoking the exemptions and exclusions specifically written
into it to withhold information. It is also possible that these national security concerns have
contributed to the recent increase in FOIA backlogs, as determining whether to disclose
potentially sensitive military information, for example, likely takes longer than making
determinations about information that is more obviously disclosable. There are also instances
when agencies decide to partially fulfill requests by releasing records that they heavily redact
beforehand, which can be a time-consuming procedure that contributes to the processing of
fewer records overall. This would suggest that FOIA is actually working as intended while
agency officials carefully process sensitive requests, despite the cries of transparency advocates
who claim that the law is broken.

Discussion
To summarize, existing scholarship seems to suggest that there are two overarching
theories that attempt to explain why FOIA seems to have become so ineffective. The first theory
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states that a lack of funding has forced executive branch agencies to ignore or deny more FOIA
requests as the volume of requests has increased and amendments to the law have placed
additional FOIA-related demands (such as increased oversight and reporting requirements) on
agencies. The second theory states that an increase in FOIA requests related to sensitive national
security issues has resulted in more denials through the invocation of exemptions and exclusions
written into the law. Although there is evidence to support both of these theories, each fails to
address some important questions that should at least be considered when trying to understand
recent FOIA performance.
Perhaps the biggest question relates to Congress’s role in passing amendments to FOIA
over the past 20 years: if a lack of funding or an increase in national security requests are really
responsible for the law’s current ineffectiveness, then why has Congress refrained from
addressing these problems in each of its recent updates? One answer might be related to political
scientist Eric Schickler’s concept of “disjointed pluralism,” in which tensions between
competing coalitions in Congress with different interests result in fragmented final product that
accomplishes only some of each coalition’s respective goals.18 It is possible that pressures to
keep costs down and protect national security interests have been so strong that they have
entirely prevented Congress from taking measures to make FOIA more effective. However, if
this is the case, then it raises another important question: if fixing the law’s biggest problems in
these ways has proven to be politically infeasible, then why has Congress bothered to update the
laws at all? Existing theories do not address the congressional motivations that could provide
additional insight into why Congress, with all the other demands on its time, would choose to
repeatedly amend FOIA without actually addressing the law’s major problems. Although it is
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possible that legislators are simply determined to improve the law however they can, it is also
possible that they might have different intentions in passing amendments than they lead the
public to believe—an idea I explore in greater detail in the next section.

A Different Approach
Existing scholarship on FOIA identifies problems with the law that have intensified over
the past two decades, either because of an overall increase in FOIA requests that has
overwhelmed agencies or because of an increase in requests for information related to national
security issues that are exempted from disclosure. Both are related in part to the public’s
increased demand for information. However, the supply side of the equation has not yet been
examined in sufficient detail. Is it possible that members of Congress have made the problem
worse through their recent amendments to FOIA, and that they are enabling federal agencies to
continue abusing the law? What if the recent amendments to FOIA have failed not because of
congressional incompetence but instead because that is exactly what they were intended to do?
What really goes into the process of passing a law, and what motivations do lawmakers have that
they might want to hide from their constituents?
I attempt to answer those questions in this section by outlining a new hypothesis that has
not yet been analyzed by others in the FOIA scholarship. I suggest that members of Congress
may be motivated to intentionally pass amendments to FOIA that appear to improve performance
but fail to do so. Such action could satisfy public demands for greater transparency while also
protecting other interests that might be threatened by a more robust law; as I explain, some
scholars argue that concerns about reelection are the primary motivators for legislators when
making policy decisions, so appeasing their constituents is therefore a top priority. However, I
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suggest that there are other interests that legislators may also need to consider when passing
transparency laws—such as protecting the national security or limiting oversight of the executive
branch—that may not always be politically popular. By passing laws that seem to accomplish
one politically advantageous goal but that actually accomplish something else, legislators can
ensure that all of their interests are being addressed, and I argue that this is exactly what has
happened with FOIA.
This theory is based largely on the work of George Lovell, who outlines a process
through which legislators may pass laws in this way in his book Legislative Deferrals. In the
next subsection, I elaborate on Lovell’s scholarship. Then, in the following subsection, I explain
the connections between his work and my own before outlining my plan to test this theory in the
rest of my project.

Defining a Legislative Deferral
In Legislative Deferrals, Lovell examines four federal labor statutes passed in the United
States between 1898 and 1935: the Erdman Act (1898), the Clayton Act (1914), the NorrisLaGuardia Act (1932), and the Wagner Act (1935). He explains that each of these laws initially
appeared to represent a major victory for the increasingly powerful labor movement in the
country.19 However, important provisions within the Erdman, Clayton, and Wagner Acts were all
subsequently overturned by the courts in what seemed to be clear reversals of the intentions the
legislators who passed the laws, limiting the political power of the labor movement they were
supposedly designed to appease.20 Naturally, this angered pro-labor voters, who Lovell explains
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expressed their frustration by criticizing the judges who made the controversial rulings.21 He
argues, however, that the judges themselves should not have received all the blame for these
decisions; instead, he suggests that members of Congress may have intentionally designed the
laws so that the courts would be compelled to make these rulings,22 thereby placing judges at
fault for the laws’ shortcomings. Legislators made “deliberate efforts to deceive the workers
whose interests were allegedly being served by the statutes,”23 he writes, as they attempted to
“establish their responsiveness by passing nonresponsive statutes.”24 Throughout his book, he
attempts to prove that this is the case.
Before I explain Lovell’s argument in detail, however, it is important to understand why
members of Congress make the choices that they do. There is a vast literature on this topic, and
although providing a comprehensive account of the arguments and theories within it is beyond
the scope of this project, there seems to be a consensus among scholars that one motivation in
particular is often at the forefront of legislators’ minds: reelection. Lawmakers know that they
will likely find themselves unemployed within a few years if they do not appease their
constituents, and political scientist R. Douglas Arnold consequently suggests that there is nothing
more important to them than doing so and winning reelection. “This means,” he writes, “that
legislators will do nothing to advance their other goals if such activities threaten their principal
goal…[Only when] reelection is not at risk…[are they] free to pursue other goals, including
enacting their own visions of good public policy or achieving influence within Congress.”25
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David Mayhew and others similarly suggest that reelection is a main motivating factor for
lawmakers.26
With reelection in mind, legislators in the early twentieth century knew that passing labor
laws would be risky. Labor organizations in the country were growing in size and influence, yet
there was also a substantial portion of the American electorate that was not necessarily
sympathetic to these organizations’ pro-labor demands.27 This made it impossible for legislators
to enact labor policy that would satisfy everyone. Consequently, Lovell argues that members of
Congress devised a way to avoid making controversial policy decisions altogether. “Caught
between powerful constituencies with incompatible demands,” he writes, “legislators preferred to
avoid the political costs of making clear decisions…[and] thus decided that their political
interests were best served by passing statutes that appeared to make decisive choices but that
covertly empowered the courts” instead.28 He describes the process of doing so as a legislative
deferral.29
Developing the concept of a legislative deferral required Lovell to rethink one of the most
widespread assumptions in political science. He argues that most scholarship on the relationship
between Congress and the Court assumes that the two branches are fundamentally at odds with
each other competing for power, when the reality is more complex.30 He names this traditional
framework for understanding and evaluating judicial power the “legislative baseline framework:”
I call [this] framework the legislative baseline framework because its core assumption is
that outcomes established by elected legislators form a democratic baseline against which
to evaluate decisions made by less directly accountable judges. The legislative baseline
framework leads scholars to evaluate the impact and legitimacy of judicial decisions by
26
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comparing the position established by judges to a baseline position established earlier by
legislators.31
In other words, Lovell argues that judicial rulings have always been evaluated in comparison to
the supposed legislative intent of Congress when passing the laws under review. However, he
contends that it is easy to overlook the true significance of court decisions when viewing them
from this perspective. “[T]he framework is important because it influences scholars’ ideas about
which questions are interesting, which cases are important, and what evidence can be ignored,”
he writes.32 Consequently, it appears to Lovell that many scholars have asked the wrong
questions and have fundamentally misinterpreted the labor laws that he studies. He is able to
draw new conclusions about their significance by disregarding the legislative baseline
framework and fundamentally reimagining the relationship between Congress and the Court to
be far less adversarial than many scholars might assume.
By suggesting that members of Congress might actually have different goals when
developing policy than they say they do, Lovell exposes a darker side of lawmaking, where the
words of members of Congress cannot always be taken at face value. As a result, it is difficult for
judges to ascertain the true intentions of legislators when laws are challenged in court,33 creating
the possibility that decisions typically seen as judicial reversals may not actually be reversals at
all; instead, judges may make decisions to invalidate statutes that lawmakers never would have
enacted in the first place if they had not been concerned about reelection. Rather than checking
congressional power, then, these judicial decisions actually work to reinforce it; Congress and
the Court work together in this scenario rather than against each other.34 Lovell argues that
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lawmakers elicit this outcome through legislative deferrals, which are carefully constructed
provisions within their bills designed to provoke judicial interpretation.35
Specifically, Lovell explains that a legislative deferral occurs when lawmakers write their
legislation to include provisions that are purposefully ambiguous and will undoubtedly require
judges to make key decisions about their implementation.36 Doing so allows legislators to
“establish their responsiveness [to constituents] by passing nonresponsive statutes,” he writes,
that do not accomplish any of the goals that they are supposedly intended to but nevertheless
increase the legislators’ chances at reelection.37 “For example,” he suggests that “many
legislators might vote for a popular campaign finance reform law that threatens their chances at
being reelected, but end up quite happy when judges predictably strike down the law on
constitutional grounds” following a deferral.38 Lovell explains that “saying and doing things that
disguise deferrals as clear, responsive, and responsible policy choices” inevitably makes the
move politically worthwhile for lawmakers while also allowing them to pursue other interests
that may not be as politically popular.39
Scholar Mark Graber writes that Lovell’s work is now part of a broader trend of
scholarship in political science that proposes that “[j]udicial review is established and maintained
by elected officials.”40 In the case of the labor statutes that Lovell examines, Graber argues that
the eventual anti-labor decisions in the courts were nearly inevitable, not only because of
legislative deferrals but also because the “Taft, Harding, and Coolidge administrations [in power
at the time] fought to staff the federal judiciary with political actors prone to construe…[this]
35
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language against labor.”41 This supports Lovell’s contention that “all the participants in the
legislative process expected judges to be hostile to the interests of labor organizations and
expected judges to make rulings reflecting their ideology.”42 Although members of Congress
inevitably risked sacrificing some of their policy goals by deferring decision-making to the
courts, they were able to predict with a great deal of certainty how the judges would rule based
on their ideological leanings, making rulings favorable to their interests a safe bet.
Lovell develops three criteria to determine whether members of Congress have
legislatively deferred to the courts. If there is evidence to suggest that lawmakers (1) were aware
of ambiguities within a bill, (2) predicted that courts would later address these ambiguities, and
(3) specifically rejected alternative proposals to clarify the ambiguities during the course of
deliberations, then Lovell suggests that a legislative deferral has occurred.43 He uses transcripts
of House and Senate floor debates found in the Congressional Record to determine whether each
of these conditions are met.44 In his analysis of the Erdman Act of 1898, for instance, the author
demonstrates both that members of Congress were aware that their legislation would be
interpreted by the courts and that they had the foresight to use specific yet seemingly ambiguous
statutory language to influence these interpretations; he notes that Representative William Sulzer
(D-NY), for example, told the House that a proposed version of the Erdman Act was inadequate
because “[w]e can not tell just now how the courts will construe some of the provisions of the
bill, and until that is done no one can tell whether this bill will be in the interest of the workers or
not.”45 When several similar statements are compiled, it becomes possible to make a convincing
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argument that a legislative deferral has indeed occurred.
Lovell’s concept of a legislative deferral can be used to analyze any piece of legislation,
regardless of whether it relates to the labor laws he examines in his book. In the next subsection,
I explain how I plan to use this concept as the basis for my analysis of FOIA.

Applying Legislative Deferrals to FOIA
It has been more than a century since some of the laws that Lovell studies were passed,
but it is safe to assume that reelection is still the principal consideration for members of Congress
when passing legislation; nearly all political decisions can therefore be viewed as efforts by
legislators to satisfy the most pressing demands of their constituents, who evaluate the
performance of their representatives every time they head to the polls. With this in mind, it is
possible to apply the concept of a legislative deferral to other controversial issues when
evaluating contemporary policymaking, and I argue that doing so is particularly relevant when
examining recent updates to FOIA.
Efforts to increase government transparency are actually remarkably uncontroversial
among the American public. Recent polling data reveals that approximately 80% of Americans
consider government transparency and accountability to be an important priority,46 and just 5%
currently believe that their government is effectively sharing information with them.47 These
statistics suggest that passing measures designed to increase government transparency, such as
amendments to improve FOIA performance, are likely to be politically advantageous for
lawmakers, appeasing many constituents and angering few. However, legislators may have other
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interests to consider before passing these laws, as there are some potential downsides associated
with doing so. Particularly post-9/11, for example, members of Congress may be wary to
implement measures that could inadvertently result in the disclosure of sensitive information.
Additionally, those from the same party as the president, for fear of political backlash, may be
reluctant to enact legislation that would increase public oversight and scrutiny of executive
agencies. A legislative deferral, then, is an ideal way to reconcile public demand for increased
transparency and private concerns about doing so; by writing ambiguous statutes designed to
induce certain judicial interpretations, lawmakers can increase their chances of reelection while
simultaneously ensuring that they do not abandon their other policy goals.
There are some indications that legislative deferrals have indeed been used in FOIA
legislation in the past. In the last chapter, I described how the concept of glomarization emerged
in courts following amendments to FOIA made in 1974 and 1976. The 1974 revision of the law
made it easier for requesters to access information by placing time limits on the release of
records and limiting the scope of records that could be exempted from disclosure through the
law. The amendments made two years later, in 1976, further clarified the exemptions, preventing
agencies from making broad interpretations and withholding records unnecessarily. Both of these
revisions seemed to facilitate the release of information. However, the subsequent development
of glomarization as a tool to withhold information essentially served to reverse each of these
efforts; by allowing agencies to deny the existence of records when they claimed that there were
“compelling reasons” to do so, judges overruled the new requirements limiting the use of
exemptions. According to the traditional legislative baseline framework, this would seem to be a
clear reversal of the legislators’ intentions when passing the amendments, but Lovell’s work
provides reason to believe otherwise.
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It is possible that the emergence of glomarization was the result of legislative deferrals to
the courts. Even though the use of glomarization was limited by the DOJ in subsequent updates
to its regulations, it can be argued that its initial emergence as a tool to withhold information set
a precedent for the introduction of exclusions into the law in 1982, which effectively codified the
glomarization principle. This would introduce the prospect that legislators intentionally designed
their 1974 and 1976 amendments to FOIA to be reversed by the courts as part of a long-term
strategy to limit the disclosure of records. Proving that this was indeed the case would require
reading transcripts of deliberations surrounding the updates to the law and searching for evidence
of a deferral. As I explain, however, in this project I focus instead on analyzing more recent
updates to the law to provide insight into why FOIA performance has worsened over the past 20
years.
Mark Graber suggests that the concept of a legislative deferral can also be applied to
other government actors, including administrative agencies.48 This idea is not unprecedented in
political science, as Howard Gilman has also argued that legislators can further their aims by
using courts and federal agencies in similar ways.49 In relation to the FOIA amendments, it is
possible that lawmakers could make their statutes purposefully ambiguous so that the
government officials charged with carrying out the laws must interpret them and thereby endure
any public criticism that results. Many of the recent complaints about FOIA relate to the failure
of federal agencies to implement the law appropriately, often by missing information disclosure
deadlines or improperly invoking exemptions to withhold information, so, if members of
Congress have indeed intended to defer to agencies through their legislation, it appears that their
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strategy is working. Graber also notes that “[w]hen elected officials cannot foist political
responsibility elsewhere, they often refrain from taking any action” at all.50 The fact that
legislators have taken action and delegated FOIA policymaking to agencies, then, suggests that
they had a clear reason to do so and were aware of the many political benefits that it would have.
In this project, I test the hypothesis that members of Congress have deferred to courts or
executive agencies to avoid the political consequences of refraining from passing legislation to
improve FOIA; I suggest that they may be incentivized to do so to increase their chances at
reelection while simultaneously protecting other interests that could be compromised by
increased government transparency. To test this hypothesis, I apply a modified version Lovell’s
legislative deferral model to the three most updates to the law: the Electronic Freedom of
Information Act of 1996, the OPEN Government Act of 2007, and the FOIA Improvement Act
of 2016. Each of these laws was supposedly designed to improve FOIA performance but appears
to have done the opposite, making them ideal case studies with which to test my theory.
Modifying Lovell’s model is necessary because the lawmaking process has changed
dramatically since the labor laws he studies were passed in the early 1900s. Although the goal of
reelection as a primary motivator for lawmakers likely remains unchanged, the ways in which
they pass legislation to accomplish this goal look very different now than they did a century ago.
Barbara Sinclair writes about these changes in her book Unorthodox Lawmaking. “In the
contemporary Congress,” she writes, “the textbook diagram describes the legislative process for
fewer and fewer of the major bills…Before 1970 one could speak of a standard legislative
process that most major legislation followed,” but this is no longer the case.51 Instead, Sinclair
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argues that many substantive changes to legislation often occur behind the scenes, after a bill has
been reported from committee but before members of the broader House or Senate debate it on
the floor.52 More than a third of major legislation is now subject to these backdoor adjustments,53
making the legislative process as a whole far less transparent as it has been in the past. A recent
report from a think tank known as the CATO Institute helps to demonstrate just how opaque the
lawmaking process now is: the organization recently awarded Congress a grade of “D-” when
evaluating the accessibility of its meeting records.54 “There is a lot of work to do before
transcripts and other records can be called transparent,” the organization concluded.55
The lack of transparency in the lawmaking process makes it more challenging to prove
that a legislative deferral has occurred, as doing so requires finding evidence that lawmakers (1)
were aware of ambiguities in a bill, (2) were aware that courts or federal agencies would be
required to interpret these ambiguities, and (3) specifically rejected alternative proposals to
clarify the ambiguities and limit these interpretations; with more lawmaking now occurring
behind closed doors, this evidence is simply harder to find. As a result, in this project I apply a
modified version of Lovell’s model to the FOIA amendments I study. Although the first two
criteria in my model remain the same, I adjust the third criterion to reflect the fact that finding
evidence to fulfill the original one—that legislators specifically rejected proposals by others to
clarify the law—is likely to be nearly impossible given the lack of information available. Instead,
I argue that a legislative deferral has occurred when it is clear that members of Congress are
aware of ambiguities yet choose to keep them in a bill anyway, even when they know that doing
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so will elicit judicial or agency interpretation and could potentially weaken FOIA performance.56
I believe that doing so is more realistic given contemporary constraints but will not weaken my
conviction that legislative deferrals have occurred.

Conclusion
In this chapter, I have summarized three theories that explain why recent amendments
supposedly designed to improve FOIA performance may have had the opposite effect. Existing
scholarship on this issue centers around an increased or evolving demand for government records
requested through FOIA; one theory suggests that updates to the law have placed additional
FOIA-related responsibilities on federal agencies without providing them with sufficient funds to
fulfill them. This has an effect of worsening long backlogs already caused by an increasing
volume of FOIA requests, potentially forcing agencies to deny more requests because they
simply do not have the resources to process them. The other theory suggests that, following the
9/11 terrorist attacks, a greater proportion of FOIA requests are related to sensitive national
security issues and are thus denied through the invocation of legal exemptions written into the
law. Recent amendments may not have had their desired effect, then, because they have not
sufficiently addressed the largest problem holding the law back. There is evidence to support
both of these theories, but my project focuses instead on a third theory that addresses my
research question from a different perspective.
My hypothesis examines recent declines in FOIA performance as primarily a supply-side
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issue rather than a demand-side one; instead of looking at changes to the ways in which
requesters use the law as a cause of its problems, I look at changes to the law itself. I suggest that
recent amendments to FOIA have failed to improve performance because members of Congress
have intended for them to do just that, regardless of what they have publicly proclaimed. I argue
that legislators, motivated by reelection goals, have deliberately incorporated ambiguous
language into statutes specifically so that these efforts would be “reversed” by courts and federal
agencies. This process is known as a legislative deferral and is based on George Lovell’s book of
the same name. Even though legislatively deferring policymaking in this way has the potential to
worsen FOIA, it represents a victory for legislators because it allows them to protect their own
interests and simultaneously increase their chances at reelection. This helps to explain why they
have taken the time to pass them at all. The result, though, is of course a more opaque U.S.
government, keeping American citizens in the dark about how their tax dollars are being spent.
In the next chapter, I test this theory by taking a close look at the Electronic Freedom of
Information Act (E-FOIA), which was passed in 1996 and is perhaps the most significant update
to FOIA in its history. By making electronic records subject to disclosure through the law, EFOIA overwhelmingly expanded FOIA’s reach so that American citizens could theoretically
access more government information than ever before. However, despite this seemingly
unquestionable effort to strengthen the law, it soon became clear that it had actually made FOIA
even weaker than it was before. I examine whether this counterintuitive result could have been
expected by applying my adapted legislative deferral model to the law. Afterward, in chapters 4
and 5, I apply the same model to the OPEN Government Act of 2007 and the FOIA
Improvement Act of 2016 to further test my hypothesis.
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- 3 THE ELECTRONIC FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT OF 1996
On October 2, 1996, President Bill Clinton signed the Electronic Freedom of Information
Act Amendments of 1996 into law. The amendments represented the first major update to FOIA
in its 30-year history and promised to expand the law’s reach so that the American public could
request and obtain more government records than ever before. In his signing statement, President
Clinton said that the amendments would serve to “reforge…an important link between the
United States Government and the American people” by bringing FOIA “into the information
and electronic age.”1 Also known as the Electronic Freedom of Information Act, or E-FOIA, the
new law was noteworthy in that it made digital records such as emails subject to disclosure
through FOIA requests, and it also required that federal agencies make their records available
electronically so that they could be accessed more easily.2 Previously, federal agencies had
responded to technological innovations and the rise of the digital era in diverse and confusing
ways, oftentimes charging exorbitant fees for releasing electronic records or refusing to release
them altogether.3 E-FOIA was designed to create an overarching policy regarding such practices
so that agencies would be consistent and fair in their handling of FOIA requests.
Parts of E-FOIA also modified other aspects of the original law that had rendered it
increasingly ineffective over time. For example, in response to concerns that increasing volumes
of requests were inhibiting agencies’ ability to respond in a time-efficient manner, the legally-
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required 10-day timeframe for response was doubled to 20 days.4 This change was made in an
effort to boost morale within agencies and give citizens confidence that government officials
were following the law as intended.5 Additionally, to increase agency compliance with the law,
E-FOIA placed new requirements on federal agencies to track and report data about their FOIA
activities.6 Agencies were required to publish information about their FOIA requests, backlogs,
appeals, and response times, and the country’s attorney general was given the power to monitor
this data and present his findings to both Congress and the Justice Department.7 Finally, a
requirement to allow the expedited processing of certain FOIA requests8—a provision that had
already been a part of many agencies’ individual FOIA regulations but was not yet mandatory—
was implemented in what appeared to be an effort to further strengthen the law.9
By 1998, two years after E-FOIA had been enacted, these measures were not
accomplishing the goals that members of Congress and the president had claimed they would. In
a hearing about the law’s effectiveness on June 9 of that year, Representative Stephen Horn, the
Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Government Management, Information and
Technology, said “preliminary indications suggest that agency compliance [with the law] has
been spotty at best.”10 Horn had served in the same role when the subcommittee had initially
drafted E-FOIA and advocated for its passage, so his admission that it had partly failed was
particularly significant. Still, others who testified at the hearing were more blunt, alleging that
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the law had been “virtually ignored” and that agencies were blatantly disobeying it by refusing to
release electronic records.11 In an analysis of the law about a decade later, scholars Kristin Adair
and Meredith Fuchs wrote that it “is not enough to say that federal agencies are not complying
with the law,” but rather “their failures, nearly across the board, to implement E-FOIA suggest
several more systemic problems.”12 They noted that the law had been marginalized,
underfunded, and, in some instances, totally ignored by federal agencies and that it consequently
had “not brought about the revolution in openness and transparency that it could have.”13 Instead,
by refusing to follow the law as was supposedly intended, agencies were choosing to illegally
restrict the release of records to the public, ensuring that the U.S. government remained as
opaque as ever.
In a rare showing of bipartisanship during the Clinton presidency, E-FOIA had been
passed unanimously by both the House of Representatives and the Senate, with members from
each house of Congress praising the act for taking an important step toward making the
American government more open than ever before.14 In retrospect, it seems strange that a
measure that received such universal acclaim and support in Congress would ultimately appear
so ineffective at solving the problems that plagued FOIA, raising questions about exactly how
things went wrong. How is it possible that hundreds of legislators could all overlook certain
aspects of the proposed legislation that would cause problems in the future? Why did members
of the House Subcommittee on Government Management, Information and Technology in
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particular lack the expertise and knowledge to recognize that their efforts would eventually fail?
Or what if, despite their unanimous approval of E-FOIA, members of Congress actually did
anticipate the law’s eventual failures but decided to pass the amendments anyway? What if they
actually wanted the amendments to fail?
I address these questions in this chapter by testing my hypothesis that members of
Congress intentionally used their legislation to defer to federal agencies and courts to make
FOIA decisions for them. As mentioned in the last chapter, this idea is based on political scientist
George Lovell’s concept of a legislative deferral. In this chapter, I use E-FOIA as a case study to
which I apply a slightly modified version of Lovell’s model in an attempt to explain the
amendment’s failures. By finding evidence that meets my criteria for determining whether a
legislative deferral has occurred, I am able to test and ultimately support this hypothesis.
I start with a brief legislative history of E-FOIA before explaining Lovell’s model and my
own in greater detail. Then, after exploring the similarities and differences between the labor
laws in his project and the Freedom of Information Act that I study, I analyze a specific
provision within E-FOIA designed to facilitate the expedited processing of certain FOIA
requests. By examining how members of Congress responded to accusations that this provision’s
language was overly ambiguous, I am able to test my legislative deferral hypothesis and
ultimately conclude that, based on the available evidence, a legislative deferral did occur in this
instance. Finally, at the end of this chapter I discuss the implications of my findings on the
project as a whole.
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Legislative History of E-FOIA
The original Freedom of Information Act took more than a decade to pass in Congress,
and E-FOIA was no different, as numerous bills were introduced and reintroduced on the House
and Senate floors to address the original law’s increasing ineffectiveness at making the U.S.
government more transparent. Efforts to amend FOIA to incorporate digital records began in
1985, 11 years before E-FOIA was passed, when the House Subcommittee on Government
Information, Justice, and Agriculture held a series of hearings to investigate the electronic
collection and dissemination of information by federal agencies.15 Witnesses from freedom of
information groups and corporations alike testified about the importance of having laws that
were reflective of technological developments that were changing the ways in which the
American government operated. Following these hearings, the broader Committee on
Government Information released a report that provided a series of recommendations for new
and updated policies to address these concerns.16 One section of the report was titled “Public
Access to Public Records” and detailed strategies for releasing electronic information to the
public through FOIA.17 A similar and lengthier hearing was held nearly four years later, in 1989,
signaling that the proposed policies were becoming ever more important as technology continued
to progress.18
The first attempt to implement these policies in relation to FOIA specifically occurred on
November 7, 1991, when Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) introduced bill S. 1940, titled the
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“Electronic Freedom of Information Improvement Act of 1991” on the Senate floor.19 Cosponsored by Senator George Brown (R-CO), the bill included provisions that would require
federal agencies to release any electronic records that were the subject of FOIA requests. This
bill was very similar to the 1996 bill that would ultimately be passed into law, but it also
included some provisions that likely would have made the law notably stronger, including one
that penalized agencies for failing to respond to FOIA requests in a timely manner:
The court may assess against the United States all out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the
requester, and reasonable attorney fees incurred in the administrative process, in any case
in which the agency has failed to comply with the [10-day] time limit…Any agency not
in compliance with the time limit…shall demonstrate to a court that the delay is
warranted under the circumstances. It shall be within the discretion of the court to award
the requester an amount not to exceed $75 for each day that the agency's response to his
request exceeded the time limits.20
No similar provision was included in the version of E-FOIA that ultimately became law in 1996.
As mentioned previously, the most widespread criticism of the law was that agencies were
almost universally failing to comply with the new twenty-day response window, and a clear
penalty for long delays might have prevented such delays from occurring. However, the Senate
never had the chance to vote on the bill with this provision in the 102nd Congress, so it was
shelved until a later date.21
Senators Leahy and Brown reintroduced the Electronic Freedom of Information
Improvement Act in the Senate on November 23, 1993. Although this version of the legislation
still included the provisions penalizing agencies for failing to comply with the law, these
provisions were eventually removed by January 1 of the following year, when a new version of
the bill was released.22 In the time period between the release of the two bills, there were no

Electronic Freedom of Information Act of 1991, S. 1940, 102nd Cong.
Ibid.
21
GovTrack, "S. 1940 (102nd): Electronic Freedom of Information Improvement Act of 1991," Civic Impulse, LLC.
22
Electronic Freedom of Information Act of 1994, S. 1782, 103rd Cong.
19
20

70

public hearings related to the proposed legislation, so it is unclear exactly why these changes
were made. However, they had an effect of weakening the other provisions of the proposed
legislation by making them harder to enforce.
On April 11, 1994, Senator John Kerry (D-MA) cosponsored the bill.23 On August 11 of
that year, the Committee on the Judiciary unanimously decided to report a revised version of the
bill to the full chamber, and on August 25 the bill was passed by a voice vote in the Senate.24 A
few weeks later, on September 12, the bill was referred to the Committee on Government
Operations in the House of Representatives, but the House never had a chance to vote on it
before the end of the congressional term, so it was once again died until a later date.25
Senators Leahy, Brown, and Kerry tried again in 1995. This time, the bill succeeded. It
was introduced in the Senate on July 28 of that year and reported by the Senate Judiciary
Committee on May 15 of the following year.26 The bill was introduced in the House on July 12,
1996, and both chambers of Congress ultimately passed it on September 17 and 18.27 It was
passed by a unanimous voice vote in the Senate and by a vote of 402-0 in the House,28
demonstrating just how popular the legislation was. Two weeks later, on October 2, President
Clinton signed the Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996 into law. In his
signing statement, he recognized Senator Leahy for his tireless efforts to pass E-FOIA over the
past half-decade and expressed confidence that the law would make the U.S. government more
transparent.29
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Table 3.1: Legislative History of E-FOIA
Date

Bill Number

Title

Event

11/7/91

102 S. 1940

Electronic Freedom of Information
Improvement Act of 1991

Introduced in Senate

Electronic Freedom of Information
Improvement Act of 1993

Introduced in Senate

11/23/93
8/22/94

103 S. 1782

8/25/94

Reported in Senate
Electronic Freedom of Information
Improvement Act of 1994

9/12/94

Referred in House

7/28/95
5/15/96

Passed in Senate

104 S. 1090

Electronic Freedom of Information
Improvement Act of 1995

Introduced in Senate
Reported in Senate

9/17/96

Electronic Freedom of Information
Improvement Act of 1996

Passed in Senate

7/12/96

Electronic Freedom of Information
Amendments of 1996

Introduced in House
Reported in House
Passed in House

9/17/96
104 H.R. 3802
9/18/96
10/2/96

Electronic Freedom of Information
Act Amendments of 1996

Received in Senate
Passed in Senate
Signed into law by President

Although it took several years for E-FOIA to become law, it appears that this was the
case not because it was particularly controversial but rather because it was a relatively low
priority for members of Congress at the time; with issues such as taxation and social security, for
example, that more directly affected the daily lives of their constituents, it was more politically
advantageous for legislators to focus on issues other than government transparency, even though
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efforts to increase transparency would inevitably be popular.30 As I explain in the next section,
that E-FOIA was relatively free of controversy before being passed and received such
widespread support actually makes it harder to support the notion of a legislative deferral, as it
makes it more challenging to suggest that legislators had legitimate motivations to defer FOIA
decision-making to courts and agencies in efforts to weaken the law.

Applying Lovell’s Legislative Deferral Model to E-FOIA
In the remainder of this chapter, I apply a modified version of George Lovell’s legislative
deferral model to E-FOIA to determine whether members of Congress intentionally left certain
provisions in the amendment vague in an attempt to avoid the political controversy that might
accompany its implementation. Through his analysis of a series of labor laws passed in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Lovell makes a convincing argument that on several
occasions lawmakers identified specific ambiguities in their legislation but ultimately decided to
refrain from clarifying these ambiguities, precisely, he claims, so that they could pass laws that
appeared to be pro-labor but would ultimately be “reversed” by the courts.31 By deliberately
using ambiguous language in their provisions, Lovell argues that members of Congress
intentionally enabled unelected judges to make controversial policy decisions for them, thus
deferring any ensuing criticism to the judges and preserving their chances at reelection.32 As I
mentioned earlier, in this chapter I test whether this concept of a legislative deferral can be
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applied to an issue such as government transparency, in which implementation is delegated to
other unelected governing officials, including executive branch bureaucrats.
As discussed in the last chapter, there is some evidence to suggest that past amendments
to FOIA have involved legislative deferrals to the courts, but my analysis of E-FOIA specifically
will examine whether legislative deferrals to administrative agencies have occurred as well.
Mark Graber first suggested that this type of deferral was possible in an article published about a
decade ago,33 but thus far it does not appear that any scholars have tested this theory. Luckily,
the same method that Lovell uses to support his notion of legislative deferrals to the courts can
be applied to administrative agencies with few modifications, allowing me to make this type of
analysis relatively easily.
Lovell concludes that a legislative deferral has occurred when he finds evidence in the
Congressional Record to suggest that legislators were “not doing all they could to limit the
power of judges to interfere with the advertised goal[s] of…statute[s].”34 He makes this
determination when three conditions are all met:
1. “legislators were aware of and drew attention to the precise ambiguities and
interpretive questions that judges would later decide;
2. legislators specifically associated those ambiguities with a future role for the courts;
and,
3. legislators specifically rejected alternative legislative proposals that were offered to
clarify the language and limit the discretion of the courts.”35
As I explained in chapter 2, because more lawmaking now occurs behind closed doors than it did
a century ago when the labor laws that Lovell studies were passed, using these criteria to prove
that a legislative deferral occurred in contemporary lawmaking is more challenging if not
impossible. Consequently, it is therefore necessary to modify the third criterion when applying
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Lovell’s model to my own analysis. In this project, then, I will conclude that a legislative
deferral has occurred if there is evidence to suggest that lawmakers (1) recognized ambiguities in
E-FOIA, (2) predicted that courts or agencies would eventually be forced to interpret these
ambiguities, and (3) kept the ambiguities in the bill anyway. Even if there is no evidence that
lawmakers rejected alternative proposals, the decision to keep ambiguities in the bill should
serve as sufficient proof that they wanted those ambiguities to be there, even though doing so
would undoubtedly result in weakening the law. If this is the case, I will be able to support my
hypothesis and conclude that legislators intentionally designed their bill to be ineffective at
accomplishing the publicly stated goal of increasing government transparency.
Before I examine the available evidence in greater detail, however, it is important to
consider the differences between the labor laws that Lovell studies and the freedom of
information laws that are the subject of my own analysis. During the time period in which the
laws that Lovell uses as case studies were passed, labor organizations were becoming more
powerful forces in American politics, and labor legislation was the subject of great controversy
as the Supreme Court increasingly supported a doctrine of freedom of contract.36 Because of this,
there was great incentive for members of Congress to defer to the courts; it allowed them to reap
the political rewards of passing legislation that appeared to be pro-labor while simultaneously
staying true to their values with the knowledge that the new policies would not be in effect for
long. The fact that E-FOIA passed through Congress with unanimous votes in both the House
and Senate signals that it was different from the labor laws of the early 20th century, specifically
because the legislation was almost entirely free of controversy. Although national security
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considerations have certainly affected FOIA legislation in the post-9/11 United States, there
appear to have been fewer reasons for members of Congress to make deferrals before that
because there were fewer compelling interests that could overrule the goal of increasing
government transparency. Because of this, proving that a legislative deferral occurred with EFOIA requires that I find evidence to unequivocally support this notion and explain the
motivation behind it, which I am able to do in the next section.

Expedited Processing and Legislative Deferrals in E-FOIA
On June 13 and 14, 1996, the House Subcommittee on Government Management,
Information, and Technology held hearings to discuss proposed E-FOIA legislation. Members of
media organizations and others with great familiarity with the law were invited to testify before
the subcommittee about their experiences with FOIA and their opinions about proposed changes
to it. Among those in attendance were Jane Kirtley, the Executive Director of the Reporters
Committee for the Freedom of the Press, and Robert Gellman, an attorney and privacy
information policy consultant, who both expressed concern in their testimonies that one of EFOIA’s provisions in particular was not written clearly enough to ensure that federal agencies
implemented it appropriately. For the rest of this chapter, I will use the deliberations over this
provision to test my hypothesis about a legislative deferral as the cause of E-FOIA’s
ineffectiveness.
The provision of concern related to the expedited processing of FOIA requests, which
required agencies to process certain requests more quickly than others if they met a set of criteria
outlined in the law. Expedited processing provisions had already existed in many agencies’
FOIA regulations since the beginning of the Clinton administration, as they were a part of the
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Department of Justice’s guidelines for FOIA implementation, but supporters of E-FOIA
nevertheless wanted to incorporate these provisions into the proposed legislation so that they
could not be easily reversed by future administrations.37 According to the legislation, agencies
were expected to determine within ten days of receiving a FOIA request whether that request
qualified to receive expedited processing.38 This determination would be made if it was decided
that there was a “compelling need” to do so,39 which would occur when a failure to release
records in a particularly timely manner would (1) threaten a person’s safety, (2) result in the loss
of a person’s due process rights, or (3) affect public opinion about “actual or alleged
governmental actions that are the subject of widespread, contemporaneous media coverage.”40 In
their testimonies, Kirtley and Gellman shared their concerns about the third category, and the
phrase “widespread, contemporaneous media coverage” in particular.
Kirtley noted that she and the journalists she represented were worried that this phrase
was too vague to guarantee that agencies would always accept legitimate requests for expedited
processing. “We do have some concerns,” she said, “that the current bill may not completely
serve the need for expedited access.”41 She expressed her hope that the eventual legislation
would be “clearly understood to direct agencies to expedite processing whenever records are
requested that would enlighten the public on matters where public concern is strong, and not just
those areas that are already the subject of fervent media attention.”42 In other words, Kirtley
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believed that agencies should expedite the processing and release of any records of great interest
to the American public, regardless of whether or not they were related to a story that had already
received widespread media attention. Although Kirtley did not propose specific language to
replace the phrase “widespread, contemporaneous media coverage” to strengthen the provision in
this way, her warning that the current language would not be “clearly understood” nevertheless
sent a strong signal to the subcommittee that it was inadequate and would need to change.
This identification of vague language is a key indicator of the potential for a purposeful
legislative deferral; without proof that legislators are aware that an ambiguous statute exists, it is
impossible to conclude that they intentionally kept the ambiguity in the bill to avoid controversy
that might result from clarifying it. Similarly, it is not possible to conclude that legislators
anticipated that courts or agencies would interpret statutes without proof of their recognition that
the statutes might need interpretation. By pointing out to the subcommittee that the phrase
“widespread, contemporaneous media coverage” was too vague, Kirtley informed legislators
about a flaw in their bill, forcing them to choose between fixing this flaw and ignoring it through
a deferral.
Robert Gellman placed additional pressure on legislators to change this provision when
he testified before the subcommittee the following day. Gellman was critical of the same
ambiguous language, although for different reasons. “This language raises so many questions
that it is hard to know where to begin,” he said.43 Gellman was concerned that the phrase was too
broad to be effective, suggesting that “it is hard to imagine a legitimate request that would not
satisfy this test” and that it would thus impose an overwhelming administrative burden on
agencies that would slow down the entire FOIA process.44 He provided a variety of examples to
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illustrate his point about the ambiguous language and the challenges involved in having
bureaucrats interpret it:
If a news story attracts extensive local coverage in Charleston, West Virginia, will that
qualify as substantial media coverage or does the coverage have to be statewide or
national to qualify?...[Or imagine that] The Associated Press runs a story about travel by
a government official, and the identical story appears in 100 newspapers nationwide. Is
that enough to qualify? What if the story runs in only 50 papers or 10 or 2? Does it matter
if the story ran on the front page or elsewhere? Do we want bureaucrats making these
evaluations of the media?45
While Kirtley worried that the ambiguous provision would allow agencies to limit usage of the
proposed expedited processing provision, Gellman was instead afraid that the ambiguity would
encourage too much usage because so many requests would presumably qualify. He concluded
that the processing of these requests would inevitably result in widespread agency backlogs that
would have an effect of slowing the process down “for nearly all requesters” and limit the release
of information as a result.46
Interestingly, Gellman also predicted that the ambiguous language would “increase the
amount of [FOIA] litigation.”47 By doing so, he signaled to the subcommittee that its legislation,
when passed into law, would be interpreted not only by the administrative agencies to which
Congress was delegating but also by judges deciding FOIA appeal cases. Although it is likely
that members of the subcommittee already knew this, it is important to recognize that they were
clearly reminded of this during the hearing, signifying that they were undoubtedly aware of the
consequences of failing to clarify the confusing provisions in their bill.
Later in his testimony, Gellman suggested that it was even possible to predict how
specifically the courts would interpret the phrase he was concerned about. When another witness
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suggested that “the courts have been integral in interpreting…[FOIA in the past] and ensuring
the congressional intent for public access rights has been fulfilled the way Congress intended it,
rather than the way some of the agencies might have wanted to do it,”48 Gellman was quick to
disagree. He suggested that the courts had instead interpreted FOIA less strictly than Congress
had perhaps intended, often favoring federal agencies over the requesters who were challenging
their decisions, which inevitably had an effect of making FOIA weaker and reducing government
transparency. In particular, he said “it is very hard to get relief in court” when requesters “come
to court and say agencies are not complying with time limits.”49 Because the expedited
processing provision under discussion would require agencies to process some requests faster
than others, it was inherently related to time limits, and as a result Gellman predicted that the
courts would use the ambiguity in the provision to similarly go against congressional intent. This
would mean upholding agency denials of expedited processing requests and thus making people
wait longer to access important government records.
So Gellman’s criticism of the ambiguous language regarding the expedited processing of
requests was twofold: he worried (1) that it would allow too many requests to qualify for
expedited processing, which he feared would create an administrative burden that would
ironically slow down the release of records, and (2) that it would increase FOIA litigation that
had historically seemed to go against congressional intent, giving agencies additional power and
precedent to disobey the law. Although his prediction that courts would uphold expedited
processing denials would theoretically have an effect of clarifying the “widespread,
contemporaneous media coverage” standard and thus limit the future use of the provision, it
would not help alleviate any administrative burden resulting from the provision because the same
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number of requests would still have to be processed; requests that were not granted expedited
processing would still often result in the release of records, just more slowly, so there would be
no disincentive for requesters to ask for expedited processing anyway and thus continue to clog
the system. Because of this concern, Gellman was as opposed to the idea of expedited processing
in general as he was to the specific language of the corresponding provision that he criticized at
the hearing. He reflected this opinion when asked how he would change the provision if it were
to be included at all: “If you are going to do it,” he said, “I would suggest basically that you
dump most of the language in the bill and put in a one line provision that says agencies can do it
if they want, and let it go at that. That will minimize quibbling over what the statutory standards
mean.”50
To summarize, both Jane Kirtley and Robert Gellman expressed concern in their
testimonies that the phrase “widespread, contemporaneous media coverage” was too vague to
serve as a condition that would warrant expedited processing of FOIA requests. As a
representative of the news industry, Kirtley worried that this language could be interpreted to
allow agencies to deny expedited processing requests for records that were clearly in the public
interest but not necessarily the recipients of “fervent media attention.”51 Somewhat contrarily,
Gellman was afraid that it could be interpreted to warrant expedited processing for nearly any
request, which would create an administrative burden for agencies and ultimately slow down the
entire FOIA process. Although the reasoning underlying their respective concerns about the
vague provision differed, they both seemed to agree that it ultimately would have an effect of
weakening the law in one way or another by making it more challenging for requesters to access
government records.
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Additionally, both Kirtley and Gellman provided suggestions for ways that legislators
might go about clarifying or changing the ambiguous provision to make it stronger. Kirtley
proposed that the provision be modified to somehow include records that would “enlighten the
public on matters where public concern is strong,”52 and Gellman suggested that it basically be
eliminated to give agencies the discretion to set their own expedited processing guidelines,53
which would ensure that they would not be unnecessarily burdened by a far-reaching and, in
some cases, unrealistic federal policy. Although others who testified before the subcommittee
defended the expedited processing provision in general like Kirtley did, none of them defended
nor criticized the “widespread, contemporaneous media coverage” language in particular; this
meant that Gellman and Kirtley were the only ones who mentioned the language and that the
feedback the subcommittee received about it was thus exclusively negative. This fact becomes
particularly significant when analyzing how the subcommittee eventually decided to respond to
this criticism.
About a month following the hearings in which Kirtley and Gellman testified before the
Subcommittee on Government Management, Information, and Technology, Representative
Randy Tate (R-WA) introduced a revised version of the bill on the House floor. This bill
included new guidelines for expedited processing that would effectively become a part of the
actual law three months later. According to these guidelines, it would be determined that there
was a “compelling need” to expedite the release of records when (1) “a failure to obtain
requested records on an expedited basis…could reasonably be expected to pose an imminent
threat to the life or physical safety of an individual,” or (2) “with respect to a request made by a
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person engaged in disseminating information, [there is a] compelling urgency to the public.”54
The second condition in the original legislation, which was related to protecting a person’s due
process rights, was essentially folded into the first condition protecting a person’s physical
safety, and, more importantly, the condition related to “widespread, contemporaneous media
coverage” was changed to instead require “compelling urgency.” By the time E-FOIA became
law a few months later, the wording of this condition had been changed again, although subtly.
The final statute required there to be “urgency to inform the public concerning actual or alleged
Federal Government activity” if a member of the news media were to receive expedited
processing.55
For my project, concluding that a legislative deferral has taken place requires finding
evidence that legislators have (1) drawn attention to specific ambiguities in a bill, (2) expressed
recognition that courts or agencies will later be forced to interpret these ambiguities, and (3)
chosen to keep the ambiguities in the bill anyway, thereby refusing to limit the discretion of
courts and agencies. Based on the transcripts from their testimonies, it is clear that Jane Kirtley
and Robert Gellman both (1) made the subcommittee aware of an ambiguous provision in the bill
and (2) openly predicted that both federal agencies and courts would have to interpret this
provision. They even went so far as to provide suggestions for clarifying the ambiguous
language, which the legislators on the subcommittee chose not to adopt. Instead, as I explain, it
appears that the legislators modified the controversial provision to include language that seems
to be no less ambiguous than the original language, giving courts and agencies the discretion to
interpret the law on their own, even if that meant that FOIA might become weaker as a result.
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This failure to clarify the provision fulfills my the third criterion for a purposeful legislative
deferral, thereby allowing me to conclude that one occurred with this part of the legislation.
By modifying the “widespread, contemporaneous media coverage” language after Kirtley
and Gellman publicly articulated their concerns about it, it appears that lawmakers were
attempting to demonstrate that they were being responsive to criticism of their legislation, even if
they had no intention of modifying it in a way that would actually make it stronger. Thus, the
final language that the subcommittee settled on instead, requiring that there be “urgency to
inform the public,” is indeed different from the original but does not appear to alleviate either
witness’s specific concerns or even make the provision any less ambiguous; the need to
demonstrate “urgency” to access information seems to be just as unclear as the need to
demonstrate that requested records are related to a “widespread” media story. Consequently,
Kirtley’s fears that agencies could unnecessarily reject expedited processing requests still seem
reasonable, as do Gellman’s fears that agencies would contrarily be forced to interpret the statute
too broadly, thus slowing them down with an overwhelming number of expedited processing
requests. So although the subcommittee responded to a perceived weakness in its bill by
modifying the weak language under discussion, its modifications do not seem to have had any
real effect on making the bill stronger and improving FOIA performance.
The question that arises, then, is why the subcommittee decided to modify the language
the way it did; with specific proposals to make the bill stronger, why go with an alternative one
that does not appear to accomplish this goal? Because the process of deliberation for the
subcommittee was closed to the public and no transcripts of it are available, we will likely never
know exactly how the final language was chosen, and any answer to this question is
consequently bound to be at least partly speculative. However, all available evidence points to
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the idea that members of Congress actually did not want to accomplish the goal of making the
bill stronger at all, choosing instead to legislatively defer to the courts and federal agencies on
the issue to avoid the potential consequences of making a politically unpopular decision about it.
By demonstrating responsiveness to concerns made in a public setting, lawmakers were able to
display an apparent desire to make FOIA stronger while changing the E-FOIA legislation in a
way that would, unbeknownst to their constituents, fail to actually do so. This allowed them to
create policy that was reflective of some of their other interests, such as a desire to protect the
national security, while simultaneously satisfying their primary interest of preserving their
chances at reelection.

Conclusion
As I explained in this chapter, the Electronic Freedom of Information Act was passed by
a unanimous Congress and signed into law by an enthusiastic President Clinton in 1996. Within
just a few years, though, it became evident that the law was not working in the way that it was
supposedly intended to, causing FOIA performance to decline in a number of areas rather than
improve. By examining the transcripts of a series of Congressional hearings and the texts of
House and Senate committee reports, I was able to find evidence to support the idea that
lawmakers legislatively deferred to courts and federal agencies to make certain FOIA-related
decisions for them, presumably in an attempt to avoid political controversy. In particular,
legislators changed a provision requiring “widespread, contemporaneous media coverage” to
qualify for the expedited processing of FOIA requests to instead require “urgency.” This appears
to have been an attempt to appease critics Jane Kirtley and Robert Gellman, who had different
opinions on how to clarify the provision, without actually addressing the substance of their
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concerns, that the legislation was too ambiguous. The result was an equally ambiguous statute
that was likely to cause the exact problems that Kirtley and Gellman predicted, but that would
transfer the resulting public frustration to courts and agencies instead of the legislators
themselves.
Even though the expedited processing provision in the final version of E-FOIA may have
made the law weaker, it is important to remember that it was certainly not the most criticized
aspect of the law following its implementation. Instead, there was widespread agreement that EFOIA failed because there were no penalties for agencies who refused to adopt its requirements
altogether. Unfortunately, because transcripts of deliberations over E-FOIA are largely
unavailable, it is impossible to determine whether a legislative deferral occurred when a
provision including these penalties in an early version of the bill was removed. However,
recognition of this flaw in the amendment was so prevalent that it would undoubtedly arise the
next time Congress attempted to make another major revision to FOIA. That would happen about
a decade later, in 2007, with the OPEN Government Act. This time penalties for agencies that
failed to comply with the law would indeed be part of the final legislation. Does this mean that
members of Congress had a change of heart and suddenly wanted FOIA performance to
improve? In the next chapter, I attempt to find out.

86

- 4 THE OPEN GOVERNMENT ACT OF 2007
After the Electronic Freedom of Information Act was passed in 1996, another major
update to FOIA would not come for more than a decade. President George W. Bush eventually
signed the Openness Promotes Effectiveness in our National Government Act of 2007 on
December 31 of that year. Often called the OPEN Government Act for short, the law seemed to
address many of the problems that transparency advocates claimed were resulting in the release
of fewer agency records than ever before and making the U.S. government more opaque as a
result. It added penalties to agencies that failed to fulfill their FOIA responsibilities;1 established
a new agency known as the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) to serve as a
FOIA ombudsman and oversee compliance with the law, recommend policy changes, and assist
the public with making requests;2 increased agency reporting requirements to help identify
successes and failures both at the agency level and government-wide;3 and broadened the
definition of “representative of the news media” to include journalists from online publications
and other bloggers, thus allowing more requesters to submit FOIA inquiries for free.4
Each of these changes was designed to help U.S. citizens access more information held
by their government, and they certainly seemed to be promising steps in the right direction at the
time. However, there is evidence to suggest that they ultimately failed to solve FOIA’s problems
completely and, in some cases, actually made the problems worse. Five years later, in 2012, the
nonprofit the National Security Archive published a study that revealed that more than half of
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federal agencies had still not fully complied with the law.5 In a congressional hearing around the
same time, Kevin Goldberg, a representative for the Sunshine in Government Initiative and the
American Society of News Editors, noted that “most of the original goals of the OPEN
Government Act—and FOIA itself—simply haven’t been realized.”6 FOIA backlogs were
continuing to increase,7 and dissatisfaction with the law seemed to be higher than ever.
At the conclusion of this chapter, I analyze where things went wrong and why. However,
I begin by outlining a series of developments in American politics and to FOIA policy in the
years leading up to the OPEN Government Act’s passage to provide additional context for how
and why the law formed in the way it did. As I explain, the inauguration of President Bush in
early 2001 and the terrorist attacks on American soil later that year transformed the political
climate into one in which government transparency was no longer a top priority and instead was
often viewed as a threat to the country’s national security. This catalyzed changes to FOIA
policy that resulted in the release of fewer records. I then provide a brief legislative history of the
OPEN Government Act before using George Lovell’s legislative deferral model to examine
whether members of Congress intentionally designed the law to be ineffective. As I demonstrate,
all available evidence suggests that no legislative deferral occurred. However, there is evidence
to support the notion that both an increased demand for sensitive national security information
and a lack of resources to process these requests, two ideas outlined in chapter 2, did contribute
to the law’s ineffectiveness.
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FOIA Policy in Post-9/11 America
Following the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, FOIA policy
in the country changed dramatically. Protecting the country’s national security interests proved
to be of a higher priority than government transparency for the Bush administration, so it took
measures to scale back FOIA and other similar laws. On October 12, just a month after 9/11,
Attorney General John Ashcroft issued a memorandum to all agencies within the executive
branch that detailed the administration’s new policy for handling FOIA requests. Although the
memo began by affirming the administration’s commitment to “full compliance” with FOIA as it
was written, Ashcroft also wrote that the administration was “equally committed to protecting
other fundamental values that are held by our society,” including “safeguarding our national
security, enhancing the effectiveness of our law enforcement agencies, protecting sensitive
business information and, not least, preserving personal privacy.”8 As a result, he ordered
agencies to consider these values when making decisions about FOIA disclosures:
I encourage your agency to carefully consider the protection of all such values and
interests when making disclosure determinations under the FOIA. Any discretionary
decision by your agency to disclose information protected under the FOIA should be
made only after full and deliberate consideration of the institutional, commercial, and
personal privacy interests that could be implicated by disclosure of the
information…When you carefully consider FOIA requests and decide to withhold
records, in whole or in part, you can be assured that the Department of Justice will defend
your decisions unless they lack a sound legal basis or present an unwarranted risk of
adverse impact on the ability of other agencies to protect other important records.9
This new policy went into effect immediately, and in doing so it overturned an earlier policy
memorandum that had been issued in 1993 by Attorney General Janet Reno, which had
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encouraged a “presumption of disclosure” when handling FOIA requests.10 Instead, according to
Anthony Romero, the Executive Director of the American Civil Liberties Union, agencies were
now expected to “resist disclosure wherever legally possible” to protect the country’s national
security interests.11 Should any legal challenges arise as a result of this policy, the Department of
Justice was prepared to intervene on the agencies’ behalf, giving them no reason to resist
Ashcroft’s orders.
In 2003, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report suggesting that
the administration’s new policy was having its desired effect of limiting the disclosure of
potentially sensitive records. According to the report, about one in three of the FOIA officers that
the agency interviewed reported that they were less likely than before to release records to the
public, with the majority referencing Ashcroft’s memo as the main motivating factor.12
Additionally, Ari Schwartz, the Associate Director of a nonprofit called the Center for
Democracy and Technology, testified in a 2005 House hearing that many FOIA officers admitted
to him that “they have specifically denied requests that they would have accepted in the past.”13
And at another hearing in 2007, Melanie Ann Pustay, the Acting Director of the DOJ’s Office of
Information and Privacy, commented that this was far from unusual given the new national
security concerns following 9/11:
Certainly all of us in the FOIA community looked at information in a new light after
9/11, and there certainly have been situations where agencies had to start, for the first
time, thinking about the impact of disclosure on a potential terrorist, and we would be
10
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irresponsible if we didn’t think that way…The law enforcement exemptions have been
used in a new way because of new threats, new consequences from disclosure that were
simply unforeseen before 9/11.14
Because FOIA requires that government officials determine which information should be
released to the public based on a set of relatively vague guidelines, it is understandable that these
officials might become more conservative with disclosures following an event as devastating as
9/11, and especially when ordered to do so by the sitting attorney general. However, many
transparency advocates later accused the Bush administration of going too far in encouraging this
type of behavior, limiting FOIA’s utility as a tool to promote open government.15
Many of the criticisms of the Bush administration’s FOIA policies related not only to the
content of the Ashcroft memo but also to its practice of creating new ways to classify documents
to prevent their disclosure to the public. According to Meredith Fuchs of the nonprofit the
National Security Archive, “these new secrecy stamps…tell government bureaucracies ‘don’t
risk it’…[and] ‘find a reason to withhold.’”16 Some congressmen agreed. Representative Henry
Waxman (D-CA), for example, said in a 2005 hearing that the “new pseudo-classifications,”
including “Sensitive but Unclassified” and “For Official Use Only” had “no statutory or
regulatory basis, yet they are being used to keep important information from the public.”17
Waxman likened this practice to a “wholesale assault on open government,”18 one that
necessitated the congressional action that would ultimately come in part in the form of the OPEN
Government Act.

14

U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee, The State of the FOIA, 76.
Clint Hendler. “What We Don’t Know Has Hurt Us.” Columbia Journalism Review, January 2009,
http://archives.cjr.org/feature/what_we_didnt_know_has_hurt_us.php.
16
U.S. Congress. Senate. Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security of the Committee on the
Judiciary, Openness in Government and Freedom of Information: Examining the Open Government Act of 2005:
Hearing before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security of the Committee on the
Judiciary. 109th Cong., 1st sess., March 15, 2005. 46.
17
U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee, Implementing FOIA, 27.
18
Ibid., 26.
15

91

Even information that was not particularly sensitive was withheld from the public during
this time. According to Thomas Kean, the Chair of 9/11 Commission created to investigate the
terrorist attacks, three quarters of the classified information he saw during the course of the
investigation should not have been so classified and withheld.19 At a hearing a few years later,
Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) noted that “billions of dollars of taxpayers’ money is spent every
year to classify things that sometimes have been on Government websites for months before they
are classified.”20 It was clear that the Bush administration’s policy of withholding information
whenever possible was leading to mistakes. “I am deeply concerned,” Representative Lacy Clay
(D-MO) said, “that this administration appears to be shielding information that ought to be
accessible to the public.”21 Other members of Congress felt the same way.22
There was even debate about whether withholding sensitive information would have the
desired effect of protecting American citizens. At a hearing about an early version of the OPEN
Government Act in 2005, the National Security Archive’s Meredith Fuchs shared an interesting
quote from Eleanor Hill, the staff director of the joint House-Senate Intelligence Committee
investigation into 9/11. Hill had said that, prior to the attacks, “‘the U.S. intelligence and law
enforcement communities were fighting a war against terrorism largely without the benefit of
what some would call their most potent weapon in that effort, an alert and committed American
public.’”23 By this same logic, as Fuchs explained in her testimony, President Bush’s efforts to
protect the country by making FOIA more restrictive may have actually put American citizens in
greater danger.24 There are “things that the public needs to know and that the government needs
19
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to acknowledge so that instead of hiding these secrets,” Fuchs said, “we can confront the
problems and fix them.”25
There is no way to prove whether a stronger FOIA would indeed make America safer, but
the discussion surrounding this idea does underscore how controversial FOIA policy had become
in post-9/11 America. With the Ashcroft memo and its new classification practices, the Bush
administration took notable steps toward withholding information from the public, much to the
frustration of those in the country who placed a higher priority on having an open and transparent
government. There was disagreement not only about how much information should be withheld
but also about whether withholding information was beneficial to the country at all. These
differences in opinion would persist throughout the decade and were perhaps strongest during the
time that the OPEN Government Act was being debated in Congress. Consequently, the
legislation was significantly more controversial than the Electronic Freedom of Information Act
that preceded it. Perhaps as a result of this controversy, the final law largely avoided the question
of which records were eligible for disclosure, instead making a variety of procedural changes
designed to increase agency compliance with FOIA as it was already written. However, as many
transparency advocates would later affirm at hearings before the House and Senate
subcommittees charged with writing the legislation, these were still welcome and necessary
improvements.

FOIA Performance Hits New Lows
Even before 9/11 and the Ashcroft memo, it was obvious that another major update to
FOIA was necessary. Despite what appeared to be efforts by members of Congress to improve
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FOIA with 1996’s Electronic Freedom of Information Act, it seemed that less information was
being released to American citizens than ever before. As mentioned in the previous chapter, in a
1998 hearing dedicated to assessing E-FOIA’s success, the Chairman of the House
Subcommittee on Government Management, Information, and Technology, Stephen Horn (RCA), admitted that “preliminary indications suggest that agency compliance [with the law] has
been spotty at best.”26 By 2007, the year the OPEN Government Act was passed, it was possible
to develop a more complete understanding of E-FOIA’s shortcomings; some scholars suggested
that it had been ignored, marginalized, and underfunded by the majority of federal agencies,27
and there was data to support their claims: only 21% of federal agencies were fulfilling the basic
requirements of the law, according to the National Security Archive.28 It was clear that
something needed to be done.
Deliberations over the OPEN Government Act had actually started two years earlier, in
2005, when there was already widespread agreement that FOIA needed to be amended. In
response to these deliberations in both the House and Senate, President Bush issued an executive
order on December 14 of that year titled “Improving Agency Disclosure of Information” that
included a variety of measures designed to make FOIA stronger, including the creation of a new
Chief FOIA Officer at each federal agency.29 The Chief FOIA Officer was tasked with
monitoring FOIA compliance throughout the agency and recommending changes when
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appropriate.30 The executive order also required that each agency submit a report within six
months with information about how to improve its FOIA practices, along with reports in each of
the following two years detailing its successes and failures at making these improvements.31
Members of Congress who had been advocating for improvements to FOIA were
generally receptive to President Bush’s efforts, although there seemed to be a consensus that
further legislation was still necessary. “This Executive order is certainly a step in the right
direction,” Representative Henry Waxman (D-CA) said. “If implemented properly, it could
address some of the problems faced by FOIA requesters, but even if fully implemented, the
Executive order will not address all of FOIA’s problems.”32 Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT)
agreed: “I see it as a constructive first step, but not the comprehensive reform we [are
considering].”33 And Representative Brad Sherman (D-CA) pointed out that “[w]hile the
Executive order was helpful, it failed to deal with a number of problems including the fact that
under FOIA, the exemptions are too broad; the delays are too numerous; [and] there is a
complete lack of penalties for agencies that violate FOIA.”34 As a result, these legislators
continued their efforts to pass a new FOIA amendment.
Although President Bush’s executive order served to make FOIA stronger by facilitating
agency compliance with the law, it is important to recognize that it was not a complete reversal
of his administration’s earlier policy of encouraging agencies to withhold particularly sensitive
information. Melanie Ann Pustay of the Office of Information and Privacy helped to explain this
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distinction at a 2007 hearing before the House Subcommittee on Information Policy, Census, and
National Archives:
The Executive order is addressed completely to the processes by which FOIA is
administered, and it is designed to help agencies set up systems where requestors can
learn about their requests more readily, have their requests processed more quickly. It
doesn’t address in any way the substance of what is released or withheld.35
Whereas the Ashcroft memo and the Bush administration’s crackdown on the classification of
certain documents sparked a series of debates about the substance of information eligible for
disclosure through FOIA, the 2005 executive order was instead dedicated to improving the
efficiency of the disclosure of those records that were eligible. It did not change Bush’s
controversial policy on discouraging the release of potentially sensitive information, but it did at
least partly satisfy some of his critics by addressing some of FOIA’s many problems. It was
indeed a positive and much-needed step forward, especially considering that a preponderance of
evidence was beginning to accumulate to support the notion that the law was becoming less
effective than ever before.
Prior to Bush’s executive order, an audit of 35 federal agencies had revealed that some
FOIA request backlogs went back as far as 16 years.36 In 2005, the number of backlogged
requests at all federal agencies combined increased by 25 percent from the year before because
of the “new challenges concerning the protection of National Security Information…[and]
limited agency resources,” according to Representative Edolphus Towns (D-NY).37 And
according to Linda Koontz of the Government Accountability Office, the rate of backlog
increase accelerated in 2005 for the fourth consecutive year.38 Things only seemed to be getting
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worse by 2006, when a nonprofit known as OpenTheGovernment.org released a midyear report
on agency implementation of President Bush’s executive order, which by then had been in effect
for more than six months. The report found that 17 federal agencies were not doing anything at
all to address the requirements of the order, and many others developed plans to do so that were
rated as either poor or merely adequate.39
Although lawmakers were working on the OPEN Government Act throughout this entire
period, the legislation did not receive significant attention until early 2007, nine months before a
modified version would be signed into law. This is when scrutiny over FOIA really started, and it
revealed a law that appeared to be failing by almost every measurement. In February of that year,
a watchdog group known as the Coalition of Journalists for Open Government released a report
detailing the results of a comprehensive study it completed on FOIA. Titled “The Waiting Game:
FOIA Performance Hits New Lows,”40 the report opened by stating that “overall FOIA
performance remains at the lowest point since agency reporting began in 1998, despite President
Bush’s executive order last December directing agencies to become more service oriented and
reform legislation introduced in the Congress.”41 It then outlined the law’s many shortcomings,
concluding that agency backlogs were worsening,42 people were waiting longer for
information,43 agencies were denying FOIA requests more frequently,44 people whose requests
were denied got relief on appeal less often,45 and costs to administer FOIA were continuing to
rise,46 despite the fact that agency FOIA staffs were smaller than in 1998.47 The nonprofit
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supported these findings with a plethora of empirical data that made their conclusions
undeniable. It also debunked the claims of potential skeptics by proving that the complexity and
volume of requests played no role in contributing to these disturbing statistics; according to the
report, agencies had actually processed fewer requests in 2005 than eight years earlier,48 and a
smaller proportion of these requests were considered to be particularly complex, which could
have had an effect of slowing down the disclosure process.49 Yet the costs of administering
FOIA had still risen 55% since 1998,50 a clear sign that the program was being mismanaged and
needed reform.
A month later, in March 2007, the Government Accountability Office released a similar
report about FOIA, and although it seemed to suggest that the law was more effective than the
Coalition of Journalists for Open Government claimed it was, it still outlined several areas where
FOIA performance was lacking. Titled “Processing Trends Show Importance of Improvement
Plans,” the report concluded that “the number of pending requests carried over from year to year
has been steadily increasing,”51 rising 43% from 2002 to 2006.52 The GAO noted repeatedly,
however, that it did not have enough data to develop meaningful statistics about governmentwide FOIA performance in a number of other areas because the law only required agencies to
report median statistics that could not be combined:
Our ability to make further generalizations about FOIA processing times is limited by the
fact that, as required by the act, agencies report median processing times only and not, for
example, arithmetic means (the usual meaning of “average” in everyday language)
...Thus, although using medians provides representative numbers that are not skewed by a
few outliers, they cannot be summed...As a result, with only medians it is not statistically
possible to combine results from different agencies to develop broader generalizations,
48
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such as a governmentwide statistic based on all agency reports, statistics from sets of
comparable agencies, or an agencywide statistic based on separate reports from all
components of the agency.53
The report concluded with a recommendation that future FOIA legislation require that agencies
disclose averages (arithmetic means) and ranges in their annual FOIA reports.54 However,
despite the fact this this data was currently unavailable, all other indications seemed to suggest
that it was time for FOIA to be updated for the first time in more than a decade. The only
question was what measures that revision would include, and a series of congressional hearings
and debates in subsequent months would prove that disagreements about FOIA’s future were
plentiful.

Legislative History of the OPEN Government Act
Despite the fact that fewer government records were being released to the public, there
were still FOIA success stories during the time that helped to expose a variety of troubling
government activities. In February 2007, for example, USA Today reported that there were 122
levees in the country that were “so poorly maintained that they could fail in a major flood.”55
According to the newspaper, “The Army Corps of Engineers, which built many of the levees,
refused to name the affected communities” until USA Today and the Associated Press submitted
a FOIA request.56 A couple of years earlier, the Marine Corps Times had used FOIA to report
that “nearly 10,000 Marines were issued body armor that flunked government safety tests and
had potentially life-threatening flaws.”57 And, perhaps most prominently, FOIA helped to expose
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a series of disturbing human rights violations at the U.S.-controlled Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq in
2004.58 These examples of FOIA successes helped to remind both legislators and the American
public of the law’s importance, even as the country continued to reconsider its information
policies following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Anthony Romero of the American Civil Liberties
Union, for instance, used the Abu Ghraib example when making a passionate plea for
strengthening FOIA at a 2007 hearing before the House Subcommittee on Information Policy,
Census, and National Archives:
The photographs from Abu Ghraib alone should be enough to convince this Congress that
our body politic is not well. More pictures are being improperly withheld by our
government as we speak. Do they show that the abuse pre-dated Abu Ghraib, or perhaps
that it continued after the events that we know about? The CIA has refused to say
whether it is continuing to use abusive interrogation techniques, making a mockery of the
concept of a government that answers to the people. Congress needs to restore and even
improve democracy’s x-ray, so that the American people can correctly diagnose the
problems, and make informed decisions about how to improve their government. A
robust Freedom of Information Act will not make us weak; it will demonstrate for all to
see the unconquerable strength of a free nation dedicated to the supremacy of the rule of
law.59
Others who testified in hearings related to the OPEN Government Act were also quick to remind
legislators of the law’s importance. Meredith Fuchs of the National Security Archive, for
example, provided lawmakers with a list of nearly 100 recent news stories that had been made
possible by FOIA at a 2007 hearing.60 These efforts did not go unnoticed, and they gave
additional weight to the claims of legislators like Representative Lamar Smith (R-TX) and
Senator John Cornyn (R-TX), who in 2005 started to demand that FOIA be amended.
Representative Smith introduced the OPEN Government Act of 2005 on the House floor
on February 16, 2005, the same day that Senator Cornyn introduced a nearly identical bill on the
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Senate floor.61 Both pieces of legislation were referred to committees, and each of the respective
committees held a hearing shortly thereafter to develop an understanding of FOIA’s shortfalls
and how the OPEN Government Act might address them.62 The Senate version of the bill was
eventually reported on September 21 of the following year but never became law.63 A similar
bill, known as the Restore Open Government Act of 2005, was introduced on the House floor by
Representative Henry Waxman (D-CA) in May 2005, but this legislation was no more
successful.64 It was not until 2007 that efforts to reform FOIA would begin to gain momentum.
On March 5 of that year, Representative Lacy Clay (D-MO) introduced a new bill on the House
floor.65 A week later, a similar bill was introduced in the Senate by Senators Leahy (D-VT) and
Cornyn.66 These bills would both be subsequently modified but were ultimately passed nine
months later. The OPEN Government Act of 2007 became law upon President Bush’s signature
on December 31, 2007.
Throughout this entire process, there were substantive debates in Congress about certain
aspects of the legislation. Many Democrats, for example, wanted to include a provision that
would repeal 2001’s Ashcroft memo, which had encouraged agencies to withhold information
from the public whenever possible.67 Although this provision was indeed a part of early versions
of the legislation, it was eventually removed from the final bill to win the votes of Republicans
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like Senator Thomas Davis of Virginia.68 “As I’ve stated since we began work on this
legislation,” he said on the Senate floor, “improving procedural aspects of FOIA should be our
[main] goal,”69 and others agreed with him; the final version of the OPEN Government Act
would be almost entirely procedural, as it was overwhelmingly focused on improving access to
records that everyone agreed could safely be released to the public, not on providing additional
legal guidelines to help government officials determine what those records were.70
There were two other provisions within the legislation that were also the subject of
scrutiny and passionate debate. The first expanded the definition of “representative of the news
media” as it was used by agencies when determining whether certain requesters would qualify to
be exempted from paying certain fees related to their FOIA requests. The second provision was
perhaps the most controversial part of the entire bill, as it penalized agencies that failed to fulfill
their FOIA responsibilities by requiring that they pay for the attorney fees of requesters that
successfully appealed their FOIA denials. Although lawmakers disagreed about these issues,
they were ultimately able to compromise by developing common understandings of particular
language within the legislation that would influence how courts interpreted it. Because members
of Congress anticipated that the courts would be interpreting their legislation and ultimately
modified some of its contents as a result, the debates over both of these issues serve as ideal
examples to which I can apply to George Lovell’s legislative deferral model and test my
hypothesis. However, as I conclude in the next section, although FOIA’s problems would persist
following the OPEN Government Act’s passage, there does not appear to be enough evidence to
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support my legislative deferral theory and thus the idea that legislators wanted the law to be
ineffective.

Senator Kyl Takes The Floor
In this project, I examine whether members of Congress have specifically designed recent
FOIA amendments to fail to achieve their stated goals, and whether they have done so covertly
to satisfy their constituents’ demands for transparency and thereby preserve their chances at
reelection. I assess whether the FOIA updates qualify as what scholar George Lovell describes as
a legislative deferral, in which members of Congress specifically write certain controversial
provisions in a way that appears ambiguous so that courts and federal agencies must interpret
them and bear the brunt of any criticism from the public that may arise as a result. This would
seem to make sense with FOIA, as laws designed to increase government transparency are likely
to be popular in the United States but must simultaneously be weighed against the need to protect
sensitive information from getting into the wrong hands, particularly post-9/11. If, however, a
legislative deferral is not evident, then any difficulties experienced within the current FOIA
regime can likely be attributed instead to one of the other theories I outlined in chapter 2, which
relate to a changing composition and volume of FOIA requests. These theories explain FOIA’s
failures as a product of demand (i.e. the requests themselves) rather than supply (i.e. legislative
intent to change how the requests are processed).
Evidence of a legislative deferral consists of legislators (1) being aware of ambiguities
within a bill, (2) recognizing that courts or federal agencies will be forced to interpret these
ambiguities if they are not clarified, and (3) choosing to refrain from clarifying the ambiguities
anyway. I am only able to conclude that a legislative deferral has occurred—and that lawmakers
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therefore anticipated that their amendment would be ineffective—if all three of these criteria are
met. As I explained in the previous chapter, it appears that a legislative deferral did indeed take
place with 1996’s Electronic Freedom of Information Act, which could help explain why it
became obvious in subsequent years that it had failed to solve FOIA’s many problems, and in
some cases even exacerbated them. However, in this chapter I conclude that legislative deferrals
did not occur with any portion of the OPEN Government Act, specifically because of an
amendment that was introduced on the Senate floor—and later approved by a unanimous
Congress—by Senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ), who was determined to make sure that everyone knew
exactly what Congress’s intentions were when passing the law.

Defining “Representative of the News Media”
As discussed in the previous chapter, one of the most important portions of the Electronic
Freedom of Information Act was a statute that allowed journalists and others “engaged in
disseminating information” to receive expedited processing of their FOIA requests if government
officials determined that there was “urgency to inform the public concerning actual or alleged
Federal Government activity.”71 The ambiguity within this language and legislators’ refusal to
clarify it was what allowed me to conclude that a legislative deferral occurred with the law. As I
explain in this section, lawmakers would debate a similar provision a decade later as the OPEN
Government Act made its way through Congress, giving them another chance to decide whether
and how to clarify language that would affect journalists and their interactions with the law.
FOIA had long exempted “representative[s] of the news media” from paying processing
and search fees related to their FOIA requests because lawmakers believed that these
71
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representatives played an important role in disseminating information to the American public.72
By making it cheaper for journalists to submit FOIA requests, it was thought that they would be
able to serve as more effective government watchdogs.73 The first version of the OPEN
Government Act, introduced on the House floor on February 16, 2005, sought to expand the
traditional definition of “representative of the news media” so that journalists from online
publications and other bloggers would be newly eligible to receive fee waivers:
In making a determination of a representative of the news media…an agency may not
deny that status solely on the basis of the absence of institutional associations of the
requester, but shall consider the prior publication history of the requester. Prior
publication history shall include books, magazine and newspaper articles, newsletters,
television and radio broadcasts, and Internet publications. If the requestor has no prior
publication history or current affiliation, the agency shall consider the requestor's stated
intent at the time the request is made to distribute information to a reasonably broad
audience.74
This addition to the legislation was designed to increase access to FOIA to a much wider variety
of people, and although there was general agreement that journalists from online publications
should indeed qualify for fee exemptions, there was debate about whether the requirement that
agencies consider “the requestor’s stated intent…to distribute information to a reasonably broad
audience” was specific enough to allow the tool to be used effectively. In an addendum to a
report published by Senate Committee on the Judiciary on April 30, 2007, for example, Richard
Hertling, the acting assistant attorney general, criticized nearly every aspect of the proposed
OPEN Government Act, including this phrase, which was still present in the most recent version
of the legislation. “Because it can be assumed that virtually all requesters claiming to be
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representatives of the news media will readily state that it is their ‘intent’ to distribute the records
to a broad audience,” he wrote, “this expansion of the definition…would render the concept of
‘representative of the news media’ virtually meaningless.”75 He went on to suggest that this
expansion of the phrase in this way “would have severe fiscal and other practical consequences
for the Executive branch,” creating an “increased taxpayer burden” and stretching agency
resources to an extent that would ultimately slow down the FOIA disclosure process for
everyone.76
Senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ) also submitted an addendum that was included in the Senate
report, and although he did not mention this provision at the time, it soon became clear that he,
too, found the “stated intent” phrase to be problematic. About six months later, on August 3, Kyl
proposed an amendment to the OPEN Government Act on the Senate floor that, in part, modified
the legislation’s definition of “representative of the news media.” This amendment would
eventually be approved by a unanimous Congress and become a part of the law later that year. In
it, Kyl removed the “stated intent” phrase and instead expanded the section as a whole to clearly
lay out which types of journalists would qualify for fee waivers. For example, he wrote in one
part that a “freelance journalist shall be regarded working for a news-media entity if the
journalist can demonstrate a solid basis for expecting publication through that entity,” which
could include a “publication contract” or a “past publication record” that was likely to make
publication in the entity more probable.77 “The compromise language included in my
amendment,” Kyl said on the Senate floor, “clarifies the definition of media requester in a way
that protects internet publications and freelance journalists but that still preserves commonsense
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limits on who can claim to be a journalist.”78 The requirement that requesters now “demonstrate
a solid basis for expecting publication” was one such limit on that claim, and it would have an
effect of reducing the financial toll that expanding the definition of “representative of the news
media” would have on agencies.
To support my hypothesis that legislative deferrals occurred with FOIA amendments, it is
necessary to find evidence that members of Congress are aware of ambiguities within a bill and
choose to keep the ambiguities in it, even when they recognize that federal agencies will
consequently be forced to interpret these ambiguities. The portion of the original OPEN
Government Act legislation requiring that there be a “stated intent” to disseminate information to
“a reasonably broad audience” was perhaps ambiguous in that it did not lay out specifically what
stating one’s intent would look like, or what would constitute a sufficiently broad audience.
However, Senator Kyl’s insistence on clarifying this language by expanding the broader
definition of “representative of the news media” proves that a legislative deferral did not occur
with this portion of the legislation. In fact, Kyl went out of his way to explain on the Senate floor
exactly what he intended the revised definition to mean, specifically so that the courts would
have enough information to make appropriate decisions in the FOIA appeal cases that would
inevitably arise as a result. Although this disproves that a legislative deferral occurred, taking a
closer look at how Kyl clarified the language is still valuable, as it serves as an example of what
clear lawmaking looks like; juxtaposing this example with the legislative deferral in the
Electronic Freedom of Information Act further emphasizes why lawmakers’ refusal to clarify EFOIA’s language is so troubling.
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Senator Kyl clarified his definition of “representative of the news media” in part by
referencing prior court cases in which the same definition had arisen. “[W]e have incorporated
into the amendment the definition of media requester that was announced by the DC Circuit in
National Security Archive v. U.S. Department of Defense,” he said, explaining that the definition
used in the case seemed to be largely consistent with the one proposed by Representative Lamar
Smith (R-TX) and others who had written the OPEN Government Act.79 He also acknowledged
that, with the exception of including bloggers and other online journalists within the definition to
expand it, “this definition of the term ‘news media’ as used in FOIA has been in effect for 17
years…[and] I do not think that anyone can reasonably fear that codifying it will turn the world
upside down.”80 In other words, Kyl was being clear that it was Congress’s intent that the same
definition that had always been used would continue to be used, with one relatively minor
exception to make it more expansive. He concluded by explaining that the reason why he was
taking the time and effort to be so explicit about this definition was so that the courts would
know exactly how to interpret the law. “By incorporating a judicially crafted definition of news
media,” he said, “I believe that my amendment spares the courts the indignity of being
compelled to parse conflicting Senate floor statements in order to divine the meaning of that
term.”81 The fact that Kyl anticipated that courts would eventually get involved and clarified the
language for this specific purpose demonstrates that a legislative deferral certainly did not occur
in this instance; rather, it appears that Kyl was genuine in his desire to improve FOIA and
believed that modifying this section was a part of that process.
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“Substantiality” and Attorney’s Fee Recovery
Senator Kyl also used his amendment to clarify a second portion of the OPEN
Government Act. This was perhaps the most controversial part of the entire bill, as it penalized
agencies for failing to fulfil their FOIA responsibilities by requiring that they pay for the
attorney’s fees of requesters who appealed their FOIA denials. Although it was used
infrequently, this was technically already a part of the law, which stated that “[t]he court may
assess against the United States reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs reasonably
incurred in any [FOIA] case…in which the complainant has substantially prevailed [my
emphasis].”82 When Senator Kyl presented his amendment on the Senate floor on August 3,
2007, the proposed OPEN Government Act legislation included a section that would expand this
statute by clarifying the definition of the term “substantially prevailed” so that more people
would qualify to have agencies pay for their legal fees. It read:
For purposes of this section, a complainant has substantially prevailed if the complainant
has obtained relief through either—
(I) a judicial order, an administrative action, or an enforceable written agreement
or consent decree; or
(II) a voluntary or unilateral change in position by the opposing party, where the
complainant’s claim or defense was not frivolous.83
Section (II) was particularly controversial because it served to legislatively overrule a 2001
Supreme Court case known as Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia
Department of Health and Human Resources. In the case, the Buckhannon Board and Care
Home, an assisted living facility, sued the state of West Virginia for ordering that it close
following a failed inspection by the state fire marshal’s office.84 The home failed its inspection
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because it did not meet the state’s “self-preservation” requirement, which required that residents
be capable of escaping the building in case of an emergency.85 Buckhannon argued that failing
on these grounds was a violation of both the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (FHAA)
and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA).86
Before the case was decided, though, the West Virginia state legislature passed two bills
that eliminated the “self-preservation” requirement from the law, allowing the case to be
dismissed as moot by the local District Court. Buckhannon, however, then requested that the
state pay for its attorney’s fees by referencing part of the FHAA, which stated that “the court, in
its discretion, may allow the prevailing party…a reasonable attorney’s fee and costs.”87 The
assisted living facility argued that it was the “prevailing party” in the dispute under something
known as the “catalyst theory,” which suggests that a plaintiff is a “prevailing party” if a
defendant voluntarily changes its conduct in response to a lawsuit.88 Because the state of West
Virginia had modified its law in response to its conflict with Buckhannon, the home thought that
it qualified as a “prevailing party,” but the courts demonstrated that they disagreed; the District
Court denied its motion, and both the Court of Appeals of the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme
Court upheld the decision.
The proposed amendment to FOIA, which required federal agencies to pay the attorney’s
fees of requesters following a “voluntary or unilateral change in position” by the agencies,
would, if enacted, serve to legislatively overrule the Buckhannon decision; it was effectively an
embrace of the catalyst theory that the courts had already rejected. Although there were many
people who were in favor of this measure because it would incentivize agencies to follow FOIA
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appropriately, others worried that it would impose a significant financial burden on agencies that
would ultimately be counterproductive.89
Although Senator Kyl was part of the latter group, the amendment he introduced on the
Senate floor did not attempt to eliminate the attorney’s fee provision, but rather modify it to
make it slightly more restrictive. “In the spirit of compromise,” he said, “and out of deference to
[bill sponsor] Senator Cornyn’s arguments and persistence, I have agreed to incorporate
language into my amendment that does not fully address my concerns about this part of the bill
and that is very generous to FOIA requesters.”90 He proposed changing the requirement that
agencies pay for the attorney’s fees of requesters as long as the requesters’ claims are “not
frivolous” to instead require that they do so whenever the requesters’ claims are “not
insubstantial.”91 Although this was a seemingly minor change to the legislation, Senator Kyl was
insistent that it be made, specifically so that the courts would have a better understanding of
congressional intent and would accordingly refrain from ordering agencies to pay the legal fees
of undeserving requesters.92
In his remarks, Kyl explained that using the concept of substantiality in the provision
would give the courts additional guidance when interpreting it. “Substantiality is a test that is
employed in the Federal courts,” he said, “to determine whether a federal claim is adequate to
justify retaining jurisdiction over supplemental or other State law claims.”93 He continued by
explaining that courts typically interpreted substantiality in a very specific way based on the
Supreme Court’s decision in 1933’s Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin.94 In the case,
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according to Kyl, Justice George Sutherland concluded that a claim is “‘plainly unsubstantial
either because [it is] obviously without merit, or because its unsoundness so clearly results from
the previous decisions of this court as to foreclose the subject and leave no room for the
inference that the questions sought to be raised can be the subject of controversy.’”95 Kyl
explained that using this judicially-defined concept with FOIA would be appropriate because
“the ‘insubstantiality’ of a claim is a quality ‘which is apparent at the outset’” and “is a standard
that courts should be able to apply without further factual inquiry into the nature of a
complaint.”96 This would allow courts to decide whether to order agencies to reimburse
requesters for their attorney’s fees without wasting time or money in “a second major
litigation.”97
Throughout his five-minute discussion of the concept of substantiality, Senator Kyl
referenced a total of 11 different court cases in which the concept had been discussed,
specifically because he anticipated that the courts would inevitably have to interpret the term in
the OPEN Government Act as well.98 “I hope that these comments on my understanding of the
law in this area are of assistance to courts and litigants who will now be forced to adapt to the
application of the substantiality test to FOIA fee shifting,” he said.99 He concluded by
encouraging courts and litigants to look at two cases in particular for “some recent and very
thorough examples of how a substantiality analysis is actually conducted.”100
As he did by clarifying the “representative of the news media” standard, Senator Kyl
went out of his way here as well to ensure that the language in the attorney’s fee recovery
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provision of the OPEN Government Act was as unambiguous as possible. By proposing an
amendment that incorporated the concept of substantiality in the provision regarding attorney’s
fee recovery, he was able to guarantee that the courts would interpret the provision in the way
that he and, by extent, Congress intended. This eliminated the risk that the courts might award
attorney’s fees to requesters whose FOIA appeals lacked merit, which was enough to convince
Kyl to support a measure that he otherwise would have opposed. Because he went to such great
lengths to clarify language that he worried the courts might find to be ambiguous, it is clear that
a legislative deferral certainly did not occur with this portion of the OPEN Government Act;
once Kyl’s amendment was adopted and the act as a whole was passed into law, there was
nothing ambiguous at all about the substantiality requirement.

Conclusion
In researching this chapter, I examined the transcripts of five congressional hearings
regarding the OPEN Government Act and several debates on the House and Senate floors. I read
reports produced by the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, the Government Accountability Office, and nonprofit organizations
such as the Coalition of Journalists for Open Government and the National Security Archive.
These sources have allowed me to conclude that, at least based on the available evidence, a
legislative deferral did not occur with the OPEN Government Act. As such, there must be
another explanation for the law’s ultimate failure to increase the amount of information released
to the American public.
One possibility relates to the Bush administration’s crackdown on FOIA following 9/11;
as I explained, there is evidence to suggest that the Ashcroft memo and the administration’s
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increased classification of sensitive documents had an effect of reducing FOIA disclosures.101
This would seem to support the theory I outlined in chapter 2 that suggests that national security
concerns, and specifically an increased volume of FOIA requests for national security
information, are a key cause of the recent increase in FOIA denials. There is also evidence that
supports the theory that a lack of funding was a contributing factor; some agencies, for example,
had such limited financial resources that they were unable to afford scanners and photocopiers
with which to process their FOIA requests.102 It seems only natural that these problems would be
exacerbated by a law that increased agencies’ FOIA responsibilities so dramatically without
providing them with additional resources to do so.
It is impossible, however, to determine whether these potential explanations have any
merit without examining them in greater detail, which is beyond the scope of this project. All I
am able to conclude for now is that no portion of the OPEN Government Act appears to be
purposely ambiguous, so the notion that legislators wanted it to fail is unlikely. Nevertheless, I
chose to include discussions of two provisions within the law in particular, which involved the
law’s definition of “representative of the news media” in relation to FOIA fee exemptions and
the determination of eligibility for attorney’s fee recovery in FOIA appeal cases, because they
both serve as examples of what good lawmaking looks like; Senator Jon Kyl’s insistence on
clarifying the definitions of certain terms and phrases on the Senate floor, where he knew his
comments would be transcribed and published, sent a clear message to the courts that he knew
would eventually be interpreting the legislation. He wanted them to know what Congress’s intent
was in passing the OPEN Government Act so that they could enforce it appropriately. This could
not have been more different from the legislative deferral that occurred with the Electronic
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Freedom of Information Act a decade earlier; when compared to the selected provisions in the
OPEN Government Act, the statute I examined in the previous chapter is so ambiguous that the
conclusion that legislators wanted it to be that way is almost undeniable. Senator Kyl’s
amendments should therefore be seen as examples of clarity against which all other legislation
should be compared.
In the conclusion of this project, I outline some theories that could account for why there
is clear evidence of a legislative deferral occurring prior to 9/11 but not afterward; one would
assume that legislators would have greater incentive to limit improvements to FOIA (and thus
limit FOIA disclosures) following such a terrifying event in American history, but the fact that
they did not do so through a legislative deferral suggests otherwise. It is possible that members
of Congress felt that the Bush administration had already gone too far in limiting FOIA
disclosures in the years immediately following the terrorist attacks, and that, by the time
deliberations surrounding the OPEN Government Act began to intensify six years later, they
were finally ready to pull back on some of the restrictions. Another possibility relates to the fact
that the OPEN Government Act, unlike E-FOIA, dealt almost entirely with procedural aspects of
the law rather than substantive ones about the types of information that could be disclosed;
making these improvements would, at least theoretically, not threaten the national security to a
greater extent, giving legislators no reason to resist them. Again, I explore these theories in
greater detail in the project’s conclusion.
However, it is important to reiterate that, given the fact that much of the lawmaking
process now happens behind closed doors, it is impossible to conclude definitively that a
legislative deferral did not occur at all. There is also the possibility that many other members of
Congress initially attempted to write a legislative deferral into the OPEN Government Act but
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were forced to change course when Senator Kyl publicly introduced his amendment on the
Senate floor; after all, it is conceivable that their constituents might have noticed the legislators’
opposition to Kyl’s improvements, which could have threatened their chances at reelection. We
will never know whether Kyl’s amendment would have still been successful if it had been
proposed in a private setting, but we do know that, even with the amendment, the OPEN
Government Act would fail to fix FOIA for good. This set the stage for 2016’s FOIA
Improvement Act, which is the subject of the next chapter.
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- 5 THE FOIA IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 2016
Almost immediately after the OPEN Government Act was passed in 2007, it became
clear to lawmakers and FOIA requesters alike that the law was not going to remedy all of the
problems that it was supposedly designed to address. While early evidence suggested that the
amendment did help to reduce FOIA backlogs at some agencies1 and the newly established
Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) successfully helped to reduce the amount of
FOIA-related litigation,2 there was almost universal consensus among FOIA experts that more
needed to be done.
At a hearing before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform in early
2013, members of Congress invited journalists and other transparency advocates to testify about
how the FOIA process had changed in the half-decade since the amendment had been
implemented. Many witnesses shared the results of a recent audit conducted by the National
Security Archive, which found that fewer than half of federal agencies had even attempted to
implement the law.3 “The last five years have been disappointing on many fronts, and the
promise of the OPEN Government Act has not fully been realized,” Anne Weismann of Citizens
for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington said in her written testimony.4 “The fault, however,
lies not with the legislation, which pinpointed many of the problem areas in FOIA processing,
but with agencies that have successfully resisted complying with the meaning and intent of the
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Act.”5 Kevin Goldberg, who spoke on behalf of the Sunshine in Government Initiative, agreed
that agency implementation was weak but instead suggested that the legislation itself was indeed
at fault. “The major enforcement element from the OPEN Government Act….simply has not
been successful,” he said. “The requirement that agencies respond to requests within 20 days or
lose the right to collect certain fees has been riddled with exceptions and, frankly, wasn’t that
strong to begin with.”6 Legislators would have to try to force agency compliance again in another
amendment to the law.
Passed by a unanimous House and Senate and subsequently signed into law by President
Barack Obama on June 30, 2016, the FOIA Improvement Act would eventually address this
issue and others that arose following the 2007 law. The newest amendment to FOIA required that
agencies post more of their records online in an easily-accessible format; expanded the role of
the OGIS as a FOIA ombudsman; limited the use of some FOIA exemptions that transparency
advocates claimed were overly broad; established a program mandating that the Chief FOIA
Officers at each agency work together to develop recommendations to increase agency
compliance with the law; required that agencies submit more comprehensive annual FOIA
reports; and, perhaps most importantly, codified a portion of an executive order that had been
signed by President Obama on his first day in office, which required agencies to adopt a
“presumption of openness” when processing their FOIA requests.7
This project studying the Freedom of Information Act was completed in March 2017, just
nine months after the FOIA Improvement Act’s implementation. Consequently, developing an
understanding of the law’s effectiveness is not yet possible by the thesis deadline, as agencies
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have likely only recently begun to update their FOIA regulations and practices to comply with
the amendment. Preliminary data about the law’s effectiveness will likely not be available until
at least March 2018, when transparency advocates will travel to Capitol Hill to testify before
House and Senate committees as part of Sunshine Week, an annual event that celebrates FOIA
and access to public information. Until then, however, it is possible to make some predictions
about whether the amendment will succeed at improving FOIA performance, and I do that in this
chapter.
I start by discussing FOIA’s development throughout President Obama’s tenure in office,
which culminated with his signing of the FOIA Improvement Act seven months before he left
the White House. As I explain, although this amendment will likely become the most longlasting change to FOIA that Obama made during this time, he also took other steps to strengthen
the law earlier in his presidency, beginning on his first day in office. These efforts were
eventually overshadowed, however, by reports that the Obama administration was failing to
implement FOIA appropriately, both by refusing to comply with the OPEN Government Act and
by politicizing the disclosure process. I explain these developments in detail for two reasons.
First, Obama’s public efforts to improve FOIA and his administration’s private actions to
seemingly undermine it were each important catalysts for the development of legislation that
would become the FOIA Improvement Act; as I explain, the final law included provisions that
were written in response to both the Obama administration’s FOIA successes and its failures, so
my explanations of each provide important context for my subsequent analysis. And second,
because President Obama just recently left office, FOIA performance today is largely the result
of the policies and practices he helped implement. Explaining them in detail is therefore relevant
to understanding one of the reasons why the law is currently so ineffective.
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After discussing this context, I test George Lovell’s legislative deferral model on the
FOIA Improvement Act to see whether it is possible that members of Congress intentionally
designed the law to be ineffective. Specifically, I examine a provision within the amendment that
codified an earlier effort by President Obama to encourage a “presumption of openness” in the
processing of FOIA requests; this provision required that agencies prove that the disclosure of
information would cause a “foreseeable harm” to a government interest before the agencies
could invoke an exemption to withhold it. As I explain, I ultimately conclude that a legislative
deferral did indeed occur through this provision, as legislators failed to address publicly stated
concerns that this “foreseeable harm” requirement would ultimately slow down the entire FOIA
process and thus increase backlogs. I also explain that, in addition to the legislative deferral
contained within it, the amendment as a whole appears to be regressive in that it fails to address
some of the most commonly cited problems with the law, giving credence to other theories in
FOIA scholarship that claim that a lack of funding and national security concerns might also
explain the law’s shortcomings over the past two decades.

FOIA in the Obama Era
It was not long after President Bush signed the OPEN Government Act of 2007 into law
that a new person assumed the role of Commander in Chief. President Barack Obama was
inaugurated on January 20, 2009 following a successful election campaign in which he had
repeatedly promised to make his administration the most transparent in American history.8
Advocates for government transparency certainly hoped that his administration would be less
secretive than the Bush administration, which had doubled down on protecting potentially
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sensitive information following 9/11. However, by the time Obama left office eight years later,
his legacy on transparency issues generally and FOIA specifically would be decidedly mixed, as
notable improvements in access to information were coupled with equally palpable setbacks.
Many of Obama’s critics now claim that the President’s early and promising efforts to increase
transparency were largely ineffective or even regressive,9 although his supporters naturally
disagree.
There seemed to be general approval, however, when these early efforts were first
implemented. For example, on his first full day in office, President Obama issued a
memorandum to the heads of all federal agencies in which he wrote that “[t]he Freedom of
Information Act should be administered with a clear presumption: In the face of doubt, openness
prevails.”10 He justified this policy by explaining that government officials worked for the
American people, who had a right to access as much information as possible:
The Government should not keep information confidential merely because public
officials might be embarrassed by disclosure, because errors and failures might be
revealed, or because of speculative or abstract fears. Nondisclosure should never be based
on an effort to protect the personal interests of Government officials at the expense of
those they are supposed to serve. In responding to requests under the FOIA, executive
branch agencies…should act promptly and in a spirit of cooperation, recognizing that
such agencies are servants of the public.11
This presumption of disclosure was a reversal of the Bush administration’s efforts to limit
disclosure, which had come most notably in the form of Attorney General John Ashcroft’s
infamous 2001 policy memo that encouraged the release of records “only after full and deliberate
consideration of the institutional, commercial, and personal privacy interests that could be
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implicated” by doing so.12 In his own memo, President Obama directed Attorney General Eric
Holder to issue new FOIA guidelines to federal agencies that “reaffirm[ed] the commitment to
accountability and transparency.”13 Holder officially rescinded Ashcroft’s policy about two
months later.14
Obama also issued another memorandum in which he reaffirmed his commitment to
openness in other areas of government,15 along with an executive order that increased public
access to the records of former presidents.16 Approval of these measures was widespread. “This
is the earliest and most emphatic call for open government from any president in history,” Tom
Blanton, the director of the National Security Archive, said in a press release at the time.
“President Obama has reversed two of the most dramatic secrecy moves of the Bush initiatives,
one that told agencies to withhold whatever they could under FOIA and the other that gave
presidential heirs and vice presidents the power to withhold presidential records indefinitely.”17
Daniel Metcalfe, the executive director of the Collaboration on Government Secrecy, agreed; “I
think it is fair to say that [the] action[s] by President Obama [were] not only unprecedented,” he
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later said, “but…[went] much further than any other President has gone…in fostering
transparency internationally.”18
It soon became clear, however, that the president’s efforts would not entirely solve
FOIA’s problems. In March 2010, a year into Obama’s first term, the National Security Archive
released its annual Knight Open Government Survey, which found that just 13 of 90 federal
agencies that the organization studied had updated their FOIA policies to comply with the
president’s orders.19 In response, the White House issued a new memorandum asking agencies to
update their FOIA regulations and “assess whether you are devoting adequate resources to
responding to FOIA requests.”20 Perhaps as a result, the same survey found that an additional 36
agencies had updated their policies by March of the following year—a significant improvement,
but still less than half of all agencies whose FOIA activities were examined for the review.21
Nevertheless, early indications suggested that FOIA was improving by some measures. In
FY2011, for example, the Obama administration processed more FOIA requests than in any year
since 2005, and its use of exemptions to deny requests dropped dramatically.22 Part of this drop
was the result of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Milner v. Department of the Navy that year,
which overturned three decades of FOIA precedent by restricting agencies’ use of an exemption
written into the law.23 This exemption, known as exemption 2, had commonly been interpreted to
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allow agencies to withhold information when, in the words of one FOIA expert, its
“disclosure…could reasonably be expected to enable someone to circumvent the law,” but the
Court found this interpretation to be invalid. As a result, the use of exemption 2 fell by an
astounding 63 percent, according to Sean Moulton of the nonprofit OMB Watch.24 He was
careful to note, however, that “the decrease also appears to be the result of a deliberate policy
change by the Obama administration.”25 It appeared that Obama’s recommendations were having
a beneficial effect.
However, FOIA performance in this area did not seem to be as encouraging the following
year. When testifying before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary in March 2013, Moulton
said that the use of two other exemptions had risen “23 percent and 25 percent, respectively, in
2012 to their highest usage levels since 2002, when the use of both exemptions experienced
extreme spikes likely related to greater information withholding in the aftermath of the 9/11
terrorist attacks.”26 Agencies were now responding to the Milner decision by increasing their
invocation of other exemptions to withhold information that presumably would have been
withheld through exemption 2 in the past. There was even evidence that some representatives
from the Justice Department were encouraging this behavior in an attempt to “protect the
sensitive information left exposed” following the decision.27 Perhaps as a result, a report from
the Associated Press later found that the total number of exemptions invoked for national
security reasons had recently reached its highest level since Obama had taken office four years
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earlier.28 And FOIA performance continued to suffer in other areas as well: just three of 11
cabinet-level agencies that had sizable FOIA backlogs, for instance, succeeded in meeting their
backlog reduction goals the same year.29
Also in 2012, though not directly related to FOIA, the Obama administration had opened
an “unprecedented number of investigations and excessive prosecutions of leaks,” according to a
report by the Center for Effective Government (formerly OMB Watch).30 One particularly
disturbing finding within the report was that the administration had used the Espionage Act to
bring six cases against government or military employees for leaks, compared to just three such
cases total since the law’s enactment nearly a century earlier, in 1917.31 It was starting to become
clear that, despite President Obama’s early promises to govern with an unprecedented level of
transparency, this was not entirely shaping up to be the case. Throughout a series of FOIA
hearings during this time, journalists and other transparency advocates repeatedly expressed their
frustration with the Obama administration’s implementation of the law, noting that FOIA
performance seemed to be worse than ever before. An attorney who had used the law for thirty
years, for example, said that the Obama administration “is the worst on FOIA issues. The worst.
It has gotten to a point where I am stunned. I am really stunned.”32
There seemed to be two major areas of dissatisfaction with FOIA as President Obama
entered his second term. The first was that many federal agencies were continuing to resist
complying with the OPEN Government Act of 2007 and with the Obama administration’s policy
memorandums on FOIA implementation. The Department of Justice specifically received by far
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the most criticism for its egregious violations of the law, which were especially problematic
because it is the agency tasked with monitoring FOIA compliance government-wide. The second
area of dissatisfaction was with what appeared to be a clear politicization of FOIA processing at
several federal agencies. At hearings before House and Senate committees charged with
overseeing FOIA, many conservatives suggested that their FOIA requests were being denied
specifically because of their political affiliation. Additionally, there was also evidence that senior
Obama administration officials were endorsing these practices, casting further doubt on its
claims that it was trying to be as transparent as possible. Because these two areas of
dissatisfaction played an important role in the development of a political climate that, a few years
later, would ultimately allow the FOIA Improvement Act to be passed, I will discuss each of
them before turning to a lengthier analysis of the 2016 amendment as it made its way through
Congress.

DOJ Resistance to FOIA Reforms
As mentioned previously, there seemed to be widespread agreement by the middle of
Obama’s presidency that more needed to be done to live up to the promises he made at the
beginning of his first term. At a hearing in 2012, for example, Senator Chuck Grassley (R-IA)
said that “there is a disturbing contradiction between President Obama’s grand pronouncements
and the actions of his political appointees. The Obama administration does not understand,” he
continued, “that open government and transparency must be about more than just pleasant
sounding words and memos.”33 A year later, Angela Canterbury, the Director of Public Policy
for the nonpartisan Project on Government Oversight, said that despite some limited progress
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under Obama, agencies were still regularly disobeying various aspects of the law.34 And the
Center for Effective Government noted in a report that “across-the-board improvements [in
FOIA performance] have been rare,” in part “due to inconsistent enforcement” of the law by
federal agencies.35
One would not have come to the same conclusion, however, by listening to
representatives from the Department of Justice (DOJ) talk about FOIA. At several House and
Senate hearings during this time, for example, Melanie Ann Pustay, the director of the DOJ’s
Office of Information Policy (OIP), was invited to testify about recent changes to the law. The
OIP is the agency responsible for overseeing government-wide FOIA compliance, so legislators
likely expected Pustay to provide a valuable insider’s perspective on how recent developments
had affected FOIA processing. However, she quickly appeared to lose much of her credibility by
seeming to misrepresent information about the government’s actual FOIA performance. “It is
clear to [the DOJ] that agencies are continuing to make significant, tangible progress” at
improving implementation of the law, Pustay said at one hearing in 2012. (This was the same
year that the DOJ’s own FOIA backlog nearly doubled.)36 She also claimed that agencies
throughout the federal government had recently released records in 94% of FOIA requests they
processed, a statistic that others, including Tom Blanton of the National Security Archive and
Rep. Mike Kelly (R-PA) found to be wildly misleading. According to Blanton,
[t]he only way the Department of Justice gets to that number is by leaving out nine of the
11 reasons the government does not answer your FOIA requests. Those other nine
reasons are: fee-related issues that do not get resolved or the agency has a “No records”
in response or it sends the request to another agency for a referral. If you add in those
reasons why FOIA requesters go away unsatisfied, your actual response rate gets down to
a more pedestrian, more realistic 55, 60 percent, roughly.37
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Kelly suggested that the actual response rate could be as high as 65%, but he also noted that
many of the records agencies released were likely to be heavily redacted, meaning that even less
information than one might assume was actually being disclosed to the public.38 “[T]he stretches
that were involved…[in Pustay’s testimony] were really extraordinary,” Blanton said, noting that
“the entire community of folks…who care about the Freedom of Information Act disagree with
the Justice Department on this.”39 He concluded by saying that there was “a profound cognitive
dissonance between the rosy view provided by the Justice Department on how FOIA is working,
and the actual experience of requesters.”40
A year earlier, in 2011, Blanton’s organization had given the DOJ its annual Rosemary
Award (named after President Nixon’s secretary Rose Mary Woods, who is known for
mysteriously deleting eighteen minutes of audio recordings from White House tapes during the
Watergate scandal), which is awarded to the agency with the worst open-government
performance each year.41 This came after the department issued new regulations for its own
FOIA processing that, according to Blanton, “would have let officials lie to the public about [the]
existence of records…among many other regressive provisions.”42 The DOJ only put its
proposed changes on hold after receiving widespread public criticism.43
Similarly, the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform assigned the
Justice Department a grade of “D” in a 2012 investigation into FOIA compliance throughout the
federal government.44 The investigation found that just three of 40 offices within the DOJ were
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able to release requested information about their FOIA processing to the committee in a timely
manner.45 There was also evidence that the department was directly litigating against the OPEN
Government Act, in part by filing an amicus brief in a recent Supreme Court case that endorsed a
position that would render one of the law’s enforcement mechanisms virtually meaningless.46
And the DOJ even went so far as to distance itself from the presumption of openness that
President Obama had mandated on his first day of office (and that Obama asked the head of the
DOJ, Attorney General Eric Holder, to enforce government-wide); when asked about this
presumption in a 2011 Supreme Court case, a DOJ lawyer admitted that “[w]e do not embrace
that principle.”47
How is it possible that the federal agency tasked with overseeing FOIA compliance
throughout the government could so egregiously violate the law itself? Angela Canterbury of the
Project on Government Oversight noted in a 2013 House hearing that the Office of Information
Policy, the office within the DOJ tasked with monitoring FOIA compliance, had an inherent
conflict of interest because the larger department is responsible for defending agencies when
they withhold information through the law and are challenged in court.48 Rep. Blake Farenthold
(R-TX), among others, suggested that “one of the ways to deal with that would be go give an
independent entity more authority to enforce FOIA.”49 When members of Congress eventually
passed the FOIA Improvement Act into law a few years later, though, it did not include any such
measure.
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What was unclear at the time was what was behind the DOJ’s refusal to embrace the
Obama administration’s FOIA policies. Had the department independently decided to break the
law, or were members of the Obama administration secretly encouraging this type of behavior,
despite their public proclamations that government transparency was one of their top priorities?
There was certainly evidence to suggest that the administration’s FOIA practices were more
complex and nuanced than they led the public to believe, which potentially provides support for
the latter scenario; around the same time, some conservative transparency advocates started to
claim that the Obama administration was denying or overly redacting their FOIA requests
specifically because of their political philosophies. Like the failure of the DOJ and other federal
agencies to update their FOIA regulations to reflect recent changes to the law, this was a clear
sign that FOIA was not being implemented in an appropriate manner.

Politicization of FOIA Requests
During the first months of the Obama presidency, it appears that senior officials in the
White House were already taking steps to undermine the President’s public efforts to make his
administration more transparent. After the White House started to post its visitor logs online, for
example, officials were caught having regular meetings with lobbyists and others at a coffee
shop across the street, presumably so that these meetings would not be publicly disclosed.50
Additionally, on July 21, 2010, Ted Bridis of the Associated Press reported that beginning in
mid-2009, just half a year following Obama’s inauguration, copies of some FOIA requests to the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) were required to be sent to senior political advisors
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working under DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano for review prior to processing.51 Bridis found
that staff in the DHS’s FOIA office were not allowed to release records that were considered to
be politically sensitive without prior approval by these advisors, which often delayed disclosure
for “weeks beyond the usual wait,” if these records were disclosed at all.52 And although the
department rescinded this prior approval requirement in response to the AP’s reporting,
Secretary Napolitano’s political staff retained the ability to halt the release of records at any
time,53 a practice that continued at other federal agencies until at least June 2015.54 As reporter
Sharyl Attkisson said at a hearing around the same time, “FOIA does not permit this political
intervention, but it’s routinely done.”55
Some conservative FOIA requesters soon noticed that the involvement of these political
advisors was having a real effect on the amount of information that agencies were disclosing. In
his written testimony to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary in 2011, for example, J. Christian
Adams, a reporter for the conservative news organization Pajamas Media (now known as PJ
Media) shared several examples of the improper politicization of FOIA requests under the
Obama administration. Adams had previously worked for five years as an attorney in the Civil
Rights Division of the DOJ, and he claimed that he had consequently witnessed many of the
malpractices he described firsthand.56 Within the Civil Rights Division specifically, Adams
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alleged that Republicans often had to wait longer for the disclosure of records than Democrats
did:
For example, Republican election attorney Chris Ashby of LeClair Ryan made a request
for the records of five submissions made under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.
Ashby waited nearly eight months for a response. Afterwards, Susan Somach of the
“Georgia Coalition for the People’s Agenda,” a group headed by Rev. Joseph Lowery,
made [a] request for 23 of the same types of records. While Ashby waited many months
for five records, Somach waited only 20 days for 23 records. The requested records were
identical in kind.57
In many cases, Adams said, “very short delays mark a request from an administration friend. But
in no instance does a conservative or Republican requestor receive a reply in the time period
prescribed by the law,” at least according to the agency FOIA logs that he examined.58 “The logs
demonstrate an unmistakable pattern,” he noted: “friends zoom in the express lane, while foes
are stuck waiting on the shoulder.”59
There were also instances, according to Adams, when FOIA requests made by
Republicans were totally ignored. He claimed that the Civil Rights Division never responded to
requests from conservative media outlets but often responded to organizations such NPR in just
days.60 Additionally, he said that while the Bush administration had responded to a Boston Globe
request for certain DOJ records “well within the statutory [20-day] deadline” a few years earlier,
the Obama administration never responded to a Pajamas Media request for the same records four
years later.61 Tom Fitton, the president of the conservative watchdog organization Judicial
Watch, seemed to support the notion that the Obama administration was politicizing FOIA by
revealing that, just two years into Obama’s first term, he had already filed 44 FOIA lawsuits
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against the federal government for failing to enforce the law appropriately.62 It is hard to imagine
so many lawsuits being necessary for a more progressive organization to obtain information that
was supposedly eligible for disclosure through the law. “[I]n terms of getting information from
the administration,” he said, “it is as difficult if not more difficult than ever.”63
There is no evidence that President Obama himself played any role in encouraging
agencies to bend the rules in this way. Throughout his tenure on office, however, he repeatedly
criticized Fox News, the cable network known for its mix of conservative opinion programming
and self-described “fair and balanced” reporting, for unfair coverage of his policy initiatives.64
His administration even attempted to block the network from interviewing an official from the
Treasury Department in an infamous 2009 incident that immediately sparked protests by the
Washington bureau chiefs of five other TV news networks.65 Consequently, even if the president
never endorsed the politicization of FOIA processing, he certainly sent signals to those under his
discretion that some organizations were more legitimate than others, arguably opening the door
for unequal FOIA treatment.
The more members of Congress learned about the Obama administration’s
implementation of FOIA as his presidency progressed, the greater the conviction seemed to
become that another major update to the law was necessary. Although Republicans were
naturally Obama’s loudest critics, there was also widespread support for a new FOIA amendment
among Democrats, who saw it as an opportunity to remedy some of the longstanding problems
with the law that 1996’s Electronic Freedom of Information Act and 2007’s OPEN Government
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Act had failed to effectively address. Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT), who had been instrumental
in the passage of the other two amendments, for instance, continued to demonstrate his
commitment to the law by working with Senator John Cornyn (R-TX) to introduce a bill that
would establish a bipartisan commission to study FOIA and make recommendations to Congress
on ways to improve it.66 The Senate passed the bill unanimously,67 and although the House never
had a chance to vote and it consequently never became law, it still showed that there was a clear
desire to make FOIA stronger. If President Obama was not going to improve the law, it appeared
that members of Congress were ready to do so instead.

Legislative History of the FOIA Improvement Act
The FOIA Improvement Act did not begin to take shape until President Obama’s second
term began in 2013. The process of drafting it, however, was informed by the testimonies of
journalists, transparency advocates, and other FOIA experts at House and Senate hearings earlier
in his presidency. These early hearings were primarily focused on examining the effects of the
OPEN Government Act and the president’s policy memorandums, which gave legislators an idea
of which aspects of their earlier efforts were working, which were not, and whether there was
anything they had omitted from previous updates to FOIA that should be included in the future.
As a whole, these witnesses provided valuable recommendations to lawmakers about what was
needed to make FOIA stronger.
The first version of what would become the FOIA Improvement Act was known as the
“FOIA Oversight and Implementation Act of 2013,” and it was introduced in the House of
Representatives on March 15 of that year by Reps. Darrell Issa (R-CA) and Elijah Cummings
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(D-MD), the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the House Committee on Oversight
and Government Reform.68 This came just two days after the committee had held a hearing on
FOIA, and the legislation seemed to reflect many of the recommendations of those who had
testified. It amended FOIA to require the more proactive disclosure of records online, further
encourage agency compliance, and streamline the FOIA process to facilitate the release of
records.69 It also gave the newly-created Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) the
ability to report its findings directly to Congress, required agencies to submit more data in their
annual FOIA reports, and created a Chief FOIA Officers Council to encourage collaboration in
the development of effective new FOIA regulations throughout the federal government.70 Most
importantly, though, it codified the presumption of openness standard that President Obama had
ordered agencies to adopt in the FOIA memorandum that he issued on his first day in office.71 If
passed, this would ensure that future presidents would not be able to rescind this policy without
obtaining congressional approval first.
On February 25 of the following year, the House passed the bill unanimously by a voice
vote, but it was never voted on in the Senate.72 Instead, Senators Patrick Leahy (D-VT) and John
Cornyn (R-TX) introduced another bill, which was known as the “FOIA Improvement Act of
2014,” on the Senate floor a few months later.73 This bill was substantively identical to the
previous one, except for the fact that it clarified and lengthened the section that codified the
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presumption of openness standard.74 The Senate unanimously passed this bill by a voice vote on
December 8, 2014, but it died after the House failed to consider it before the 113th Congress
ended a few weeks later.75
Senators Leahy and Cornyn, along with new Judiciary Committee Chairman Chuck
Grassley (R-IA), reintroduced the bill on the Senate floor in February of the following year
(naturally, it was now known as the “FOIA Improvement Act of 2015”).76 As they mentioned in
a report published two weeks later, the bill was nearly identical to the previous one, except for
one minor technical change designed to clarify a new time requirement for posting records
online.77 Reps. Issa and Cummings introduced a similar bill in the House around the same time,
and it was reported favorably by the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform two
months later.78 The reported version reflected three amendments to the original legislation that
clarified the OGIS’s new responsibilities, strengthened the requirement that agencies pay for the
litigation fees of requesters who substantially prevail in FOIA lawsuits, and restricted the use of
one of the nine FOIA exemptions.79 A year later, on March 15, 2016 (in the midst of the annual
Sunshine Week celebration), a unanimous Senate passed a combined version of the two bills, and
the House passed this version by a voice vote three months later, on June 13.80 On June 30,
President Obama signed the FOIA Improvement Act of 2016 into law.81
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Clarifying the Presumption of Openness and “Foreseeable Harm”
One of the things that is interesting about the FOIA Improvement Act is that the text of
the legislation did not change much in the three years that it was under consideration in
Congress. As the previous section suggests, most of the changes in each iteration of the bill were
relatively minor and were unlikely to drastically affect how the law would be implemented on a
daily basis. If anything, the hearings held during these three years largely served to reiterate the
need for the proposed legislation rather than to help lawmakers rewrite and revise it. However,
the provision that codified President Obama’s presumption of openness standard was unique in
that one FOIA expert recommended that it be changed in a rather significant way, even if
members of Congress ultimately refrained from doing so. In this section, I outline the
development of this provision and lawmakers’ explanations (or lack thereof) about how they
intended it to be implemented. Because it is commonly viewed as the most important part of the
entire FOIA Improvement Act, it also serves as an ideal case study to which I can apply George
Lovell’s legislative deferral model as I test my hypothesis that members of Congress have
intentionally designed recent amendments to FOIA to fail.
As I have explained in previous chapters, in this project I examine whether how recent
updates to the law are written help to explain why FOIA performance seems to have worsened
over the past two decades. This is a supply-side approach that differentiates my work from most
other FOIA scholarship, which explains the recent increase in FOIA denials and backlogs to be
the result of a changing volume and composition of FOIA requests rather than the evolving
legislation. Because members of Congress have taken the time to make a few major revisions to
the law over the past 20 years and FOIA performance nevertheless appears to have continued to
worsen, I suggest that it is possible that these lawmakers have deliberately written their
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amendments to achieve this outcome, even if the amendments appear to be positive steps toward
making the law stronger. Members of Congress might be incentivized to do so to satisfy their
constituents’ calls for greater government transparency, and thereby increase their chances at
reelection, while simultaneously defending other interests that they personally consider to be
more important, such as protecting the national security or safeguarding the executive branch
from additional public scrutiny.
To test this hypothesis, I use a model designed by political scientist George Lovell. He
describes a legislative deferral as the process through which members of Congress write
controversial provisions into legislation that appear to accomplish one goal but are actually
designed to be “reversed” by the courts so that they ultimately accomplish an entirely different
goal.82 Unelected judges consequently receive criticism for unpopular policy decisions rather
than the elected representatives who are more easily held accountable for their actions. Lovell
concludes that a legislative deferral has taken place when there is evidence that members of
Congress (1) are aware of ambiguities within a bill, (2) predict that courts will later be forced to
interpret these ambiguities, and (3) specifically reject alternative proposals to clarify these
ambiguities.83
As I explained in chapter 2, however, I use a modified version of this model in my
project that reflects how lawmaking has changed in the century since the laws that Lovell studies
were passed; as a result, I conclude that a legislative deferral has occurred with a recent FOIA
amendment when it is clear that lawmakers (1) knew that a provision within a bill was
ambiguous, (2) recognized that a judge or government official would have to interpret this
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ambiguity, and (3) chose to keep the ambiguity in the bill anyway, even if doing so could have
an effect of weakening the law. (In addition to the courts, I am also looking for deferrals to
federal agencies and the FOIA officials within them, as these agencies are tasked with
interpreting and implementing the law on a daily basis. Mark Graber first suggested that
expanding the legislative deferral analysis in this way was possible in a 2005 article that I
previously summarized.84) In chapter 3, I concluded that a legislative deferral did indeed occur
with 1996’s Electronic Freedom of Information Act, but I was not able to find evidence of one in
my chapter 4 analysis of 2007’s OPEN Government Act. As the rest of this chapter explains,
there is evidence that a legislative deferral did occur with the FOIA Improvement Act, serving to
further support my hypothesis that congressmen and women designed the law to be ineffective.
The presumption of openness standard that is the subject of this case study was first
implemented as a FOIA policy in modern history on President Obama’s first day in office in
2009, when he issued a memorandum on FOIA reform to the heads of all executive branch
agencies.85 In it, he wrote that FOIA “should be administered with a clear presumption: In the
face of doubt, openness prevails.”86 Obama also instructed Attorney General Eric Holder to
develop new FOIA guidelines for federal agencies that “reaffirm[ed] the commitment to
accountability and transparency” that this presumption embodied.87 About two months later, on
March 19, Holder issued these new guidelines.88 By doing so, he formally rescinded the Bush
administration’s previous FOIA policy in which the Department of Justice had vowed to defend
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agency withholdings of information “unless they lack[ed] a sound legal basis or present[ed] an
unwarranted risk of adverse impact on the ability of other agencies to protect other important
records.”89 Instead, the DOJ would now “defend a denial of a FOIA request only if (1) the
agency reasonably foresees that disclosure would harm an interest protected by one of the
statutory exemptions, or (2) disclosure is prohibited by law.”90 This first condition is commonly
known as the “foreseeable harm” standard, and it is an important part of the FOIA amendment
that legislators would eventually pass.
Obama’s presumption of openness was actually a return to a policy that had been issued
by Attorney General Janet Reno during the Clinton administration,91 so many government
officials likely already had some idea of how to implement it. It is important to recognize,
however, that this policy did not seem to have much of an effect on improving long-term FOIA
performance throughout President Obama’s first few years in office; as discussed earlier in this
chapter, the federal government as a whole would soon invoke a record number of exemptions to
withhold national security information,92 and individual agencies would largely fail to meet other
FOIA performance goals such as reducing their backlogs.93 Still, efforts to codify the
presumption of openness would at the very least ensure that a future president could not easily
adopt a more regressive policy, so it appeared that it would have at least some beneficial effects.
In the first version of the FOIA Improvement Act, released as the “FOIA Oversight and
Implementation Act of 2013,” legislators proposed incorporating the presumption of openness
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standard into the existing FOIA text by changing a provision that outlined the exemptions to
FOIA disclosures to include the aforementioned concept of “foreseeable harm.” At the time,
section (b) of the FOIA law read that section (a), which outlined agency responsibilities to
disclose information, would “not apply to matters that are…” before listing the types of
information exempted from the law.94 The proposed legislation suggested modifying this
provision to read that section (a) would “not apply to matters that would cause foreseeable harm
and that are…” [my emphasis] before listing the same exemptions.95 According to the
representatives who wrote the legislation, this alteration of the language would “place the burden
on agencies to demonstrate why information may be withheld, instead of on the public to justify
release.”96 However, they did not specify exactly how they expected agencies to determine
whether releasing information might cause foreseeable harm, or what would a constitute a
foreseeable harm in the first place. Still, it seemed that this change would inevitably have a
positive effect of limiting the amount of information that agencies could legally withhold though
the law, as there was now a new requirement for agencies to satisfy before doing so.
By the beginning of the following year, the language in the original legislation had been
modified to read that “[a]n agency may not withhold information under this subsection unless
such agency reasonably foresees that disclosure would cause specific identifiable harm to an
interest protected by an exemption, or if disclosure is prohibited by law.”97 Based on the
available evidence, it is unclear why legislators felt the need to change the language in this way.
However, the desired effect of limiting the withholding of records seemed to be the same.
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At a hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee a few weeks later, Daniel Metcalfe,
the Executive Director of the Collaboration on Government Secrecy and a former DOJ
employee, did not reference this language in particular but did suggest that the idea behind a
presumption of openness needed to be implemented in a very specific way. “There needs to be a
focus on the implementation of the ‘foreseeable harm’ standard,” he said, “which by the way is a
very specific, concrete thing; that’s how we implemented it in the Clinton Administration, not
with some more amorphous term such as ‘presumption of openness,’ which doesn’t mean that
much to a FOIA analyst in the trenches.”98 Although the term “foreseeable harm” was already a
part of the FOIA legislation, it seemed that the senators nevertheless took Metcalfe’s advice to
heart, as they were clear in a subsequent report to explain exactly what they meant by the term in
what appeared to be an effort to eliminate any confusion about it:
Under this standard, the content of a particular record should be reviewed and a
determination made as to whether the agency reasonably foresees that disclosing that
particular document, given its age, content, and character, would harm an interest
protected by the applicable exemption. Agencies should note that mere “speculative or
abstract fears,” or fear of embarrassment, are an insufficient basis for withholding
information.99
Members of the Judiciary Committee also noted in the report that the foreseeable harm standard
would apply to all the FOIA exemptions under which the discretionary disclosure of information
could occur,100 meaning that almost all requested records would be affected by the change.
In a hearing before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform the next
year, in February 2015, however, one witness suggested that implementing the concept of
foreseeable harm in this way would slow down the entire FOIA process and even had the
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potential to inadvertently expose sensitive national security information. Frederick Sadler had
recently retired from working for the Food and Drug Administration, where he had processed
FOIA requests for more than 40 years.101 He suggested in his testimony that the legislation as
written would require the application of the foreseeable harm test to “even those exemptions
which have a minimal discretionary component,” which he claimed had “the potential to
unintentionally delay the Federal Government, increase backlogs, and almost inevitably result in
increased disclosure-based litigation.”102 According to Sadler, the foreseeable harm test would
apply to too many exemptions that FOIA officials might consider invoking to withhold
information, which he claimed would ultimately backfire by overwhelming the officials and
slowing down the process for everyone. He went on to explain his opinion that the application of
the test to some specific exemptions was unnecessary anyway because the exemptions already
contained restrictions, set both by members of Congress in FOIA amendments and by the courts
in FOIA litigation cases, that were sufficient to prevent the unnecessary withholding of
information.103
Sadler also suggested that “there needs to be some additional clarification with regard to
the test’s application.”104 He was curious about how specifically the foreseeable harm analysis
would be applied as FOIA officials considered releasing information. “Would the analysis need
to be prepared in a formal document? Would that determination need to be confirmed by an
expert in the subject matter under discussion? Would those analyses be releasable under the
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FOIA?,” he wondered.105 It appeared that these were legitimate questions that members of the
House and Senate had not yet considered. If a written foreseeable harm analysis or consultation
with an expert were necessary each time FOIA officials wanted to invoke a discretionary
exemption, for example, then Sadler’s concerns about increasing backlogs certainly seemed
valid. And if information about this process itself surrounding a given FOIA request was
releasable under the law, then it was possible that sensitive national security or other information
could inadvertently be exposed, putting the American people at risk. It seemed that how
Congress responded to these concerns would largely determine whether the application of
foreseeable harm would be a success.
Ultimately, it appears that legislators chose to refrain from doing anything substantive to
clarify this aspect of their legislation. They left the language of the provision itself the same and,
in reports that they published in subsequent months, did not provide any meaningful
supplementary context for the foreseeable harm requirement. In a House report released on
January 7, 2016, for example, members of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
wrote that a foreseeable harm inquiry “would require the ability to articulate both the nature of
the harm and the link between the specified harm and the specific information contained in the
material withheld,”106 but they did not provide any additional information about what this
articulation would specifically look like or whether the process itself would be disclosable
through FOIA.
Using this example to test my legislative deferral theory is more complicated than either
of the other case studies I analyzed as a part of this project because members of Congress
seemed to be sending mixed messages in response to concerns about the foreseeable harm
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standard in their bills. One the one hand, they kept the language “foreseeable harm” in their
legislation rather than using the phrase “presumption of openness” instead after FOIA expert
Daniel Metcalfe claimed that “foreseeable harm” was a “very specific, concrete thing” that FOIA
officials would know how to implement.107 The legislators also responded to this comment by
explaining in a subsequent report that foreseeable harm analyses would be necessary prior to the
use of all discretionary exemptions and that “‘speculative or abstract fears’” were “an
insufficient basis for withholding information.”108 This seemed to be an effort to facilitate the
disclosure of as much information as possible by limiting the ability of federal agencies to use
exemptions.
On the other hand, though, members of Congress refused to clarify whether foreseeable
harm analyses would have to be in writing and, if so, whether these written documents would
themselves be eligible for disclosure through FOIA. As witness Frederick Sadler pointed out at a
hearing in 2015, legislators’ decisions on these issues would directly determine the severity of
FOIA backlogs and the likelihood that sensitive information could mistakenly be released to the
public. If they refrained from making these decisions, it was implied that federal agencies and
courts would ultimately be forced to make them instead.
Proving whether a legislative deferral occurred, then, seems complicated because it
appears that legislators tried to make the foreseeable harm standard as expansive as possible but
simultaneously failed to address legitimate concerns that doing so would ultimately slow down
the entire process and consequently increase FOIA backlogs, rendering the foreseeable harm
provision effectively meaningless; by specifying that the foreseeable harm standard would apply
to all discretionary exemptions, legislators required agencies to complete foreseeable harm
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analyses for information that they may have otherwise withheld automatically, effectively
creating a new criterion to be fulfilled and facilitating the disclosure of information. Yet without
specifying how that criterion would be fulfilled, the legislators opened the door for complex and
time-consuming analyses that would create delays for everyone. It almost seems as if, at least
based on what legislators said publicly, the intentions behind the provision were good but the
execution of these intentions was poor. As I explain, though, this is actually evidence of a
masterfully crafted deferral.
The first requirement of a legislative deferral is evidence that members of Congress are
made aware of a potential ambiguity within their bill. Because Daniel Metcalfe did not
recommend that lawmakers change the language of their legislation but instead reiterated that the
language they had chosen, requiring a “foreseeable harm” rather than a “presumption of
openness,” was appropriate, the first criterion is not fulfilled in this instance. It is fulfilled,
however, in the case of Frederick Sadler, who said that the legislation as it was written did not
provide enough information about how specifically the required foreseeable harm analyses
would be conducted (in writing, with the consultation of an expert, etc).
It also appears that the second criterion, namely that legislators be made aware of the fact
that courts or federal agencies would consequently be forced to interpret the alleged ambiguity,
is also fulfilled in this case, as legislators and Sadler were talking specifically about how
agencies would implement the foreseeable harm test. (It is also likely that legislators understood
that foreseeable harm analyses would inevitably be a part of FOIA appeal cases within the court
system, although there is no direct evidence of this.) And because legislators did not change the
language of their bill to clarify the ambiguity or provide any additional context on how it would
be implemented, the third criterion is also fulfilled. Thus, insofar as a legislative deferral is
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defined by these three criteria, it appears that one has taken place in this instance. Consequently,
I am able state with confidence that members of Congress will be responsible if the
implementation of the FOIA Improvement Act ultimately fails to improve FOIA performance.
This is a masterful example of a legislative deferral because lawmakers seemingly went
out of their way to ensure that the foreseeable harm standard incorporated into their legislation
was as expansive as possible, even though there was evidence (though notably not publicized by
the lawmakers themselves) that expanding it in this way would potentially have the
counterintuitive effect of limiting the release of information. Because requiring that agencies
adopt a presumption of openness through their foreseeable harm analyses was commonly viewed
as by far the most prominent portion of the entire legislation, it would therefore be easy for
members of Congress to convince the American people that they were taking important steps to
improve the law, when in reality they knew that any expected changes would not come to
fruition. Bill sponsor Rep. Darrell Issa (R-CA), for example, said in a press release that the
amendment was a “critical update” to FOIA that represented a “major milestone” and “a
significant step forward to the accountable government the people deserve.”109 My analysis
suggests that Issa likely knew that this was not actually the case.
Only time will tell whether any backlash that arises as a result of the amendment’s likely
failure to improve FOIA processing will have political costs for the legislators themselves, but it
seems that they have already decided to point their fingers at agencies should the need arise. “It
is the intent of Congress that agency decisions to withhold information…under the foreseeable
harm standard be subject to judicial review for abuse of discretion,” they wrote in a 2015 Senate
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Report.110 This appears to ensure that any dissatisfaction with the FOIA Improvement Act will
play out in the courts, and not on Capitol Hill.

Conclusion
Shortly after the OPEN Government Act was passed in 2007, a new president would
enter the White House, and he would not move out until the conclusion of his second term eight
years later. Despite his early campaign promises to make his presidency the most transparent in
American history, many advocates of government transparency now suggest that President
Obama largely failed to do so. In an interview just three weeks before the president left office,
White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest halfheartedly attempted to deflect this criticism when
asked if the Obama administration had done enough to respond to FOIA requests. “Well there
were hundreds of thousands of FOIA requests that were answered and responded to with at least
some of the information that was requested,” Earnest replied.111 It seemed to be a rather tepid
response, especially from the person hired to serve as the president’s greatest advocate. Earnest
suggested that a variety of institutional factors were the cause of FOIA’s shortcomings instead of
the Obama administration’s policies,112 although others certainly disagree.
With President Obama now out of the White House, though, it seems that FOIA
Improvement Act he signed into law will have a more significant long-term impact on FOIA
processing than other similar efforts made during his presidency, as it cannot be easily reversed
by the Trump administration in its ongoing war against the news media. However, based on my
analysis in this chapter, it appears that the amendment’s most important provision requiring
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foreseeable harm analyses prior to the withholding of records will ultimately be ineffective or
potentially even counterproductive at improving FOIA performance, as, according to one FOIA
expert, doing so will likely overwhelm agencies and subsequently increase backlogs. Because
members of Congress did not respond to this concern by clarifying the foreseeable harm
requirement and the expectations of federal agencies when implementing it, there is evidence to
suggest that a legislative deferral occurred, meaning that legislators intentionally chose to refrain
from strengthening the law in an attempt to protect some other, unidentified interests. As a result,
if and when it becomes clear that FOIA Improvement Act has not actually improved the law, any
criticism of the amendment that arises will likely fall on federal agencies rather than the
legislators themselves—so the lawmakers preserve their chances at reelection, even without
demonstrating responsiveness to the desires of their constituents.
It is important to recognize, though, that any future evidence that the FOIA Improvement
Act has failed will not necessarily be the effect of the foreseeable harm requirement contained
within it; as I have explained in previous chapters, there are two other, widespread theories in
FOIA scholarship that attempt to explain why FOIA performance has worsened over the past 20
years, and I found plenty of evidence to support both of these notions throughout my research for
this chapter. There seems to be widespread agreement, for instance, that a heightened concern for
protecting the national security has caused agencies to deny an increasing portion of FOIA
requests. Angela Canterbury of the Project on Government Oversight summarized the idea
behind this argument succinctly when she said that “there continues to be two American
governments. One looks like a democracy and the other is a national security state where claims
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of national security usually trump openness and accountability.”113 It appears that this national
security state is continuing to grow in power and influence.
There are also many who believe that a lack of funding has continued to prevent federal
agencies from spending the resources needed to enforce the law appropriately. Whether the law
is enforced or not, Kevin Goldberg of the Sunshine in Government Initiative suggested in 2013,
“the issue has always been a lack of resources.”114 If this is indeed one of the causes of FOIA’s
problems, it is likely that these problems will only grow worse in the coming years, as the FOIA
Improvement Act did not increase funding to agencies to fulfill their added responsibilities under
the law, even though it is expected to cost an additional $22 million government-wide over the
next five years.115 And it is possible that this number does not even take into account the increase
in the average FOIA request processing time that will likely occur as a result of the new
foreseeable harm standard, which will require more FOIA officials to work longer hours
processing FOIA requests.
What is clear is that, two decades following the passage of the Electronic Freedom of
Information Act, legislators still do not appear to have found a solution that will make a real
difference at improving FOIA performance, nor have they demonstrated that they have any
particular desire to do so. In fact, it seems to work in the legislators’ best interests to pass laws
that appear to strengthen FOIA but in reality fail to do so, even if that means that their
constituents’ wishes are ignored and the government becomes ever more opaque. In the next
chapter, I summarize my findings in the project as a whole and discuss their implications for
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freedom of information moving forward, especially now that a new president sits in the Oval
Office.
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CONCLUSION
This thesis has outlined the development of the Freedom of Information Act from its
original enactment in July 1966 to today. Over the course of its history, the law has been
amended and modified on several occasions, but it still has the same goal of increasing
government transparency that it did a half-century ago. FOIA’s influence at holding government
officials accountable throughout this time period is both impressive and undeniable, as
journalists and other concerned citizens have used it expose government fraud, waste,
mismanagement, and negligence time and again over the past 50 years. Despite the many
challenges that it now faces, the law continues to demonstrate its utility at shining a light on
government activities that would otherwise be hidden in darkness; within the past few months,
for example, the federal law has been used to provide insight into a recent security breach at a
naval base in California,1 the Drug Enforcement Agency’s sudden decision to halt enforcement
of laws governing the sale of opioids,2 and a veteran’s massacre of five Dallas police officers
after doctors refused to treat his PTSD.3 These stories are important, and they would not have
come to light without FOIA.
Just because important information is still being disclosed through the law, however, does
not mean that it is functioning properly. The stories and experiences of FOIA requesters that I
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have shared throughout this project should serve as ample evidence that something has gone
dangerously wrong; it often takes agencies months or years to disclose information, when the
law requires that they do so within just 20 days. It also appears that the government is releasing
less information overall than ever before, making it more difficult for journalists and others to do
the important work of holding government officials accountable. In 2016, for example, the
Obama administration denied more FOIA requests than at any point in history.4 It also spent
more money on FOIA lawsuits than ever before and a record $478 million on the processing of
FOIA requests.5 The law is becoming more expensive for American taxpayers, even though they
are getting less in return.
This project has focused on finding an explanation for why FOIA performance seems to
have declined so rapidly. Specifically, I have tried to determine why the recent downward trend
in performance has continued and even intensified following the three most recent efforts to
reverse it—the Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, the OPEN
Government Act of 2007, and the FOIA Improvement Act of 2016. Upon their passage, all were
heralded as major steps toward a more open government, yet the beneficial changes they
promised do not appear to have had any tangible effects at actually improving the law.
Throughout this thesis, I have tested my hypothesis that the amendments’ eventual failures to
live up to the promises of their creators are not the result of legislative incompetence but rather
something entirely different; instead, I argued that legislators intentionally designed the
amendments to fail in attempts to uphold their personal policy interests, but that they did so
covertly to satisfy their constituents and simultaneously increase their chances of reelection.
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My theory is based largely off the work of George Lovell in his book Legislative
Deferrals. Lovell suggests that legislators can write legislation in ways that are purposefully
ambiguous to invite judicial interpretation, and I argued that this is exactly what happened with
the FOIA amendments I studied. When I tested this hypothesis, however, my results were mixed.
In chapter 3, I used the Electronic Freedom of Information Act as a case study. Based on
the available information about the congressional deliberations surrounding the law, I was able to
conclude that members of Congress incorporated a provision into it that was designed to worsen
FOIA performance, even though it appeared to do the opposite. This provision allowed for the
expedited processing of FOIA requests that were made by “person[s] engaged in disseminating
information” in cases when requested documents were related to an issue of “compelling
urgency to the public.”6 After reading the transcripts of House and Senate hearings on the
proposed legislation, it appears that legislators altogether ignored concerns that this provision
would have an effect of weakening the law, either by increasing backlogs or limiting the use of
expedited processing regulations already in place throughout the government. Because members
of Congress did not clarify their language to alleviate these concerns, it is safe to assume that a
legislative deferral occurred.
Chapter 4 was different in that I did not find any evidence of a legislative deferral. I
examined the deliberations surrounding the OPEN Government Act of 2007 and concluded that
the efforts of one legislator in particular, Senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ), helped to publicly clarify any
provisions within the amendment that may have been confusing. As a result, federal judges and
FOIA officials—along with the American public—would undoubtedly be aware of Congress’s
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intent when passing the law, eliminating any possibility of lawmakers deceiving their
constituents and pursuing other interests through a legislative deferral.
In chapter 5, I once again concluded that a legislative deferral took place, this time with
the FOIA Improvement Act of 2016. The deferral within this amendment was particularly
significant because it involved the most important portion of the entire legislation, a provision
that codified President Obama’s “presumption of openness” policy by requiring that agencies
conduct foreseeable harm analyses before withholding information. Although such an effort to
limit agency withholdings could seemingly only have beneficial effects, legislators once again
ignored concerns that doing so would increase FOIA backlogs and decelerate the request process
for everyone. Because there is evidence that these legislators knew that this provision would
cause problems but still made no effort to change it in any noticeable way, it is safe to assume
that they wanted this outcome to occur.
I was therefore able to determine that a legislative deferral occurred in two of my three
case studies, which means that I am unable to conclude that my theory provides a comprehensive
explanation for recent declines in FOIA performance; although there is evidence that a
legislative deferral occurred with both the Electronic Freedom of Information Act and the FOIA
Improvement Act, the absence of evidence to support this theory in relation to the OPEN
Government Act suggests that there must also be other factors contributing to FOIA’s problems.
These findings are similar to Lovell’s in his analysis of labor laws passed during the Progressive
Era, as the author is only able to support his own legislative deferral hypothesis in two of his four
case studies.7 Still, he concludes that “participants’ expectations about judicial reactions shaped
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the content” of all four statutes he examines before they were enacted,8 which I can similarly
conclude about all three of the recent FOIA amendments; although there is no evidence of a
legislative deferral with the OPEN Government Act, it is clear that lawmakers anticipated that
their legislation would nevertheless be interpreted by courts and federal agencies, as Senator Jon
Kyl demonstrated on the Senate floor. This suggests that FOIA lawmaking more generally often
requires close inter-branch cooperation, which raises the possibility that some traditional
assumptions about it—that federal agencies play no role in the process, for example—should
perhaps be reexamined.
That I was able to support my hypothesis with 1996’s E-FOIA is particularly significant,
as one might assume that a legislative deferral would be least likely in the United States prior to
9/11. My theory is based on the presumption that national security concerns might dissuade
legislators from passing measures designed to facilitate the disclosure of information, as doing so
could theoretically put the American people at risk. One would assume that these concerns
would be less prevalent prior to the terrorist attacks, so my finding that a legislative deferral
nevertheless occurred is noteworthy and increases confidence in the validity of my argument, as
it proves that conditions do not need to be perfect for my theory to be supported.
Although I was not able to find evidence of a deferral in the scenario when it would
presumably be most likely, the first amendment to the law following 9/11, there are several
reasons why this does not necessarily undermine my assertion; as I discussed at the end of
chapter 4, it is possible that legislators were responding to the Bush administration’s crackdown
on FOIA disclosures immediately following the attacks, and that by the time they were ready to
pass the OPEN Government Act of 2007 there was a consensus that some of the restrictions on
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releasing information could be eased. It is also possible that the majority of lawmakers intended
to legislatively defer to agencies with the amendment, but that Senator Jon Kyl’s proposal to
clarify certain provisions on the Senate floor put them in a position in which they could not
publicly protest for fear of political backlash. A third possibility is that legislators felt no need
for a deferral because the amendment solely addressed procedural aspects of the law rather than
substantive ones, so the OPEN Government Act had virtually no effect on increasing the
disclosure of potentially sensitive information. Further research might examine whether any of
these theories have merit, or whether there is some other explanation for this anomaly in my
research.
It is also important to recognize that there is evidence to support two other theories that
explain recent declines in FOIA performance more generally. While I focused on a supply-side
problem in this project—namely that changes to FOIA itself have contributed to its problems—
other theories contend that a changing and growing demand for information through FOIA has
caused the problems. One suggests that limited resources have prevented agencies from
processing all the requests they receive in a timely manner, thereby creating backlogs, and
another contends that a greater proportion of recent requests have been related to sensitive
national security concerns, thus allowing agencies to legally withhold more information. I chose
to refrain from studying these explanations in depth in my project because they have already
been the subject of FOIA scholarship, but I was able to find evidence to support each of them
throughout my research, even when I was not necessarily looking for it—a sign that the theories
are strong and should be taken seriously. My research, then, serves as yet another piece of the
puzzle as scholars develop a more comprehensive understanding of the causes of FOIA’s current
problems. Only then is it possible to develop strategies for fixing them.
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The Future of FOIA
Despite the many changes to the Freedom of Information Act over the past half-century,
it appears that the law’s supporters and opponents have remained remarkably constant. The
original legislation received unanimous support in Congress but was signed into law by a
reluctant President Lyndon Johnson, who “had to be dragged kicking and screaming to the
signing ceremony” because he “hated the very idea of the Freedom of Information Act.”9
Similarly, the amendment to the law enacted 50 years later, the FOIA Improvement Act, was
also passed unanimously by the House and Senate but received significant private resistance
from the Obama administration,10 despite the president’s public promises to make transparency a
top administration priority. This pattern is perhaps understandable, as efforts to strengthen FOIA
inevitably increase oversight of the executive branch but have no direct effect on members of
Congress; a more robust law has the potential to embarrass or otherwise harm the president while
leaving senators and representatives unscathed. As I explained throughout this project, though,
oftentimes there are nevertheless incentives for these legislators to resist making genuine efforts
to improve the law.
Even though Presidents Johnson and Obama both eventually yielded to public pressure
and signed their FOIA legislation into law, however, executive branch resistance should still be
seen as a major barrier to improving FOIA performance. Because there are no major penalties
yet for federal agencies that fail to comply with the law’s requirements, there are few
disincentives preventing agencies from bending the rules and taking steps to limit oversight of

9
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their own activities, especially when instructed to do so by the president himself. The Obama
administration’s refusal to implement FOIA appropriately, as I explained in chapter 5, serves as
an example of how the executive branch can undermine what may otherwise be effective
improvements to the law, as President Obama’s own policies designed to improve performance
were ultimately ineffective because of his administration’s private refusal to comply with them.
The reality, it seems, is that a certain degree of executive branch cooperation is necessary for
FOIA to be successful.
As I publish this thesis, the United States is two months into the tenure of a new
president. When Donald Trump was inaugurated on January 20, 2017, he delivered a populist
address in which he promised that his administration would transfer power from Washington,
D.C. back into the hands of the American people.11 “For too long,” he said, “a small group in our
nation’s Capital has reaped the rewards of government while the people have borne the
cost…[Today] will be remembered as the day the people became the rulers of this nation
again.”12 This speech followed months of campaigning during which then-candidate Trump had
promised to “drain the swamp” of corruption in Washington.13
Based on my research for this project, it is clear to me that a robust Freedom of
Information Act could be one of the most effective tools at President Trump’s disposal to fulfill
these promises. Trump is right in that corruption and waste are not uncommon in the nation’s
capital, and giving the American people a law that would help them uncover these malpractices
themselves could help the president become the populist hero he aspires to be. Campaign trail
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Donald J. Trump, “Inaugural Address,” Washington, D.C., January 20, 2017, The White House
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rhetoric, however, does not always translate into actual policy, and early indications suggest that
President Trump is unlikely to make efforts to strengthen FOIA anytime soon, primarily because
of his distaste for the news media that uses the law on a regular basis.
Journalists actually only submit a small portion of FOIA requests—just 7.6%, according
to a recent estimate14—but, as mentioned previously, the stories they uncover by using the law
for their investigative reporting often cause major embarrassment for those in power, which
undoubtedly explains executive branch resistance to FOIA over the past 50 years. Although
President Trump has not yet articulated a FOIA policy, he has repeatedly attempted to
delegitimize the press, which he has called “fake news,” “the opposition party,” and even the
“enemy of the American people” for reporting on him that he claims is biased and unfair.15
Unfortunately for Trump, though, this strategy does not appear to be working: every time the
president comments about the “failing New York Times,” for example, new subscriptions to the
newspaper skyrocket, according to its executive editor.16 And despite Trump’s boasts about his
influence over his 20 million Twitter followers,17 they still tuned in to “Fake News CNN” more
than ever before in 2016,18 which suggests that his influence—at least on the public’s perception
and consumption of the news—is more limited than one might assume.
In a recent column in The Baltimore Sun, media critic David Zurawik argued that
although President Trump’s rhetoric against the news media has been troubling, his actions to
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undermine it have been relatively limited thus far in comparison to those of the Obama
administration.19 Although I believe that this statement is correct, I worry that it will not be for
long; the Trump administration has already started to threaten the notion of a free press by
limiting participation in press briefings20 and actively rewarding news outlets that cover the
president favorably.21 If the administration continues to act on its anti-media views, I fear that a
lack of access to information in the United States will become a much bigger problem than it
currently is with a weak FOIA alone.
Although it is still unclear whether the most recent update to the law—the FOIA
Improvement Act of 2016—will successfully improve FOIA performance, all available
information suggests that it will not. Evidence of a legislative deferral within the amendment and
the recent inauguration of a decidedly anti-media, and arguably anti-information, president point
to a bleak future for FOIA, at least in the near future. What information will be hidden from the
American people as a result? And what will be the consequences of this increased secrecy, other
than a less accountable government? These are unanswerable questions, but important ones to
ask nonetheless. In recent history, FOIA has been updated about once a decade, so when the time
eventually comes to update the law again, Americans will need to be ready, still asking these
questions to demand the Freedom of Information Act that they deserve.
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